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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis consists of four studies, presented in three main essays, empirically 
linking economic growth to public expenditure and telecommunication 
infrastructure using four different sample groups of countries with data from 
1972-2012. 
 In the second chapter, in Study 1, the permanent growth effects of fiscal 
policy are investigated across countries with different income levels using the 
public-policy endogenous growth model, where public spending is classified by 
function. The endogeneity problems associated with taxes and investment are 
taken into account, as is a possible non-linear relationship between government 
expenditure and economic growth. The results have shown that gross capital 
formation is the only control variable that has a significant positive coefficient in 
all growth regressions, while the evidence of conditional convergence 
hypothesis is reaffirmed. An increase in transportation and communication 
spending is conducive to growth in both developing and high-income countries, 
whereas other types of spending are not.  
 In the third chapter, in Study 2, we firstly consider the relationship 
between public spending and growth with a government budget constraint. The 
evidence for productive expenditure being conducive to growth only exists in 
high-income OECD countries. Distortionary taxes are shown to have growth-
deteriorating effects in both the developing country and the high-income OECD 
country groups. 
 When considering the relationship between public spending and long-run 
GDP per capita level in Study 3, it was found that an increase in total spending 
financed by non-distortionary taxes enhances the per capita level of GDP in 
high-income OECD countries. Regardless of implicit financing elements, 
increases in total spending in developing countries cannot promote long-run 
increases in GDP per capita levels. In developing countries, increases in the 
shares of health care and general public services in spending can improve long-
run GDP per capita. In high-income OECD countries, increasing in the share of 
education in spending is conducive to increasing per capita GDP in the long-
run.   
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 In the fourth chapter, in Study 4, we assess the link between 
telecommunication infrastructure and economic development. The system of 
equations is used while considering stationarity and cointegration of variables in 
the models. The output dividend of fixed telephones in the period from 1975 to 
1990 for the group of high-income OECD countries is higher than for developing 
countries.  
 When considering mobile phone infrastructure, an increase in 
penetration has positive effects on aggregate output in developing countries for 
the period from 1990 to 2012. There is only weak evidence that increased 
mobile phone penetration in high-income OECD countries has a negative effect. 
When fixed telephone penetration is low, an increase in mobile phone 
penetration enhances aggregate output. When fixed telephone penetration is 
already high, an increase in mobile phone penetration might have deteriorating 
effects. The results have shown that mobile phone and fixed telephone 
infrastructures are, in fact, substitutes for one another rather than complements.  
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Introduction to the thesis 
 
Introduction 
 
Due to the fact that unequal long-term economic growth rates lead to differing 
levels of economic development across countries, many studies have attempted 
to identify the sources of growth empirically, both on the demand and the supply 
sides. The number of factors related to economic growth is extensive; however, 
this study focusses on two main sources, namely public expenditure and 
telecommunication infrastructure.  
Firstly, we are interested in the role played by governments in the growth 
process and, specifically, how this affects public spending. Fiscal policy is one 
of the factors determining the economic growth rate in endogenous growth 
models (Easterly & Rebelo, 1993). Governments must provide national security 
and essential public goods. These public services can enhance private 
investment, reduce the cost of production and raise productivity. As a result, 
economic growth can be highly affected by changes in fiscal policy. This is 
different from the Solow (1956) growth model, for which fiscal policy can only 
determine the level of output.  
Reviewing empirical literature linking fiscal policies and economic growth 
often produces conflicting results. Using full samples of both developed and 
developing countries, Lin (1994) found a positive relationship between 
economic growth and share of government consumption spending in GDP, 
whereas the results of Landau (1983) showed a negative relationship between 
this pair of variables. Bose et al. (2007) have provided two explanations for this 
disparity. The first explanation is the difference in the set of control variables. 
This may also include other variations in the period of study, the countries 
included in the data set, and the choice of econometric method. The second 
explanation relates to exclusion of the government budget constraint. Kneller et 
al. (1999) carefully take the government budget constraint into account by using 
implicit financing elements. These elements include non-distortionary taxes and 
non-productive expenditures. Without this consideration, there would be a bias 
in the estimates of the effect of fiscal policies on economic growth.  
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In this thesis, we first investigate the permanent growth effects of fiscal 
policy changes in the endogenous growth model using public expenditure at a 
disaggregated level, taking the concerns proposed by Bose et al (2007) into 
account. We also take the government budget constraint into account when 
considering the broad categories of fiscal variables within the framework 
proposed by Kneller et al. (1999).  
Gemmell et al. (2016) argue that public-policy endogenous growth 
models such as those in Devarajan et al. (1996), Bose et al. (2007) and Kneller 
et al. (1999) do not allow for Solow-type transitional dynamics with possible 
persistent effects of fiscal policy. In order to consider these effects, an 
autoregressive distributed lag model, parameterised in error correction form is 
then used. We can then separately identify the short-run dynamics and the 
long-run equilibrium relationships between level of GDP and fiscal variables. 
Secondly, telecommunication infrastructure is linked with aggregate 
output. It is widely accepted that infrastructure is another important source of 
economic development, since better communication improves efficiency when 
running businesses and increases firms’ profitability. The adoption of 
telecommunication services not only brings general infrastructure benefits but is 
also likely to bring increasing returns from positive network externalities and 
spillover effects. The returns from telecommunication services could be higher 
than from other types of infrastructure. 
Roller and Waverman (2001) pointed out that an empirical study of the 
relationship between telecommunication infrastructure and economic growth is 
subject to the problems of reverse causality and spurious correlation. In their 
study, the problem of simultaneity bias was controlled using a simultaneous 
model for telecommunication investments and economic growth. Demand and 
supply equations for telecommunication were specified so that 
telecommunication investment could be endogenised. These equations were 
estimated alongside an aggregate production function. As pointed out by 
Gruber and Koutroumpis (2011), the problem of reverse causality might be also 
dealt in some studies by using instrumental variables estimation. The second 
problem of spurious correlation was controlled by including country-specific 
fixed effects.  
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In our study, Roller and Waverman’s (2001) framework is applied 
specifically to fixed telephone infrastructures in both developing countries and 
high-income OECD countries. A similar structure is also used for our estimates 
of mobile phone infrastructure, following the example of Gruber and 
Koutroumpis (2011). 
 
Research questions 
 
This thesis attempts to address two main questions.  
Firstly, we investigate the link between public expenditure and economic 
growth for groups of countries with different levels of income. Several issues 
have been addressed by each framework.  
1.) The disaggregated analysis of public expenditure and economic 
growth identifies permanent effects of different functions of 
government spending on economic growth.  
2.) The relationship between broad categories of fiscal variables and 
economic growth is analysed with a government budget 
constraint, so as to identify the different growth impacts of various 
implicit financing elements.   
3.) The relationship between public spending and long-run GDP per 
capita level is investigated by allowing for Solow-type transitional 
dynamics. 
Secondly, we compare the aggregate output contribution of 
telecommunication infrastructure for groups of countries with different levels of 
income, namely developing countries and high-income OECD countries. We 
investigate two types of telecommunication infrastructure. 
1.) The impacts of fixed telephone infrastructure on economic growth 
are assessed for the period between 1975 and 1990. 
2.) The relationship between mobile phone infrastructure and 
economic growth is evaluated for the period of 1990 to 2012. The 
samples are classified according to both income level and level of 
fixed telephone penetration. 
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Outline of the thesis    
 
This thesis consists of four chapters with four studies (Study 1, Study 2, Study 3 
and Study 4) empirically investigating sources of growth from public spending 
and telecommunication infrastructure. 
 The first chapter summarises previous empirical and theoretical studies 
on public expenditure and economic growth. This is the basis for the analysis of 
the second chapter (Study 1) and the first part of the third chapter (Study 2).   
 The second chapter (Study 1) focusses on a disaggregated analysis of 
public expenditure and economic growth in developing and high-income 
countries, using the public-policy endogenous growth model. In this part of the 
thesis, public spending is categorised by functional classification using 
definitions from the International Monetary Fund. 
 The third chapter, which includes Study 2 and Study 3, considers two 
different aspects of the relationship between public expenditure and economic 
development. The first part (Study 2) takes the role of government budget 
constraint into account when considering the permanent growth effects of fiscal 
policy. Different implicit financing elements are included in the growth 
regressions in order to evaluate the impacts of fiscal change on economic 
growth. The second part (Study 3) focusses on the relationship between public 
spending and the long-run level of GDP per capita, where the transitional 
dynamics are taken into consideration.  The analysis in this part relates to 
different methods and more recent studies than the second chapter and the first 
part of the third chapter.  Thus, there is another review section specifically for 
literature about the relationship between government expenditure and long-run 
GDP per capita level.  
 The fourth chapter, including Study 4, investigates the relationship 
between telecommunication infrastructure and economic development by using 
a simultaneous model for telecommunication investments and aggregate 
output. Fixed telephones and mobile telephones are analysed separately in two 
different time periods. 
 Next, we summarise the studies theoretically and empirically 
investigating the link between public expenditure and economic growth.  
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Chapter 1: Literature review on public expenditure and 
economic growth 
 
Government has a role to play both in enhancing and stabilising its country’s 
economic performance. Public expenditure is a crucial tool for undertaking 
these responsibilities, since it enhances the productivity of private capital. In 
other words, the provision of public services is required for economic growth 
and sustainable development. The constrained government budget might be 
allocated according to functional purposes suitable for different stages of 
economic development in any particular country. For developing countries, 
public infrastructure is a fundamental input, facilitating economic activities in 
order to essentially promote economic growth. In high-income countries, 
healthcare and social welfare programs are currently a substantial part of total 
spending as a result of commonly and intensely found problems of population 
ageing.   
The characteristics of public utilities and infrastructure, which are similar 
to public goods, make them insufficiently provided for and without public 
investment. The under-provision of public goods might be able to offer a key 
explanation as to why developing countries’ economic performances are so 
poor. This could also be a reason for significant effects on growth from 
spending on these types of public goods in these countries. As government 
expenditure tends to only increase over time, raising taxes continuously to 
match government revenue with expenditure is extremely vulnerable to public 
resistance. Since raising revenue as to match so with increasing public 
expenditure seems unsustainable and impermissible; it is necessary to focus on 
particular functions of expenditure and re-allocate the limited resources 
efficiently. Hence, the relationship between economic development and public 
expenditure should be clearly identified and fully understood in order to achieve 
aforementioned reasons.  
There are both theoretical and empirical literature, attempting to establish 
the role of government in determining economic growth. We investigate both 
branches of studies by focussing on the empirical ones. In the next section, we 
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discuss how the role of fiscal policy has been linked to economic growth in 
theoretical framework. The empirical literature is investigated afterwards. 
 
1.1 Government and growth: theoretical perspective 
 
In order to understand differences in the level of economic development across 
countries, it is crucial to investigate factors determining growth rates in the long 
run. There are two main sets of growth models: namely neoclassical growth 
models i.e. Solow (1956); and endogenous growth models, which we should 
consider. 
 
1.1.1 Endogenous and neoclassical growth models  
 
In neoclassical growth models, there is a significant role of private investment in 
creating new units of physical capital as inputs for production. However, these 
models fail to appropriately determine long-run growth due to diminishing 
returns of capital (Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 2004). Long-run growth of output per 
capita in these models is determined solely by technological knowledge which is 
exogenous to the model (Glomm & Ravikumar, 1997). Without technological 
change, neoclassical growth models predict that the economy will converge to a 
steady state. If the incentives to save or invest are affected by fiscal policies, 
the capital-output ratio and the level of output path will be adjusted but not the 
slope (Gemmell et al., 2016). In other words, the model is capable in explaining 
why economic policy can only change the level of the long-run growth path as 
discussed in Agell et al. (1997). Hence, there are effects on growth rates only 
during the transitional period in neoclassical growth model. This also implies 
that growth effect from fiscal policy merely exists during the transition to the 
steady state (Easterly & Rebelo, 1993).  These growth impacts, however, can 
become considerable in the case where there is a persistent role of fiscal 
policies. 
On the contrary, endogenous growth models can deal with the problem 
of diminishing returns at the aggregate level by attaining broader definition of 
capital and allow technical progress to be endogenous (Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 
2004). Under these models, investment in human and physical capital affects 
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the steady-state growth rates (Kneller et al., 1999). Apart from factor 
accumulation, another source of endogenous growth could be knowledge 
creation and application of new ideas (Gemmell, 2001). By these mechanisms, 
long-run growth can then be appropriately determined by different determinants 
endogenously in growth model. The disadvantage of standard endogenous 
growth models is that the growth rates in these models do not exhibit the 
convergence property. However, in the models assuming a constant saving 
rate, it is possible to construct an endogenous growth model that convergence 
behaviour holds while exhibiting transitional dynamics.  
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) have illustrated two examples of 
convergence property in endogenous growth models. The first model initiated 
by Jones and Manuelli (1990) retains the characteristic of constant returns to 
capital in the long-run. The production function in this model combines together 
the AK and Cobb-Douglas functions. Constant returns to scale, and positive and 
diminishing returns to labour and capital are exhibited in this growth model. The 
convergence property is derived from the inverse relationship between average 
product of capital and capital per worker. 
The second model utilises the production function of Arrow et al. (1961) 
with a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) between labour and capital.  It 
has been shown that the CES model always exhibits the convergence for two 
economies with exact parameters and different values of initial capital per 
worker. The model instead predicts conditional convergence when the 
parameters are different across countries.       
 
1.1.2 Public-policy endogenous growth models 
 
Endogenous growth models allow us to identify the effects especially of fiscal 
policy on long-term growth (Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 1992). There are channels 
through which fiscal policy could have permanent growth effects in the 
endogenous growth models, for example, production externalities, productivity 
growth, productivity differences and fiscal effects on factor accumulation, 
crowding-out effects, and redistribution (Gemmell, 2001). The Barro’s (1990) 
growth model incorporates a public sector into constant-returns model of 
economic growth. Public services in this model is included as a productive input 
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of private producers with an assumption that private inputs are not close 
substitutes for public inputs.  
Long-run output growth can then be affected by both productive 
government expenditure and distortionary taxation as illustrated by Romero-
Avila and Strauch (2008) using Barro’s (1990) model. The population of 
consumers was normalised to one and they both consume and produce final 
output according to the production function: 
 
ݕ ൌ ܣ݇ଵିఊ݃ఊ,                  (1) 
 
where k represents accumulated private physical capital and g is productive 
government expenditure entering production function directly. The government 
constraint is determined by: 
 
          ݃ ൅ ܩ ൌ 	߬ݕ ൅ ܶ,        (2) 
 
where G is other public spending that is not an input of the production function, 
T represents lump-sum taxation and ࣎ is the tax rate on output which distorts 
the decision to invest by private entity. Consumers maximise intertemporal 
utility function: 
 
׬ ݁ିఘ௧ሾሺܿଵିఙ െ 1ሻ/ሺ1 െ ߪሻሿஶ଴ ݀ݐ,       (3) 
 
where ૉ represents the rate of time preference and ߪ is the elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution of consumption. In steady state, the growth rate of 
output and consumption is then determined by Equation (4): 
 
                               ċୡ ൌ
ẏ
୷ ൌ ቀ
ଵ
ఙቁ ሼሺ1 െ ߬ሻሺ1 െ ߛሻܣ
భ
భషം ቀ௚௬ቁ
ം
భషം െ ߩሽ                         (4) 
 
The equation above is shown that productive government expenditure affects 
growth positively, while distortionary taxation produces negative effect on 
growth. 
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Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) consider three versions of Barro’s (1990) 
model with publicly-provided private goods, publicly-provided public goods and 
publicly-provided goods that are subject to congestion. It was observed that 
optimal tax policy depends on the characteristics of the services. 
There are also other studies using endogenous growth models to explain 
the role of tax and government expenditure in the growth process. King and 
Rebelo (1990) argue that policies have the potential to influence the growth rate 
in models with endogenous long-run growth generating a larger influence on 
welfare than the neoclassical model, where the growth rate is governed by the 
exogenous rate of technical progress. 
Mendoza et al. (1997) investigate growth effects of tax policy in the 
endogenous growth model which is driven by human capital accumulation. They 
confirm Harberger’s (1964) super-neutrality conjecture that in practice tax policy 
is an ineffective instrument to influence growth.  
In a model of Jones et al. (1993) where sequence of government 
expenditures are endogenous to the planner’s problem in a setting which 
government spending has direct positive effects on investment, the asymptotic 
tax rate on capital income is strictly positive. 
Futagami et al. (1993) develop an endogenous growth model with 
productive public capital along with private capital similar to that of Barro (1990). 
Our further empirical analyses, in Chapter 2 and Section 3.1 of Chapter 
3, emphasise on the potential effects of fiscal policy on long-term growth rates 
under the Barro’s type endogenous growth model as illustrated by Romero-
Avila and Strauch (2008). 
 
1.2 Government and growth: empirical studies 
 
Previous empirical literature has found a link between public expenditure and 
economic growth. The discussion based on bi-directional association between 
them. Keynesian economists believe that an increase in public expenditure 
could improve economic growth. On the contrary, Wagner’s law predicts 
increase in relative share of public sector to GDP as per capita income rises 
(Henrekson, 1993). To understand this link appropriately, different types of 
public spending should be investigated accordingly. Generally, specific types of 
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expenditure are growth-promoting, whereas others may produce a negative 
result on economic development (Zagler & Durnecker, 2003). However, the 
results from the studies on the relationship between government and growth 
seem to be inconsistent regarding different specifications (Bergh & Henrekson, 
2011). This reflects that any conclusion on such a link is highly sensitive to 
choices of models. 
 
Table 1-1: List of studies on the relationship between government and growth 
Group of countries/ specific country Authors 
All countries Landau (1983) 
Barro (1991) 
Levine & Renelt (1992) 
Easterly & Rebelo (1993) 
Barro & Lee (1994) 
Lin (1994) 
Kelly (1997) 
Miller & Russek (1997) 
Cooray (2009) 
Christie (2014) 
Asimakopoulos & Karavias (2016) 
Morozumi & Veiga (2016) 
High-income countries Folster & Henrekson (2001) 
Bergh & Karlsson (2010) 
High-income OECD countries Kneller et al. (1999) 
Bleaney et al. (2001) 
Wahab (2004) 
Developing countries Devarajan et al. (1996) 
Adam & Bevan (2005) 
Bose et al. (2007) 
Moreno-Dodson (2008) 
Bayraktar & Moreno-Dodson (2012) 
Asian economies Abdullah et al. (2009) 
African countries Ansari et al. (1997) 
EU-15 countries Romero-Avila & Strauch (2008) 
G-7 countries Hsieh & Lai (1994) 
The Gulf Cooperation Council countries Al-Faris (2002) 
Ghana Nketia-Amponsah (2009) 
India Singh & Sahni (1984) 
Italy Del Monte & Papagni (2001) 
Nigeria Nurudeen & Usman (2010) 
Sevitenyi (2012) 
United Kingdom Yuk (2005) 
Thailand Jiranyakul & Brahmasrene (2007) 
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To compare the association between this pair of variables properly; it is 
required to focus on one particular set of countries at least. Such studies have 
been widely undertaken. The examples of literature indicating the group of 
countries selected for this research question are given in Table 1-1. The cross-
country analysis classifying countries in terms of wealth, ranges from all 
countries; high-income countries, namely OECD countries (Bleaney et al., 2001; 
Kneller et al., 1999; Wahab, 2004); G-7 countries (Hsieh & Lai, 1994); to 
developing countries (Adam & Bevan, 2005; Bayraktar & Moreno-Dodson, 
2012; Bose et al., 2007; Devarajan et al., 1996; Moreno-Dodson, 2008). 
Alternatively, countries can also be classified by using geographical location, for 
example: Abdullah et al. (2009) focus on Asian economies, whereas Ansari et 
al. (1997) analyse data on African countries. Al-Faris (2002) studies the 
relationship between public expenditure and growth in the Gulf Cooperation 
Council countries. Romero-Avila and Strauch (2008) focus on 15 European 
countries. Some studies compare fiscal-growth effects of groups of countries 
with different levels of income. Individually, the relationship between this pair of 
variable could be verified by looking at a particular country using time series 
data.  
All the studies listed in Table 1-1 focus on the link between growth and 
fiscal variables apart from Barro (1991), Levine and Renelt (1992), and Barro 
and Lee (1994) where many other determinants of growth are considered 
alongside with fiscal variables.  
 
1.2.1 Three generations of fiscal-growth studies 
 
Gemmell (2001) argues that previous empirical studies on the relationship 
between fiscal policy and economic growth are regarded as unreliable. The two 
main reasons for unreliability are inappropriate estimation method and failure to 
take the role of government budget constraint into account. He has classified 
this set of studies into three generations.  
The first generation of these studies existed before endogenous growth 
models of Romer (1986) and Barro (1990). The data used in these studies is 
limited while employing unreliable econometric techniques. The subsequent 
methodological developments have revealed that at least some of the issues; 
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for example, endogeneity and non-linearity were not appropriately controlled for 
in these studies. 
 
Table 1-2: List of studies on the relationship between government and growth 
by generations of studies 
Generations of fiscal-growth studies Authors 
First generation Landau (1983) 
Singh & Sahni (1984) 
Second generation Barro (1991) 
Levine & Renelt (1992) 
Easterly & Rebelo (1993) 
Barro & Lee (1994) 
Hsieh & Lai (1994) 
Lin (1994) 
Devarajan et al. (1996) 
Ansari et al. (1997) 
Kelly (1997) 
Del Monte & Papagni (2001) 
Folster & Henrekson (2001) 
Al-Faris (2002) 
Wahab (2004) 
Yuk (2005) 
Jiranyakul & Brahmasrene (2007) 
Abdullah et al. (2009) 
Cooray (2009) 
Nketiah-Amponsah (2009) 
Bergh & Karlsson (2010) 
Nurudeen & Usman (2010) 
Sevitenyi (2012) 
Christie (2014) 
Asimakopoulos & Karavias (2016) 
Third generation Miller & Russek (1997) 
Kneller et al. (1999) 
Bleaney et al. (2001) 
Adam & Bevan (2005) 
Bose et al. (2007) 
Moreno-Dodson (2008) 
Romero-Avila & Strauch (2008) 
Bayraktar & Moreno-Dodson (2012) 
Morozumi & Veiga (2016) 
 
The second generation of studies have been inspired by neoclassical 
and/or endogenous growth models with consideration of fiscal policies. The 
specifications of the models in these studies did not appropriately link with 
theories which have inspired them. Most studies appear to ignore the 
importance of government budget constraint and implicit financing of public 
expenditure. 
The third generation studies recognise the role of government budget 
constraint while testing for fiscal affects; however, they need not precisely apply 
the government budget constraint i.e. the fiscal variables omitted from 
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regressions in these studies may be non-neutral. The study of Miller and 
Russek (1997) is among the first which incorporates the government budget 
constraint into the growth regression.  
Our analysis considers effects of fiscal policy on growth, taking into 
account the role of government budget constraint while omitting fiscal variables 
that are potentially neutral. The above Table 1-2 classifies fiscal-growth studies 
into three different generations. 
 
1.2.2 Some concerns in fiscal-growth studies 
 
Apart from the inclusion of government budget constraint, there are also several 
concerns that should be taken into account in studying the relationship between 
fiscal variables and economic growth. Dealing with concerns about endogeneity 
and non-linearity can lessen inconsistency and biasedness of the estimations.  
 
1.2.2.1 Government budget constraint (GBC) 
 
Miller and Russek (1997) argue that many studies consider a number of 
different fiscal variables, but they do not examine the effects of these fiscal 
variables in a systematic way that controls the mode of financing. They found 
that the method of financing government expenditure plays an important role in 
determining the effect of that expenditure on economic growth.  
 As pointed out by Kneller et al. (1999), most early studies testing public-
policy endogenous growth models fail to appropriately take into account the role 
of government budget constraint. The estimated results of those partial studies, 
which focus only on one side of the budget constraint, suffer from systematic 
bias relating to the assumption of implicit financing elements. This effect can be 
considered by using Equation (5). 
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where growth, GRit, in country i at time t is a function of conditioning variables, 
Ij,it and a vector of fiscal variables Ml,it. When all elements of the government 
budget are included, the identity ∑ ܯ௟,௜௧ ൌ 0௠௟ୀଵ  could be derived. One element of 
M which is Mm,it must be omitted to avoid perfect collinearity. That omitted 
variable is the assumed compensating element within the budget constraint. 
Equation (6) is transformed to      
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where ߛ௟ெ ൌ 	ߚ௟ெ െ	ߚ௠ெ implies that  ߛ௟ெ depends on both ߚ௟ெ and ߚ௠ெ. The 
coefficient on each fiscal variable in Equation (7) is interpreted as the effect of a 
unit change in that particular variable offset by a unit change in the omitted 
variable. The category chosen to be omitted should be neutral, suggesting that 
ߚ௠ெ ൌ 0. In the case that omitted variable is non-neutral, the estimates will be 
biased. 
 
1.2.2.2 Endogeneity 
 
In establishing the link between government spending and economic growth, 
fiscal and other economic variables evolve jointly over time and there might 
exist reverse causality between public spending and growth (Bose et al., 2007). 
In other words, this can be potentially seen as a simultaneity problem, since 
some control variables are influenced by the rate of growth and also influence 
the growth rate (Landau, 1983). Kneller et al. (1999) argue that the effects of 
business cycle and Wagner’s law are the most possible sources of simultaneity 
in fiscal-growth regression.  
 Simultaneity and reverse causality are the causes of endogeneity 
problems that have been dealt with in several studies, for example, Lin (1994) 
argues that the changes in the share of government consumption spending and 
the gross domestic investment are both suspected of endogeneity. Bleaney et 
al. (2001) also referred to investment and fiscal variables as obvious candidates 
of potential endogeneity in growth regressions. Folster and Henrekson (2001) 
have raised the concern of an endogenous selection of tax policy while using 
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long observation periods of cross-section studies. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
test can be used to verify this suspicion. 
Estimation by instrumental variables (IV) can address this endogeneity 
concern; however, the selection of instruments can be problematic as pointed 
out by Kneller et al. (1999). Different studies come up with various sets of 
instruments. Kneller et al. (1999) use IV estimates in first differences. Country 
intercepts, the lagged levels of all fiscal variables, and the level and first 
difference of labour force growth and initial GDP are used as their instruments. 
Using different regions in Italy in their study, Del Monte and Papagni (2001) 
deal with possible endogeneity of private investment by using one-year lag of 
corruption, one-year lag of public investment per corruption, two-year lag of 
private investment and two-year lag of public investment as instruments. 
Examining possible simultaneity, Folster and Henrekson (2001) use a first 
differences, two-stage weighted least squares regression using instruments for 
the tax and government variables. The first difference of the tax and public 
expenditure variables are instrumented by the lagged levels of taxes and public 
expenditure, respectively, fixed country effects, and levels and first differences 
of the population and initial GDP variables. 
 The number of instruments included in the studies of Kneller et al. 
(1999), Del Monte and Papagni (2001), and Folster and Henrekson (2001) 
could be excessive. In order to avoid the problem of instrument proliferation, 
Morozumi and Veiga (2016) use only one lag as an internal instrument to tackle 
the possible endogeneity of fiscal variables. Barro and Lee (1994) also use 
lagged values of explanatory variables as instruments. Romero-Avila and 
Strauch (2008) instrument private investment and inflation by their two lags. The 
instruments chosen by Bose et al. (2007) for private investment and political 
instability are their averages for five-years prior to the specific decade. 
 Hausman (1978) suggested comparing ordinary least squares (OLS) and 
two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimators as a formal test of endogeneity. We 
need to investigate whether OLS yield consistent estimates in order to use 
instrumental variable estimation (Davidson & MacKinnon, 1993). If residuals 
were not asymptotically independent of the control variables, the instrumental 
variable (IV) estimators would still be consistent but the OLS estimators would 
not be.  
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 To test for endogeneity, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test is based on a 
vector of contrasts between OLS and IV estimators. According to Davidson and 
MacKinnon (1993), these statistics can be computed by artificial regressions.  
As discussed by Baum et al. (2003), this way of using Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 
requires the estimation of the first-stage regression for each of the potentially 
endogenous variables. Then their residual series are augmented to the original 
model and the F-test is used to test for endogeneity. 
 Alternatively, the simultaneity problem might be dealt with simultaneous 
equations instead of using single equation.  Later on, in Chapter 2, we use two-
stage least squares estimation to take into account possible endogeneity in 
growth regression of investment and tax variables by using their one-year lag 
variables as instruments. 
 
1.2.2.3 Non-linearity 
 
There is a possibility that the relationship between public spending and growth 
can be non-linear. Barro (1990) has shown that growth rate increases with 
public spending when government is small and growth declines, if the size of 
government becomes large.  Similarly, Devarajan et al. (1996) argue that both 
theory and intuition suggest that expenditure ratios and growth might have a 
non-linear relationship. Productive expenditures can be positively associated 
with growth when their shares in the budget are low but this turns negative 
when the share gets large. As the share keeps rising, decreasing returns to 
scale set in, and the relationship between the two variables turns negative.  
Bayraktar and Moreno-Dodson (2012) try to capture this type of non-
linearity between growth and public spending by adding additional variable to 
the specification. The variable added is either the squared value of total public 
spending or the squared term of productive public spending. Devarajan et al. 
(1996) add the square terms of the ratios of current and capital expenditure to 
total expenditure to the equations for non-linear specification. 
However, including a quadratic term may fail to detect non-linearity as 
suggested by Christie (2014). The main reason is that the effect might be 
present in the forms that could not be captured by a quadratic term. In order to 
test Barro’s non-linear hypothesis, the non-linearity of the impact of government 
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size on economic growth might be instead identified around the threshold level 
of public spending (Asimakopoulos & Karavias, 2016; Christie, 2014). Both 
studies have found asymmetric effects around threshold level of government 
spending. 
Non-linearites in the functional form can be verified by using Ramsey’s 
(1969) RESET test.  
 
1.3 Measuring government expenditure 
 
In order to understand the relationship between government and growth, it is 
important to identify the measure of government which would be considered. In 
general, the apparent representative for the size of government is its 
expenditure. The measures of government expenditure found in previous 
empirical studies can mainly be classified into three different groups. Firstly, 
government expenditure at aggregate level represents public sector as a whole. 
Secondly, public spending is separated into broad categories depending on 
various purposes or theoretical definition. Thirdly, it is classified into a 
disaggregated level either by function or by economic classification according to 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) guidelines. 
 
 1.3.1 Aggregate level of government expenditure 
 
There are several examples regarding the measures of aggregate level of 
government expenditure which are used for this analysis. The first example is 
aggregate government expenditure in Wahab (2004) and Abdullah et al. (2009). 
Similarly, Jiranyakul and Brahmasrene (2007) focus on real government 
expenditure. Secondly, government expenditure might be measured as a ratio 
of gross domestic product (GDP). This ratio is a proxy for comparing the size of 
government across countries with highly different level of GDP in relative terms.  
The share of government spending to GDP is widely used by a number of 
studies. Alternatively, Singh and Sahni (1984), Ansari et al. (1997) and Al-Faris 
(2002) use per capita public expenditure.  
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Furthermore, the rate of change of total government expenditure 
weighted by the share of government spending in GDP is analysed in Nketia-
Amponsah (2009).  
 
 1.3.2 Broad categories of government expenditure 
 
Two main criteria have been observed for a broad definition of government 
expenditure; 
 
1.) Capital and recurrent expenditure 
 
The first classification focusses on the difference between 
consumption spending and investment spending. They can also be 
called recurrent and capital expenditure. A number of studies; for 
example, Devarajan et al. (1996); Al-Faris (2002); Bose et al. (2007); 
Nurudeen and Usman (2010); Sevitenyi (2012); and Morozumi and 
Veiga (2016) separate government expenditure into capital and 
recurrent expenditure. The effects of public investment on growth are 
also investigated in several studies; however, it is not always 
necessarily included in the estimation together with public 
consumption in a particular study. One of the exceptions is the study 
by Romero-Avila and Strauch (2008) which government consumption, 
investment and transfer are considered together. 
Instead of using the level of expenditure, Lin (1994) uses both 
growth rate of government consumption and government 
consumption spending share of GDP. Levine and Renelt (1992) also 
uses the growth rate of the share of government consumption. 
 
2.) Productive and non-productive expenditure 
 
The second criterion, which was used in Kneller et al. (1999) and 
Bleaney et al. (2001), classifies expenditure according to whether it is 
included as an argument in the private production function. 
Productive expenditure has a direct impact on the rate of growth 
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through production function, whereas non-productive expenditure 
does not affect the steady-state rate of growth (Kneller et al., 1999).  
There is some other literature following the same convention in 
defining productive expenditure and non-productive expenditure 
(Bayraktar & Moreno-Dodson, 2012; Moreno-Dodson, 2008). Adam 
and Bevan (2005) and Christie (2014) focus only on productive 
expenditure, whereas Lin (1994) investigates the role of non-
productive government consumption in determining economic growth. 
 
There are few other definitions of government expenditure being 
analysed; for example, core and non-core spending (Bayraktar & Moreno-
Dodson, 2012) and economic and social expenditure (Moreno-Dodson, 2008). 
These classifications focus on dividing types of functional spending into specific 
groups similar to productive and non-productive expenditure. 
See Table 1-3 for the full list of studies using broad categories of 
government expenditure. 
 
Table 1-3: List of broad categories used for public expenditure 
Expenditure variables Description Authors 
Capital expenditure The ratio of capital expenditure to total 
expenditure 
 
Capital expenditure per capita 
 
Government capital expenditure %GDP 
 
Government total capital expenditure 
 
Total capital expenditure in real term 
 
Capital spending as a ratio to GDP 
Devarajan et al. (1996) 
 
 
Al-Faris (2002) 
 
Bose et al. (2007) 
 
Nurudeen & Usman (2010) 
 
Sevitenyi (2012) 
 
Morozumi & Veiga (2016) 
Recurrent expenditure The ratio of current expenditure to total 
expenditure 
 
Current expenditure per capita 
  
Current expenditure 
 
Total recurrent expenditure 
 
Total recurrent expenditure in real term 
 
Current spending as a ratio to GDP 
Devarajan et al. (1996) 
 
 
Al-Faris (2002) 
 
Bose et al. (2007) 
 
Nurudeen & Usman (2010) 
 
Sevitenyi (2012) 
 
Morozumi & Veiga (2016) 
Government expenditure The share of government spending to GDP 
 
Share of total government expenditure in 
GDP 
 
Hsieh & Lai (1994) 
 
Devarajan et al. (1996) 
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Expenditure variables Description Authors 
Total government expenditure to GDP  
 
Total government expenditure as a share 
of GDP 
 
The ratio of public expenditure to GDP 
 
The ratio of government expenditure 
 
Total expenditure and net lending as a 
share of GDP  
 
Log of the share of government 
expenditure in GDP 
 
Real government expenditure 
 
 
The ratio of total public expenditure to GDP 
 
Total expenditures as a share of GDP 
 
 
Aggregate government expenditure 
 
Government expenditure to GDP 
 
The rate of change of real government 
expenditure weighted by the share of 
government expenditure in GDP 
 
Total public expenditure as share of GDP 
 
The ratio of total public expenditure to GDP 
 
 
Total government expenditure as a share 
of GDP 
Miller & Russek (1997) 
 
Folster & Henrekson 
(2001) 
 
Al-Faris (2002) 
 
Wahab (2004) 
 
Adam and Bevan (2005) 
 
 
Yuk (2005) 
 
 
Jiranyakul & Brahmasrene 
(2007) 
 
Moreno-Dodson (2008) 
 
Romero-Avila & Strauch 
(2008) 
 
Abdullah et al. (2009) 
 
Cooray (2009) 
 
Nketiah-Amponsah (2009) 
 
 
 
Bergh & Karlsson (2010) 
 
Bayraktar & Moreno-
Dodson (2012) 
 
Christie (2014)  
Public investment  The ratio of real public domestic  
investment to real GDP 
 
The ratio of real public domestic 
investment to real domestic investment 
 
Total public investment to GDP 
 
Public investment to GDP 
 
Share of real public investment in real GDP 
 
 
Government investment as a share of GDP 
 
 
Public investment to GDP 
Barro (1991) 
 
 
Barro (1991) 
 
 
Easterly & Rebelo (1993) 
 
Kelly (1997) 
 
Del Monte & Papagni 
(2001) 
 
Romero-Avila & Strauch 
(2008) 
 
Cooray (2009) 
Public consumption The share of government consumption 
expenditure in GDP  
 
The ratio of real government consumption 
expenditure to real GDP 
 
Government consumption share of gross 
domestic product 
 
 
Landau (1983) 
 
 
Barro (1991) 
 
 
Levine & Renelt (1992) 
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Expenditure variables Description Authors 
Growth of the share of government  
consumption 
 
The ratio of government consumption to 
GDP 
 
The average annual growth rate of 
consumption spending 
 
The average annual growth rate of 
consumption spending share of GDP 
 
The ratio of real government consumption 
to real GDP 
 
Government consumption as a share of 
GDP 
 
Government consumption spending as a 
share of GDP 
 
Public consumption to GDP 
 
General government final consumption as 
a share of output 
Levine & Renelt (1992) 
 
 
Easterly & Rebelo (1993) 
 
 
Lin (1994) 
 
 
Lin (1994) 
 
 
Barro & Lee (1994) 
 
 
Folster & Henrekson 
(2001) 
 
Romero-Avila & Strauch 
(2008) 
 
Cooray (2009) 
 
Asimakopoulos & Karavias 
(2016) 
Government transfers Total transfers as a share of GDP Romero-Avila & Strauch 
(2008) 
Per capita public 
expenditure 
Per capita public expenditure 
 
Per capita government expenditure 
 
Government expenditure per capita 
Singh & Sahni (1984)  
 
Ansari et al. (1997) 
 
Al-Faris (2002) 
Productive expenditure Aggregation of general public services, 
defence, educational, health, housing, and 
transportation and communication 
expenditure to GDP 
 
Aggregation of general public services, 
defence, educational, health, housing, and 
transportation and communication 
expenditure to GDP 
 
Aggregation of education, health, hosing, 
transport and communication, public order 
and safety, and non-interest administration 
expenditure to GDP 
 
Aggregation of general public services, 
defence, educational, health, housing, and 
transportation and communication 
expenditure to GDP 
 
Aggregation of general public services, 
defence, educational, health, housing, and 
transportation and communication 
expenditure to GDP 
 
The sum of expenditure on education, 
health, housing, transportation and 
communication relative to GDP 
Kneller et al. (1999) 
 
 
 
 
Bleaney et al. (2001) 
 
 
 
 
Adam & Bevan (2005) 
 
 
 
 
Moreno-Dodson (2008) 
 
 
 
 
Bayraktar & Moreno-
Dodson (2012) 
 
 
 
Christie (2014) 
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Expenditure variables Description Authors 
Non-productive 
expenditure 
Annual growth rate of government 
spending less education and defence 
spending 
 
Annual growth of the ratio of real 
government spending to real GDP less 
nominal ratios to GDP of education and 
defence spending 
 
Aggregation of social security and welfare, 
recreational, and economic services 
expenditure to GDP 
 
Aggregation of social security and welfare, 
recreational, and economic services 
expenditure to GDP 
 
Aggregation of social security and welfare, 
recreational, and economic services 
expenditure to GDP 
 
Aggregation of social security and welfare, 
recreational, and economic services 
expenditure to GDP 
 
Lin (1994) 
 
 
 
Lin (1994) 
 
 
 
 
Kneller et al. (1999) 
 
 
 
Bleaney et al. (2001) 
 
 
 
Moreno-Dodson (2008) 
 
 
 
Bayraktar & Moreno-
Dodson (2012) 
Other expenditure Other expenditure (unclassified) 
 
Other expenditure (unclassified) 
Kneller et al. (1999) 
 
Bleaney et al. (2001) 
Core spending  
 
 
Expenditure on general public services, 
education, health, housing, transportation 
and communication, and fuel and energy 
Bayraktar & Moreno-
Dodson (2012) 
 
Non-core spending Expenditure on social security and welfare, 
recreation, agriculture, mining, and other 
economic affairs and services 
Bayraktar & Moreno-
Dodson (2012) 
Economic expenditure  
 
Expenditure on fuel and energy, 
agriculture, mining, transportation and 
communication, and other economic affairs 
and services 
Moreno-Dodson (2008) 
 
Social expenditure Expenditure on education, social security 
and welfare, housing, and recreation  
Moreno-Dodson (2008) 
 
1.3.3 Disaggregated analysis of public expenditure 
 
Once the database for public expenditure had been systematically developed, a 
disaggregated analysis of public expenditure became accessible and credible. 
Public expenditure is classified by function according to different activities 
associated with government spending. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
is the main source of a cross-country database for disaggregated data of public 
expenditure. The database is called “Government Finance Statistics (GFS)”. 
This database is the most reliable source for cross-country study. Most of cross-
country studies rely on the definition described by the IMF. The public 
expenditure variables usually appear in growth regression as ratios of GDP. 
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The following Table 1-4 consists of the list of studies using specific types of 
public expenditure for such analysis. 
 
Table 1-4: List of public expenditure used in disaggregated analysis 
Types of expenditure Description Authors 
Social and community 
services 
Social and community services in real term Sevitenyi (2012) 
Administration Expenditure on parliament, state, union 
territories, general administration, audit,  jail, 
justice, police, external affairs, supplies, 
disposals and public sector undertakings 
 
Administration in  real term  
Singh & Sahni (1984) 
 
 
 
 
Sevitenyi (2012) 
Economic services Economic affairs and services expenditure to 
GDP 
 
Economic services in real term 
Miller & Russek (1997) 
 
 
Sevitenyi (2012) 
Transfers Transfers in real terms Sevitenyi (2012) 
Agriculture The ratio of agricultural investment to GDP 
 
 
Government expenditure in agriculture 
Easterly & Rebelo 
(1993) 
 
Nurudeen & Usman 
(2010) 
Health The ratio of health investment to GDP 
 
 
The ratio of health to total expenditure 
 
Health expenditure to GDP 
 
Health expenditure to GDP 
 
Health expenditure to GDP 
 
Health expenditure to GDP 
 
Log of government expenditure on health to 
GDP 
 
Share of total expenditure on health 
 
 
Government expenditure in health 
Easterly & Rebelo 
(1993) 
 
Devarajan et al. (1996) 
 
Kelly (1997) 
 
Miller & Russek (1997) 
 
Moreno-Dodson (2008) 
 
Cooray (2009) 
 
Abdullah et al. (2009) 
 
 
Nketia-Amponsah 
(2009) 
 
Nurudeen & Usman 
(2010) 
Education Total investment in education 
 
The ratio of educational investment to GDP 
 
 
The ratio of education to total expenditure 
 
Education expenditure to GDP 
 
Education expenditure to GDP 
 
Education expenditure and investment 
 
Education expenditure to GDP 
 
 
Landau (1983) 
 
Easterly & Rebelo 
(1993) 
 
Devarajan et al. (1996) 
 
Kelly (1997) 
 
Miller & Russek (1997) 
 
Bose et al. (2007) 
 
Moreno-Dodson (2008) 
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Types of expenditure Description Authors 
Log of government expenditure on  
education to GDP 
 
Education expenditure to GDP 
 
Share of total expenditure on education 
 
 
Government expenditure on education 
Abdullah et al. (2009) 
 
 
Cooray (2009) 
 
Nketia-Amponsah 
(2009) 
 
Nurudeen & Usman 
(2010) 
Defence Expenditure on defence services and capital 
outlays 
 
The ratio of defence to total expenditure 
 
Defence expenditure to GDP 
 
Defence expenditure to GDP 
  
Defence expenditure 
 
Log of government expenditure on defence 
to GDP 
 
Military expenditure to GDP 
 
Government expenditure on defence 
Singh & Sahni (1984) 
 
 
Devarajan et al. (1996) 
 
Kelly (1997) 
 
Miller & Russek (1997) 
 
Bose et al. (2007) 
 
Abdullah et al. (2009) 
 
 
Cooray (2009) 
 
Nurudeen & Usman 
(2010) 
Transport and communication The ratio of transportation and 
communication investment to GDP 
 
The ratio of transportation and 
communication to total expenditure 
 
Transportation and communication 
expenditure to GDP 
 
Transportation and communication 
expenditure to GDP 
 
Transportation and communication 
expenditure and investment 
 
Transportation and communication 
expenditure to GDP  
 
Government expenditure in transport and 
communication 
Easterly & Rebelo 
(1993) 
 
Devarajan et al. (1996) 
 
 
Kelly (1997) 
 
 
Miller & Russek (1997) 
 
 
Bose et al. (2007) 
 
 
Moreno-Dodson (2008) 
 
 
Nurudeen & Usman 
(2010) 
Housing The ratio of housing and urban infrastructure 
investment to GDP 
 
Housing expenditure to GDP 
Easterly and Rebelo 
(1993) 
 
Kelly (1997) 
Mining, manufacturing and 
construction 
The ratio of industry and mining investment 
to GDP 
 
Mining, manufacturing and construction 
expenditure to GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Easterly & Rebelo 
(1993) 
 
Kelly (1997) 
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Types of expenditure Description Authors 
Social and development Expenditure on education, medical and 
public health, agriculture, rural development, 
industries, broadcasting, community 
development projects, labour and 
employment, capital outlays for railways post 
and telegraph, irrigation, electrification, civil 
aviation and transportation 
 
Social security expenditure to GDP 
 
Social-security and welfare expenditure to 
GDP 
Singh & Sahni (1984) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kelly (1997) 
 
Miller & Russek (1997) 
Infrastructure Share of total expenditure on infrastructure Nketia-Amponsah 
(2009) 
 
1.4 Conditioning variables 
 
The other important set of variables included in the studies of the relationship 
between public expenditure and growth is the set of conditioning variables. It is 
very crucial that the criteria of selecting control variables are clearly and 
systematically defined. Otherwise, the results of the study will not be reliable. 
According to recent literature survey, the wide range of conditioning variables 
can be broadly classified into economic indicators, social indicators and other 
relevant indicators respectively. The list of conditioning variables is in Table 1-5. 
 
Table 1-5: List of conditioning variables 
Conditioning variables Description Authors 
Economic indicators
Lagged growth  Lagged value of per capita GDP growth 
 
 
Lagged value of per capita GDP growth 
 
 
Lagged growth of GDP per capita 
Bleaney et al. 
(2001) 
 
Miller & Russek 
(1997) 
 
Asimakopoulos & 
Karavias (2016) 
US GDP growth  Romero-Avila & 
Strauch (2008) 
Initial  GDP Gross domestic product in 1960 
 
GDP at the initial year of each subperiod 
Kelly (1997) 
 
Bergh & Karlsson 
(2010) 
Initial per capita GDP 1960 value of real per capita GDP 
 
Square of 1960 value of real per capita GDP 
 
Initial level of real per capita GDP in 1960 
 
 
 
Barro (1991) 
 
Barro (1991) 
 
Levine & Renelt 
(1992) 
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Conditioning variables Description Authors 
Per capita GDP, 1960 
 
 
Initial per capita GDP 
 
Log of real GDP per capita at the initial 
year 
 
Initial GDP per capita 
 
 
Log of initial GDP per capita 
 
GDP per capita in constant 2000 USD 
 
 
Initial level of per capita GDP 
 
 
Initial GDP 
 
Log of initial GDP per capita (constant 2000 
USD) 
 
Initial real GDP per capita 
Easterly & Rebelo 
(1993) 
 
Barro & Lee (1994) 
 
Lin (1994) 
 
 
Folster & Henrekson 
(2001) 
 
Bose et al. (2007) 
 
Moreno-Dodson 
(2008) 
 
Abdullah et al. 
(2009) 
 
Cooray (2009) 
 
Christie (2014) 
 
 
Morozumi & Veiga 
(2016) 
Per capita output Per capita real GDP 
 
GNP per capita 
Landau (1983) 
 
Adam & Bevan 
(2005) 
Lagged per capita output Lagged real per capita GDP Miller & Russek 
(1997) 
Investment The ratio of real domestic investment to real  
GDP 
 
Investment share of GDP 
 
 
 
The ratio of real gross domestic investment 
to real GDP 
 
Gross domestic investment as a percentage 
of real GDP 
 
The investment share of GDP 
 
 
Investment ratio 
 
Investment as %GDP 
 
 
Gross investment as a share of GDP 
 
 
Investment as %GDP 
 
 
Savings in physical capital 
 
 
The ratio of investment to GDP 
 
Barro (1991) 
 
 
Levine & Renelt 
(1992) 
 
 
Barro & Lee (1994) 
 
 
Lin (1994) 
 
 
Miller & Russek 
(1997) 
 
Kneller et al. (1999) 
 
Bleaney et al. 
(2001) 
 
Folster & Henrekson 
(2001) 
 
Adam & Bevan 
(2005) 
 
Abdullah et al. 
(2009) 
 
Nketia-Amponsah 
(2009) 
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Conditioning variables Description Authors 
Investment share of GDP 
 
 
Investment as %GDP 
 
The gross capital formation as a share of 
output 
Bergh & Karlsson 
(2010) 
 
Christie (2014) 
 
Asimakopoulos & 
Karavias (2016) 
Private investment Ratio of private investment to GDP 
 
Private investment to GDP 
 
Private investment  
 
 
Private investment share of GDP 
 
Private investment to GDP 
 
 
Private investment rate 
 
 
Share of private investment to GDP 
 
Private investment to GDP 
 
 
 
Private investment share of GDP 
Hsieh & Lai (1994) 
 
Kelly (1997) 
 
Del Monte & 
Papagni (2001) 
 
Bose et al. (2007) 
 
Moreno-Dodson 
(2008) 
 
Romero-Avila & 
Strauch (2008) 
 
Cooray (2009) 
 
Bayraktar & 
Moreno-Dodson 
(2012) 
 
Morozumi & Veiga 
(2016) 
Savings Gross private saving as a fraction of GDP 
 
 
Gross national saving as a fraction of GDP 
Folster & Henrekson 
(2001) 
 
Folster & Henrekson 
(2001) 
Budget balance The government surplus to GDP 
 
 
Government budget surplus 
 
Government budget surplus 
 
 
Budget deficit %GDP 
 
 
Government surplus/deficit 
 
Log of budget balance 
 
 
Overall government fiscal balance 
 
 
Fiscal balance to GDP 
 
 
Fiscal balance to GDP 
 
 
 
Overall budget deficit as a ratio to GDP 
Miller & Russek 
(1997) 
 
Kneller et al. (1999) 
 
Bleaney et al. 
(2001) 
 
Adam & Bevan 
(2005) 
 
Bose et al. (2007) 
 
Abdullah et al. 
(2009) 
 
Nurudeen & Usman 
(2010) 
 
Moreno-Dodson 
(2008) 
 
Bayraktar & 
Moreno-Dodson 
(2012) 
 
Morozumi & Veiga 
(2016) 
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Conditioning variables Description Authors 
Revenue Total government revenue to GDP 
 
 
Fiscal revenue to GDP 
 
 
Total current revenue as a share of GDP 
 
 
Fiscal revenue to GDP 
 
 
 
Total revenue as a ratio to GDP 
 
Miller & Russek 
(1997) 
 
Moreno-Dodson 
(2008) 
 
Romero-Avila & 
Strauch (2008) 
 
Bayraktar & 
Moreno-Dodson 
(2012) 
 
Morozumi & Veiga 
(2016) 
Tax revenue Total taxes as a share of GDP 
 
 
Tax revenue as %GDP 
 
 
Tax revenue %GDP 
 
Total direct taxation as a share of GDP 
 
 
Total indirect taxation as a share of GDP 
 
 
Total tax revenue as a share of GDP 
Folster & Henrekson 
(2001) 
 
Adam & Bevan 
(2005) 
 
Bose et al. (2007) 
 
Romero-Avila & 
Strauch (2008) 
 
Romero-Avila & 
Strauch (2008) 
 
Bergh & Karlsson 
(2010) 
Corporate income tax Corporate income tax revenue to GDP Miller & Russek 
(1997) 
Individual income tax Individual income tax revenue to GDP Miller & Russek 
(1997) 
Social security tax Social security tax revenue to GDP 
 
 
Social security contribution as a share of 
GDP 
Miller & Russek 
(1997) 
 
Romero-Avila & 
Strauch (2008) 
International tax International tax revenue to GDP Miller & Russek 
(1997) 
Other revenue Other tax revenue to GDP 
 
 
Taxation on international trade, non-tax 
revenues and other tax revenues 
 
Taxation on international trade, non-tax 
revenues and other tax revenues 
Miller & Russek 
(1997) 
 
Kneller et al. (1999) 
 
 
Bleaney et al. 
(2001) 
Non-tax revenue Non-tax revenue to GDP 
 
 
Non-tax revenue %GDP 
Miller & Russek 
(1997) 
 
Adam & Bevan 
(2005) 
Distortionary taxes Taxation on income and profit, social 
security contributions, taxation on payroll 
and manpower, and  taxation on property 
 
 
 
Kneller et al. (1999) 
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Conditioning variables Description Authors 
Taxation on income and profit, social 
security contributions, taxation on payroll 
and manpower, and  taxation on property 
 
Log of distortionary taxes 
Bleaney et al. 
(2001) 
 
 
Abdullah et al. 
(2009) 
Non-distortionary taxation Domestic goods and services tax revenue to 
GDP 
 
Taxation on domestic goods and services 
 
Taxation on domestic goods and services 
Miller & Russek 
(1997) 
 
Kneller et al. (1999) 
 
Bleaney et al. 
(2001) 
Tariff rates Tariff rates on capital goods and 
intermediate products. 
Barro & Lee (1994) 
Tax rate Effective labour tax rate 
 
 
Effective capital tax rate 
 
 
Effective consumption tax rate 
Romero-Avila & 
Strauch (2008) 
 
Romero-Avila & 
Strauch (2008) 
 
Romero-Avila & 
Strauch (2008) 
Grants Grants as %GDP Adam & Bevan 
(2005) 
Seigniorage Seigniorage %GDP Adam & Bevan 
(2005) 
Trade ratio Trade share in 1970 
 
 
Sum of exports and imports to GDP 
 
The import plus export share of GDP 
 
 
Export plus import of goods and services as 
a fraction of GDP 
 
Initial trade ratio 
 
Openness %GDP 
 
 
Ratio of exports plus imports to GDP 
 
 
Exports plus imports %GDP 
 
Openness to trade 
Easterly & Rebelo 
(1993) 
 
Kelly (1997) 
 
Miller & Russek 
(1997) 
 
Folster & Henrekson 
(2001) 
 
Bose et al. (2007) 
 
Moreno-Dodson 
(2008) 
 
Romero-Avila & 
Strauch (2008) 
 
Christie (2014) 
 
Asimakopoulos & 
Karavias (2016) 
Exports The ratio of exports to GDP  
 
 
Growth of export share of GDP 
 
 
Export of goods and services as a fraction of 
GDP 
 
Share of exports to GDP 
 
 
Levine & Renelt 
(1992) 
 
Levine & Renelt 
(1992) 
 
Folster & Henrekson 
(2001) 
 
Yuk (2005) 
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Conditioning variables Description Authors 
Rate of change of real exports Nketia-Amponsah 
(2009) 
Imports Import of goods and services as a fraction of 
GDP 
Folster & Henrekson 
(2001) 
Growth rate of terms of trade  Barro & Lee (1994) 
 
Bose et al. (2007) 
Debt Servicing Expenditure on central and state 
government debt servicing 
 
The avearge growth rate of domestic credit 
 
 
The standard deviation of domestic credit 
growth 
 
Debt financing %GDP 
 
 
Credit %GDP 
Singh & Sahni 
(1984) 
 
Levine & Renelt 
(1992) 
 
Levine & Renelt 
(1992) 
 
Adam & Bevan 
(2005) 
 
Cooray (2009) 
Net lending Lending minus repayments 
 
Lending minus repayments 
 
 
Net lending %GDP 
Kneller et al. (1999) 
 
Bleaney et al. 
(2001) 
 
Adam & Bevan 
(2005) 
Interest Interest on debt %GDP Adam & Bevan 
(2005) 
Money supply The ratio of M2 to GDP in 1970 
 
 
The ratio of broad money (M2) to GDP 
 
Real money supply by broad definition (M2) 
Easterly & Rebelo 
(1993) 
 
Bose et al. (2007) 
 
Jiranyakul & 
Brahmasrene (2007) 
Inflation The average inflation rate 
 
 
The standard deviation of inflation 
 
 
The GDP implicit price deflator rate of 
inflation 
 
Percentage change in the consumper price 
index 
 
Inflation rate calculated from consumer price 
index 
 
Inflation rate 
 
 
Inflation rate 
 
 
Inflation rate calculated from consumer price 
index 
 
 
Inflation rate 
Levine & Renelt 
(1992) 
 
Levine & Renelt 
(1992) 
 
Miller & Russek 
(1997) 
 
Folster & Henrekson 
(2001) 
 
Moreno-Dodson 
(2008) 
 
Romero-Avila & 
Strauch (2008) 
 
Nurudeen & Usman 
(2010) 
 
Bayraktar & 
Moreno-Dodson 
(2012) 
 
Christie (2014) 
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Conditioning variables Description Authors 
Percentage change of CPI Asimakopoulos & 
Karavias (2016) 
Deviation of investment deflator The magnitude of the deviation of the 1960 
PPP value for the investment deflator 
Barro (1991) 
Shock A weigheted averages of changes in the 
world real interest rate, and the export price 
index and import price index for each 
country 
Devarajan et al. 
(1996) 
 
Social indicators 
Primary school enrolment  School enrolment rates at primary level in 
1960 
 
Primary school enrolment in 1960 
Barro (1991) 
 
 
Easterly & Rebelo 
(1993) 
Secondary school enrolment School enrolment rates at secondary level in 
1960 
 
Initial secondary school enrolment  
 
 
Secondary school enrolment in 1960  
 
 
Male and female secondary school 
enrolment ratios 
 
The growth rate of male and female 
secondary schooling. 
 
The proportion of the secondary school age 
population enrolled in school in 1970 
 
The ratio of high school enrolment 
 
 
Net secondary enrolment ratio 
Barro (1991) 
 
 
Levine & Renelt 
(1992) 
 
Easterly & Rebelo 
(1993) 
 
Barro & Lee (1994) 
 
 
Barro & Lee (1994) 
 
 
Kelly (1997) 
 
 
Del Monte & 
Papagni (2001) 
 
Cooray (2009) 
Initial human capital A weigheted sum of the adjusted enrolment 
ratios in primary and secondary schools, 
and the percentage of 20-24 year old 
population enrolled in higher education  
 
Initial schooling per person as years of male 
and female secondary schooling 
 
Initial school enrolment as weigheted sum of 
enrolement ratios in primary, secondary and 
higher education 
 
Weighted sum of initial enrolment ratios 
 
 
Weighted sum of initial enrolment ratios 
 
Landau (1983) 
 
 
 
 
Barro & Lee (1994) 
 
 
Bose et al. (2007) 
 
 
 
Moreno-Dodson 
(2008) 
 
Bayraktar & 
Moreno-Dodson 
(2012) 
Years of schooling Average years of schooling in the total 
population 
 
The growth rate of the average years of 
schooling 
 
Folster & Henrekson 
(2001) 
 
Folster & Henrekson 
(2001) 
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Conditioning variables Description Authors 
The average years of schooling in the 
working age population 
 
Annual growth rate of average years of 
schooling 
 
Initial average years of schooling 
Romero-Avila & 
Strauch (2008) 
 
Bergh & Karlsson 
(2010) 
 
Morozumi & Veiga 
(2016) 
Literacy rate Adult literacy rate in 1960 Barro (1991) 
Initial life expectancy Log of life expectancy at birth 
 
Log of life expectancy 
 
Life expectancy at birth 
Barro & Lee (1994) 
 
Bose et al. (2007) 
 
Moreno-Dodson 
(2008) 
Fertility Log of the typical woman's prospective 
number of live births over her lifetime 
 
Fertility rate as births per woman 
Barro & Lee (1994) 
 
 
Folster & Henrekson 
(2001) 
Population Total population in thousands 
 
 
Population aged 0-15 and above 65 as a 
fraction of total population 
 
Urban population as a fraction of total 
population 
Folster & Henrekson 
(2001) 
 
Folster & Henrekson 
(2001) 
 
Folster & Henrekson 
(2001) 
Population growth Average annual rate of population growth 
 
 
The growth rate of population 
 
The change in the share of population that is 
under age 15 
 
Growth rate of population 
 
The rate of growth of population 
 
 
Annual population growth 
 
 
Rate of growth of population 
 
 
Population growth 
 
 
Population growth rate 
Levine & Renelt 
(1992) 
 
Barro & Lee (1994) 
 
Barro & Lee (1994) 
 
 
Lin (1994) 
 
Miller & Russek 
(1997) 
 
Adam & Bevan 
(2005) 
 
Nketia-Amponsah 
(2009) 
 
Asimakopoulos & 
Karavias (2016) 
 
Morozumi & Veiga 
(2016) 
Labour force growth Annual rate of growth of labour force 
participation 
 
Labour force growth 
 
Labour force growth 
 
 
The growth rate of the labour force 
 
Lin (1994) 
 
 
Kneller et al. (1999) 
 
Bleaney et al. 
(2001) 
 
Folster & Henrekson 
(2001) 
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Conditioning variables Description Authors 
Labour force growth 
 
 
Rate of labour growth 
 
 
Average annual growth rate of the labour 
force 
Moreno-Dodson 
(2008) 
 
Abdullah et al. 
(2009) 
 
Bergh & Karlsson 
(2010) 
Unemployment Unemployment as a share of the labour 
force 
Folster & Henrekson 
(2001) 
Other indicators 
Political instability The number of revolutions and coups per 
year 
 
The number of assassinations per million 
population per year 
 
An index for the number of revolutions and 
coups 
 
Index of civil liberties 
 
 
Assassinations per million 
 
 
Revolutions and coups 
 
 
War casualties per capita 
 
 
The country's average number of revolutions 
per year 
 
The average of the indexes for political 
rights and civil liberties 
 
 
A dummy variable for countries that 
participated in at least one external war over 
1960-85 
 
The fraction of time over 1960-85 that the 
country was involved in an external war 
 
Political instability index as the average of 
revolutions and coups, and political 
assassinations per million inhabitants per 
year  
 
Bureaucracy index 
 
 
Political governance dummy 
 
 
Political instability dummy 
 
Barro (1991) 
 
 
Barro (1991) 
 
 
Levine & Renelt 
(1992) 
 
Levine & Renelt 
(1992) 
 
Easterly & Rebelo 
(1993) 
 
Easterly & Rebelo 
(1993) 
 
Easterly & Rebelo 
(1993) 
 
Barro & Lee (1994) 
 
 
Barro & Lee (1994) 
 
 
 
Barro & Lee (1994) 
 
 
 
Barro & Lee (1994) 
 
 
Bose et al. (2007) 
 
 
 
 
Moreno-Dodson 
(2008) 
 
Nketia-Amponsah 
(2009) 
 
Nketia-Amponsah 
(2009) 
Corruption Crimes against the public administration per 
million employee 
Del Monte & 
Papagni (2001) 
Black market premium The black market premium on foreign 
exchange 
Barro & Lee (1994) 
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Conditioning variables Description Authors 
Premium in the black market for foreign 
exchange 
 
The black market premium on foreign 
exchange 
Devarajan et al. 
(1996) 
 
Bose et al. (2007) 
Globalization Index of globalization using initial period 
value 
Bergh & Karlsson 
(2010) 
Economic freedom Economic freedom using Fraser Institute 
index at intial period value 
Bergh & Karlsson 
(2010 
Dummy variable for government 
accountability 
Dummy variables of high and low 
government accountability interacting with 
fiscal variables 
 
Dummy variables of high- and low- income 
countries using double interaction with 
accountability dummies 
 
Dummy variables of high- and low- level of 
law enforceability countries using double 
interaction with accountability dummies 
Morozumi & Veiga 
(2016) 
 
 
Morozumi & Veiga 
(2016) 
 
 
Morozumi & Veiga 
(2016) 
Dummy variable for socialist 
economy 
Dummy variable for socialist economic 
system 
Levine & Renelt 
(1992) 
Energy consumption per capita  Landau (1983) 
Dummy variable for climate 
zones 
Mediterranean climate zone 
 
Tropical rain forest climate zone 
Landau (1983) 
 
Landau (1983) 
Dummy variable for  regional 
group of countries 
Dummy variable of African and Latin 
American countries 
 
Dummy variables for the sub-Saharan 
African and Latin American countries 
 
Regional dummy variables for Sub-saharan 
African, Latin American and East Asian 
countries. 
 
Cotinental dummy variables 
Barro (1991) 
 
 
Levine & Renelt 
(1992) 
 
Barro & Lee (1994) 
 
 
 
Devarajan et al. 
(1996) 
Dummy variable for fast-growing 
countries 
Interactive dummy for fast-growing countries 
with fiscal expenditure 
Bayraktar & 
Moreno-Dodson 
(2012) 
 
1.4.1 Controlling economic conditions  
 
Economic indicators appear repeatedly in the literature studying the relationship 
between economic development and public expenditure. This type of indicator 
can be mainly classified into six categories according to national income 
accounting which are economic outputs, investment variables, fiscal variables, 
trade variables, debt services and monetary variables. 
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1.) Economic outputs 
 
As a control variable, economic outputs are used in terms of growth 
rates (lag of growth) and levels (initial GDP per capita). In terms of 
growth rates, Bleaney et al. (2001) use lagged value of per capita 
growth while Romero-Avila and Strauch (2008) include US GDP 
growth rates as a control variable.  
In levels, most studies use initial per capita GDP, whereas some 
studies use per capita output (Adam & Bevan, 2005; Landau, 1983). 
Per capita output is used both in constant term and logarithmic form. 
Instead of using initial value of GDP per capita, Miller and Russek 
(1997) include lagged real per capita GDP as a proxy for economic 
output. Lagged GDP is also used in Kelly (1997), while Bergh and 
Karlsson (2010) use GDP level at the initial year of each subperiod. 
This type of control variable needs to be carefully included, since it 
has a direct association with dependent variable. 
 
2.) Investment variables 
 
Investment variables are used either as aggregate investment or 
private investment. They are always represented as a share of GDP. 
The key difference is whether public and private investment are 
included together which could slightly change the interpretation of the 
results. In addition, Folster and Henrekson (2001) also consider the 
ratios of private and national savings to GDP. 
 
3.) Fiscal Variables 
 
(3.1) Fiscal balances 
Fiscal balances appear in the terms of budget balance (Abdullah 
et al., 2009; Bayraktar & Moreno-Dodson, 2012; Moreno-Dodson, 
2008; Nurudeen & Usman, 2010) or budget surplus (Adam & 
Bevan, 2005; Bleaney et al., 2001; Bose et al., 2007; Kneller et 
al., 1999; Miller & Russek, 1997; Morozumi & Veiga, 2016). This 
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element measures the symmetry between taxes and government 
expenditure. It is an indication of financial stability of a particular 
country’s government. 
 
(3.2) Revenues 
Tax revenue is used in Folster and Henrekson (2001), Adam and 
Bevan (2005), Bose et al. (2007), and Bergh and Karlsson (2010). 
In some studies, tax revenue is divided into distortionary tax 
(Abdullah et al., 2009; Bleaney et al., 2001; Kneller et al., 1999) 
and non-distortionary tax (Bleaney et al., 2001; Kneller et al., 
1999; Miller & Russek, 1997).  
Distortionary taxes affect the investment decisions of the 
agents and the steady-state rate of growth, whereas non-
distortionary taxation does not affect either investment decision or 
the rate of growth (Kneller et al., 1999). Unclassified revenue is 
called other revenue (Bleaney et al., 2001; Kneller et al., 1999, 
Miller & Russek, 1997).  
Alternatively, fiscal revenue to GDP is used instead of only 
taxes (Bayraktar & Moreno-Dodson, 2012; Moreno-Dodson, 
2008). Non-tax revenue is incorporated in the study by Miller and 
Russek (1997), and Adam and Bevan (2005). Total government 
revenue is included in the studies of Miller and Russek (1997), 
Romero-Avila and Strauch (2008), and Morozumi and Veiga 
(2016).  
There are a few other kinds of government revenue. For 
example, grants and seigniorage are included in Adam and Bevan 
(2005). Miller and Russek (1997) use disaggregated analysis of 
tax revenue which include corporate income, individual income, 
social security, and international taxes. 
Classification of revenue or tax revenue is very important 
for empirical study on the relationship between public spending 
and growth while government budget constraint is taken into 
account, since this is related to the different estimates of the 
coefficients under the use of implicit financing element. The 
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classification of government revenue in the budget constraint will 
be used for further analysis.  
 
4.) Trade Variables 
 
Trade variables are used in four different forms which are trade ratio, 
growth rate of terms of trade (Barro & Lee, 1994; Bose et al., 2007), 
exports (Folster & Henrekson, 2001; Levine & Renelt, 1992; Nketia-
Amponsah, 2009; Yuk, 2005) and imports (Folster & Henrekson, 
2001). This type of variable can be considered as an impact of 
external sector of the economy. 
 
5.) Debt services 
 
Debt services are used in the form of debt servicing (Adam & Bevan, 
2005; Singh & Sahni, 1984) or net lending (Adam & Bevan, 2005; 
Bleaney et al., 2001; Kneller et al., 1999). Interest on debt also 
appears in Adam and Bevan (2005). Cooray (2009) uses credit to 
GDP representing financial sector, whereas Levine and Renelt (1992) 
include growth rate and standard deviation of the growth rate of 
domestic credit in their study. 
 
6.) Monetary variables 
 
Monetary variables are in the forms of money supply (Bose et al., 
2007; Easterly & Rebelo, 1993; Jiranyakul & Brahmasrene, 2007) or 
inflation rate. These proxies reflect the growth effects of monetary 
policy conducted by central bank through money market. 
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1.4.2 Controlling social impacts 
 
Social indicators are also important in determining economic development. This 
group of indicators can be separated into human capital development and 
demographic variables.  
 
1.) Human capital development  
 
Human capital development is mainly measured by educational 
attainment and quality of health. The level of educational attainment 
can be represented in terms of school enrolment, years of schooling 
and literacy rate. Life expectancy and fertility are the main proxies for 
the quality of health.  These indicators represent capacity of labour 
within a country.  
 
2.) Demographic variables 
 
There are three main demographic variables present in related 
studies which are population growth, labour force growth (Abdullah et 
al., 2009; Bleaney et al., 2001; Folster & Henrekson, 2001; Kneller et 
al., 1999; Moreno-Dodson, 2008) and unemployment. Alternatively, 
Lin (1994) uses growth rate of labour force participation. This set of 
variables may directly or indirectly reflect the pool of workforce in a 
particular nation. 
 
1.4.3 Other effects 
 
1.) Institutions variables 
 
There are many indicators that could represent the quality of 
institutions within a country. A few examples of indicators are 
investigated in the studies on the relationship between public 
expenditure and growth. For example, political instability is included in 
several studies to capture quality of the institutions. Political instability 
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can be represented by wide range of indicators from revolutions and 
coups, assassinations, civil liberties, political rights, war casualties, 
bureaucracy, and political governance. These variables are used in 
the forms of indexes and dummy variable. Alternatively, corruption 
index is included in the study by Del Monte and Papagni (2001). 
Black market premium on foreign exchange appear in Barro and Lee 
(1994), Devarajan et al. (1996) and Bose et al. (2007). The remaining 
institution variables involve the issues on globalisation, economic 
freedom, government accountability and socialist economy. 
 
2.) Environmental variables 
 
Some variables can represent the environment in a specific area. 
Landau (1983) includes energy consumption per capita and dummy 
variable for climate zones as conditioning variables in the study. 
 
3.) Group of countries dummy variable 
 
For the fact that a selected group of countries might have a distinct 
characteristic, we might use dummy variable to capture such effect. 
For example, an interactive dummy variable for fast growing countries 
is analysed in Bayraktar and Moreno-Dodson (2012) in order to 
capture differential impacts of fiscal expenditure in this group of 
countries. Most of other studies use the dummy varibles to separate 
countries from different regions. 
 
1.5 Defining economic development 
 
Two main groups of dependent variables commonly used in the study of the 
relationship between public expenditure and economic development are the 
level of economic outputs and the growth rates of outputs. The list of variables 
representing economic development in related studies is in Table 1-6. 
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Table 1-6: List of variables representing economic development in related studies 
Dependent variables Description Authors 
Level of economic outputs 
Output Gross national product 
 
Gross domestic product 
 
Gross domestic product 
Ansari et al. (1997) 
 
Yuk (2005) 
 
Sevitenyi (2012) 
Per capita output GNP per capita 
 
Real GDP per capita 
 
Real GDP per capita 
 
GDP per capita 
Singh & Sahni (1984) 
 
Al-Faris (2002) 
 
Wahab (2004) 
 
Cooray (2009) 
Growth rates of outputs 
GDP per capita growth Growth rate of per capita GDP 
 
Per capita growth 
 
Per capita GDP growth 
 
Growth rate of per employee GDP 
 
 
Growth in per capita income 
 
Growth rate of GDP per capita 
 
Average annual growth rate of GDP per 
capita 
 
Growth rate of GDP per capita 
 
 
Growth rate of GDP per capita 
Easterly & Rebelo (1993) 
 
Kneller et al. (1999) 
 
Bleaney et al. (2001) 
 
Del Monte & Papagni 
(2001) 
 
Adam & Bevan (2005) 
 
Moreno-Dodson (2008) 
 
Bergh & Karlsson (2010) 
 
 
Bayraktar & Moreno-
Dodson (2012) 
 
Asimakopoulos & 
Karavias (2016) 
Real per capita GDP 
growth 
Per capita real GDP 
 
Growth rate of per capita real GDP  
 
Growth rate of real per capita GDP 
 
Growth rate of real per capita GDP 
 
Growth rate in per capita real GDP 
 
Annual growth of real per capita GDP 
 
Per capita real GDP growth rate 
 
Average rate of growth of real GDP per  
capita 
 
Growth rate of real per capita GDP 
 
Average annual growth rate of GDP per 
head (1990 prices and exchange rates) 
 
Growth rate in per capita real GDP 
 
Growth rate of real per capita GDP 
 
Landau (1983) 
 
Barro (1991) 
 
Levine & Renelt (1992) 
 
Barro & Lee (1994) 
 
Hsieh & Lai (1994) 
 
Lin (1994) 
 
Devarajan et al. (1996) 
 
Kelly (1997) 
 
 
Miller & Russek (1997) 
 
Folster & Henrekson 
(2001) 
 
Bose et al. (2007) 
 
Romero-Avila & Strauch 
(2008) 
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Dependent variables Description Authors 
Change in log of real GDP per capita 
 
Rate of change of real GDP 
 
Real output per capita growth 
 
Growth of real GDP per capita 
Abdullah et al. (2009) 
 
Nketia-Amponsah (2009) 
 
Christie (2014) 
 
Morozumi & Veiga (2016) 
Changes in real GDP First difference of log of real GDP 
 
 
Changes in real GDP 
Jiranyakul & 
Brahmasrene (2007) 
 
Nurudeen & Usman 
(2010) 
 
1.5.1 The level of economic outputs 
 
Economic output is a direct measurement of the size of the economy. The level 
of the outputs can be either directly measured or alternatively represented in 
per capita terms. Gross domestic product (GDP) is used in Sevitenyi (2012) and 
Yuk (2005), whereas gross national product is used in Ansari et al. (1997). 
There is a slight difference between GDP and GNP over geographical boundary 
and citizenship; however, it should not generate results that are profoundly 
different from one another. Level of output per capita is measured in terms of 
per capita national income in Singh and Sahni (1984) or per capita GDP (Al-
Faris, 2002; Cooray, 2009; Wahab, 2004). 
 
1.5.2 The growth rates of outputs 
 
Similar to the level of economic outputs, the rates of growth are calculated from 
either the level of outputs or output per capita; for example, growth of output is 
measured by a change in real GDP in Jiranyakul and Brahmasrene (2007) and 
Nurudeen and Usman (2010), and per capita growth is measured in terms of 
per capita GDP growth in nominal term and real per capita GDP growth. Real 
per capita GDP growth is calculated by using constant price. This requires base 
year in which can be different across countries.  Alternatively, the growth rate of 
per employee GDP is analysed in Del Monte and Papagni (2001). 
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1.6 Estimation methods 
 
The choices of static models, dynamic models and causality test were 
employed in the related studies as shown in Table 1-7. The dynamic panel data 
model and causality test are frequently used in most recent studies.  
Early studies are inevitably subject to limitation on data availability. Most 
of them use either cross-section or time-series data. Since countries are greatly 
different in economic structure, judiciary system and many other aspects, Ram 
(1986) argued that cross-section models implying strong parametric restriction 
across countries can be rigid and unrealistic.  
In many cases, the cross-section data is an average value over certain 
period of time. Folster and Henrekson (2001) have discussed several other 
problems from cross-section studies using long time spans. The first and the 
most important problem is potentially severe simultaneity. The level of public 
spending is likely to be influenced by demographics; for example, increase in 
income will expand expected life expectancy which finally results in higher 
public spending especially on healthcare and social welfare. Secondly, this can 
also cause an endogenous selection of tax policy, depending on each country’s 
experience on growth effects of fiscal changes. Thirdly, there is inefficiency from 
eliminating variation that might exist within a country over a long period of time.  
Hsiao (2003) has discussed several advantages of using panel data over 
cross-section and time-series data. Firstly, the efficiency of econometric 
estimates is improved due to the use of large number of data points, resulting in 
the increase of the degrees of freedom and the reduction of collinearity among 
the set of regressors. Secondly, the effects of missing or unobserved variables 
are better controlled by utilising both the intertemporal dynamics and 
individuality of the samples under investigation. For example, the unobserved 
characteristics that vary across individuals but unchanged through time can be 
dealt with by taking the first difference of individual observations over time.   
The issues of heterogeneity and selectivity bias might arise in using 
panel data as discussed by Hsiao (2003). The estimates could be biased if 
there is heterogeneity among cross-sectional units on different slopes and 
intercepts. In our study, heterogeneity bias is taken into account by including 
country and year fixed effects and separating countries into groups of 
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developing and high-income countries.  Selectivity bias is not a concern in our 
cross-country study.  
While taking into account the role of government budget constraint, the 
possible endogenity problem and non-linearity as mentioned earlier are also 
considered in our study of the relationship between growth and public spending. 
As a result, instrumental variable (2SLS) and ordinary least squares estimates 
are both analysed. The non-linearity is futher investigated by the inclusion of the 
squared value of public spending.  
The table 1-7 below combines the list of studies with their estimation 
methods in chronological order.  
 
Table 1-7: List of estimation methods used in related studies 
Authors Estimation methods Description  
Landau (1983) Two-stage least squares 
 
Stepwise regression 
 
Singh & Sahni (1984) Granger method  
Barro (1991) Ordinary least squares (OLS) The standard errors for the 
coefficients are based on White’s 
(1980) heteroshedasticity-consistent 
covariance matrix.  
Levine & Renelt 
(1992) 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) 
 
Extreme-bounds analysis 
 
 
A variant of Leamer's (1983) extreme-
bounds analysis (EBA) is used for 
testing the robustness of coefficients 
estimates to alterations in the set of 
control variables. 
Easterly & Rebelo 
(1993) 
Cross-section regression 
 
 
 
Panel regression 
Least squares regression with White's 
(1980) heteroskedastic-consistent 
standard errors 
 
Pooled regression with decade 
averages 
 
Pooled cross-section time series with 
annual data 
Barro & Lee (1994) Seemingly unrelated technique 
 
Instrumental estimates 
 
Hsieh & Lai (1994) Examination of inter-temporal 
interactions 
Testing for stationarity 
 
Granger causality test 
 
Impulse response functions 
 
Variance decompositions 
Lin (1994) Simultaneous equation model Ordinary least squares (OLS) 
 
Park (1967) autoregressive estimation 
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Authors Estimation methods Description  
2SLS 
 
3SLS 
Devarajan et al. 
(1996) 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) Standard errors are adjusted by the 
Hansen and Hodrick’s (1980) method 
of correlation correction.  
Ansari et al. (1997) Causality test Granger causality test 
 
Holmes-Hutton causality test 
Kelly (1997) Ordinary least squares (OLS)  
Miller & Russek 
(1997) 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) 
 
Fixed-effect model 
 
Random-effect model 
 
 
Kneller et al. (1999) 5-year average two-way fixed effects Two-way fixed effects model 
Bleaney et al. (2001) Static and dynamic panels  LSDV: 2 way fixed effects; Five-year 
averages 
 
Dynamic panel with eight lags of 
annual data 
 
Annual dynamic panels instrumental 
variables 
Del Monte & Papagni 
(2001) 
Dynamic panel data econometric 
method 
LSDV 
 
2SLS 
 
Random effects 
Folster & Henrekson 
(2001) 
Panel regressions 
 
 
 
 
 
Extended extreme bounds analyses 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) 
 
Two-way fixed effects 
 
First differences 2SLS 
 
 
Al-Faris (2002) Granger causality test Unit root and cointegration test 
 
Granger causality test 
Wahab (2004) Error-correction model (ECM)  
Adam & Bevan 
(2005) 
Fixed effects model Fixed effects estimation with fiscal 
effects lagged 
Yuk (2005) Granger causality test Vector autoregression 
Bose et al. (2007) Growth regressions Seemingly unrelated regression 
Jiranyakul & 
Brahmasrene (2007) 
 
Granger causality test 
 
Least square method 
 
Moreno-Dodson 
(2008) 
Ordinary least square (OLS) 
 
GMM 
 
Seemingly unrelated regression 
 
Romero-Avila & 
Strauch (2008) 
Panel cointegration 
 
A distributed lag model 
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Authors Estimation methods Description  
Abdullah et al. (2009) Mixed methods for panel data Ordinary least squares (OLS) 
 
Within groups 
 
First differenced GMM 
 
System GMM 
Cooray (2009) GMM estimation 
 
Seemingly unrelated regression 
 
Nketia-Amponsah 
(2009) 
OLS and Granger causality test  
Bergh & Karlsson 
(2010) 
Panel regressions 
 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) 
 
Two-way fixed effects 
 
Bayesian averaging of classical 
estimates 
Nurudeen & Usman 
(2010) 
Cointegration 
 
Error correction methods (ECM) 
 
Bayraktar & Moreno-
Dodson (2012) 
OLS and dynamic GMM 
 
Seemingly unrelated regression 
 
Sevitenyi (2012) Granger (1969) causality Unit root and cointegration test 
 
Granger causality test 
Christie (2014) Panel regressions Two-way fixed effects model 
 
One-step system GMM 
Asimakopoulos & 
Karavias (2016) 
Non-linear panel GMM Non-linear panel GMM approach of 
Seo and Shin (2014) allowing for a 
threshold effect with endogenous 
regressors and threshold variable 
Morozumi & Veiga 
(2016) 
Dynamic panel data model System GMM estimations 
 
1.7 Findings of previous literature 
 
The results of the studies on the relationship between public expenditure and 
economic growth can be classified by countries into three categories which are 
a group of all countries, a particular group of countries and an individual 
country. (see Table1-8) 
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Table 1-8: The results from the literature 
Authors Growth-promoting 
variables 
Growth-
deteriorating 
variables 
Variables with 
insignificant 
/inconsistent 
effect 
 
/ for causality 
test (C) 
All countries 
Landau (1983) 
 
 
Total investment in education 
 
 
Government 
consumption 
expenditure 
 
 
Barro (1991)  Government 
consumption 
Public investment 
Levine & Renelt 
(1992) 
  Government 
consumption 
Easterly & Rebelo 
(1993) 
Transportation and 
communication investment 
 
 
General government investment 
 Total public 
enterprise 
investment 
Barro & Lee (1994)  Government 
consumption 
 
Lin (1994) Government consumption  Non-productive 
expenditure 
Kelly (1997) 
 
Public Investment 
 
Housing expenditure 
 
 
Social security expenditure 
Health expenditure 
 
Education 
expenditure 
 
Miller & Russek 
(1997) 
Tax-financed government 
expenditure 
Debt-financed 
government 
expenditure 
 
Government deficit 
 
Cooray (2009) 
 
Government size and 
government quality 
  
Christie (2014)  Government 
spending above 33 
percent of GDP 
 
Asimakopoulos & 
Karavias (2016) 
Government spending below 
estimated threshold 
Government 
spending above 
estimated threshold 
 
Morozumi & Veiga 
(2016) 
Capital spending with 
accountable government 
 
Current spending financed by 
revenue 
 
Capital spending financed by 
revenue 
 Current spending 
financed by deficit 
Developed countries
Hsieh & Lai (1994) 
 
  Government 
spending (C) 
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Authors Growth-promoting 
variables 
Growth-
deteriorating 
variables 
Variables with 
insignificant 
/inconsistent 
effect 
 
/ for causality 
test (C) 
Kneller et al. (1999) 
 
Productive government 
expenditure 
 
Budget surplus 
Distortionary 
taxation 
 
Initial GDP 
 
Bleaney et al. 
(2001) 
Productive expenditure 
 
Other expenditure 
 
Budget surplus 
Distortionary 
taxation 
 
Folster & 
Henrekson (2001) 
 Government 
expenditure 
 
Wahab (2004)   Government 
expenditure (C) 
 
Bergh & Karlsson 
(2010) 
 Government 
expenditure 
 
Developing countries 
Devarajan et al. 
(1996) 
Current expenditure Capital expenditure  
 
Defence 
expenditure  
 
Economic 
infrastructure 
expenditure 
Total expenditure 
 
Health expenditure 
 
 
Education 
expenditure 
Adam & Bevan 
(2005) 
 Fiscal deficits at 
1.5%GDP 
 
Bose et al. (2007) 
 
Government capital expenditure 
 
Education expenditure 
 Current expenditure 
Moreno-Dodson 
(2008) 
Private investment 
 
Education spending 
 
Health spending 
  
Bayraktar & 
Moreno-Dodson 
(2012) 
Productive and core spending in 
fast growing economies 
  
Regional studies 
Ansari et al. (1997) 
 
  Government 
expenditure(C) 
Al-Faris (2002) 
 
  Government 
expenditure(C) 
Romero-Avila & 
Strauch (2008) 
Public investment Government 
consumption  
 
Direct taxation 
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Authors Growth-promoting 
variables 
Growth-
deteriorating 
variables 
Variables with 
insignificant 
/inconsistent 
effect 
 
/ for causality 
test (C) 
Abdullah et al. 
(2009) 
Health expenditure 
 
 
Education expenditure 
Defence 
expenditure 
 
Distortionary 
taxation 
 
Budget balance 
 
Individual countries
Singh & Sahni 
(1984) 
  Public expenditure 
(C) 
Del Monte & 
Papagni (2001) 
 Quality of public 
institution affected 
by corruption 
 
Yuk (2005) 
 
  Government 
spending (C)  
Jiranyakul & 
Brahmasrene 
(2007) 
Government expenditure 
 
One-period lag of government 
expenditure 
  
Nketia-Amponsah 
(2009) 
 
Health spending 
 
Infrastructure spending 
 Education spending 
 
Nurudeen & Usman 
(2010) 
Government expenditure on 
transport and communication 
 
Government expenditure on 
health 
 
Government total 
capital expenditure 
 
Total recurrent 
expenditure 
 
Government 
expenditure on 
education 
 
Sevitenyi (2012)   Government 
expenditure (C) 
  
1.7.1 All countries 
 
Early studies usually investigate the relationship between public expenditure 
and economic growth by including all countries with different income levels 
together. They also focus mainly on the aggregate level of government 
expenditure, whereas later studies shift their interest towards the components of 
government expenditure. Recent studies might also compare the estimates of a 
group of all countries with a group of developing countries and a group of high-
income countries. The findings from Landau (1983) showed that total 
investment in education is growth-promoting, whereas government consumption 
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expenditure has a negative effect on growth. The negative effect on growth of 
government consumption was also found by Barro (1991), and Barro and Lee 
(1994). In contrast, Lin (1994) showed that government consumption is growth-
promoting, whereas non-productive expenditure depending on a particular 
group of countries has insignificant and inconsistent effect on growth. Kelly 
(1997) has shown that different types of public spending exert different impacts 
on economic growth. Public investment, housing expenditure and social security 
expenditure all affect growth positively. On the contrary, health and education 
expenditure affect economic growth negatively. The effect of education 
expenditure on growth in Kelly (1997) contradicts with the results from Landau 
(1983). Transportation and communication investment, and general government 
investment are found to have positive effects on growth in the study of Easterly 
and Rebelo (1993) 
 Apart from only direct measurement of public expenditure, Cooray (2009) 
argues that both government size and quality (governance) have significantly 
positive effects on economic growth. The part of government quality raises the 
concern of the role of institution. Considering the role of government 
accountability, Morozumi and Veiga (2016) have found that capital spending by 
accountable government is conducive to growth. 
 The threshold level of government could play an important part in 
determining growth effect of public spending. Christie (2014) has found that 
government spending that exceeds 33 %GDP can have deteriorating effect on 
growth. Similarly, Asimakopoulos and Karavias (2016) find that government 
spending below threshold level can be growth-enhancing while the spending at 
above threshold level becomes growth-decreasing. 
 The fiscal-growth effects can also be sensitive to the sources of financing 
public spending. Miller and Russek (1997) have found positive effect on growth 
from tax-financed government expenditure, while debt-financed government 
expenditure can be harmful to growth.    
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1.7.2 Particular group of countries   
 
For a particular group of countries, we may classify countries according to 
income level or geographical location. The examples of developed countries, 
developing countries and regional studies are included.  
 
1.) Developed countries 
The studies of developed countries mainly include OECD and G-7 
countries. Hsieh and Lai (1994) concluded that the effects of 
government spending on economic growth in G-7 countries are 
inconsistent across countries and time. However, Kneller et al. (1999) 
and Bleaney et al. (2001) reached relatively similar conclusion for 
OECD countries. In both studies, productive expenditure is growth-
promoting, whereas distortionary taxation is growth-deteriorating.  
 Focussing on high-income countries, Folster and Henrekson 
(2001), and Bergh and Karlsson (2010) have found negative growth 
impacts of government expenditure.  
With error correction model, Wahab (2004) showed that 
government expenditure declines more proportionately with a slowing 
economy, whereas expenditure increases less with an accelerating 
economy. 
 
2.) Developing countries  
According to Bose et al. (2007), government capital expenditure, 
education expenditure and private investment have positive impacts 
on growth in developing countries. On the contrary, current 
expenditure has an insignificant effect on economic growth. Moreno-
Dodson (2008) supports the finding from Bose et al. (2007) showing 
that education and health spending are growth-enhancing.  
In contrast with Bose et al. (2007), Devarajan et al. (1996) have 
found that capital expenditure is growth-deteriorating. They have 
claimed that the negative impact is due to misallocation of public 
spending in favour of capital expenditure.  
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Some studies tried to find the condition where expenditure can 
promote growth. Adam and Bevan (2005) suggested that fiscal deficit 
at 1.5%GDP is the threshold level for the effective fiscal policy on 
growth. At higher level of deficits, growth pay off could disappear. 
Bayraktar and Moreno-Dodson (2012) suggested that only in fast 
growing economies is productive and core spending conducive to 
growth. 
 
3.) Regional studies 
Focussing on Asian economies, Abdullah et al. (2009) found that 
health and education expenditure are growth-promoting, whereas 
defence expenditure and distortionary taxation are both growth-
deteriorating.  
With a group of EU-15 countries, Romero-Avila and Strauch 
(2008) have found positive impacts on growth from public investment 
while government consumption and direct taxation are growth-
deteriorating. 
Ansari et al. (1997) and Al-Faris (2002) tried to identify the 
causation between expenditure and growth. With the Gulf Co-
operation Council countries from Al-Faris (2002), economic growth 
pre-determines expanding role of the government. To test Keynesian 
hypothesis, Ansari et al. (1997) found no evidence of government 
expenditure causing national income in African countries. 
   
4.) Individual countries 
Studying the relationship between growth and public expenditure by 
looking at any particular country is a way to clearly identify specific 
effects of government on growth for recommending national policy 
prescription.  
Singh and Sahni (1984) found that the direction of causality 
between public expenditure and growth in India is inconsistent. In 
contrast, government spending Granger-causes growth in the case of 
the United Kingdom (Yuk, 2005).  
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There is little more evidence supporting Keynesian hypothesis. 
Government expenditure and one-period lag of government 
expenditure are growth-promoting in the case of Thailand (Jiranyakul 
& Brahmasrene, 2007). In the case of Nigeria, Sevitenyi (2012) also 
supported Keynesian approach in which causality runs from 
government expenditure to growth. At the disaggregated level of 
Nigerian public spending: health expenditure, and transportation and 
communication expenditure are growth-promoting, whereas: capital 
expenditure, recurrent expenditure and education expenditure are 
growth-retarding (Nurudeen & Usman, 2010). Health and 
infrastructure spending are growth-promoting in Ghana, whereas 
education spending has insignificant effect on growth (Nketia-
Amponsah, 2009). 
Furthermore, the role of institution in determining growth was 
shown by Del Monte and Papagni (2001) where corruption has 
negative effects on growth through private investment and efficiency 
of expenditure on public investment. 
 
Even though previous studies have shown contradicting results on the impacts 
of public expenditure on economic growth, there are a substantial number of 
similar findings from cross-country studies. First, there is evidence of causality 
running from public expenditure to economic growth. Secondly at aggregate 
level, private investment, public investment and productive government 
expenditure are growth-enhancing, whereas distortionary tax and recurrent 
expenditure are growth-deteriorating. Thirdly, health, housing and education 
expenditure are growth-promoting at disaggregated level. Finally, defence 
expenditure has negative impact on growth. 
 
1.8 Further analysis on fiscal policy impacts  
  
Further analysis of this fiscal-growth study in Chapter 2 is primarily based on 
Bose et al. (2007) where several distinctive features were focussed. First, they 
focussed on a disaggregated level of government expenditure in developing 
countries. Second, the inclusion of conditioning variables was distinctively 
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systematic, since they were separated into common conditioning variables in 
growth regression and policy variables. Thirdly, the role of government budget 
constraint was taken into account.  
There are at least a few improvements from Bose et al. (2007) which we 
have extended in Chapter 2. First, more extensive group of developing 
countries can be included as well as considering high-income countries. 
Second, different time periods apart from decade averages are analysed. In this 
way, we can implement panel data analysis by using annual data which is 
different from the cross-section data they have used. Thirdly, the alternative 
techniques for panel regression are introduced as a comparison. Especially, the 
instrumental estimates are implemented to solve for potential endogeneity of 
some of the control variables. Lastly, the non-linear impact of public spending 
on growth has been investigated by including the squared terms. The 
regression analysis of our study includes control variables which mainly align 
with Bose et al. (2007). The discussion on the rationale for inclusion of these 
control variables are further discussed in Chapter 2. 
In Section 3.1 of Chapter 3, the government budget constraint is further 
investigated in a similar framework as appeared in Kneller et al. (1999). While 
Chapter 2 and Section 3.1 of Chapter 3 focus on permanent growth effects of 
fiscal changes without considering transitional dynamics, the study in Section 
3.2 of Chapter 3 allows for Solow-type transitional dynamics where the effects 
of fiscal policy could be persistent. In order to do this, the long-run GDP impacts 
of changes in the total government expenditure and in the shares of different 
spending functions are considered following Gemmell et al. (2016). 
In other words, the relationship between public expenditure and 
economic development would be investigated according to three different 
issues for groups of countries with different levels of income. 
First, a disaggregated analysis of the relationship between public 
spending by function and economic growth is investigated under the framework 
proposed by Bose et al. (2007) with the extension of the samples from 
developing to high-income countries while taking the issues of endogeneity and 
non-linearity into account. Secondly, the role of government budget constraint in 
the framework of public expenditure and growth is examined using different 
implicit financing elements appeared in Kneller et al. (1999). While their study 
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limit to high-income OECD countries, we compare high-income OECD with 
developing countries. Thirdly, the composition of public spending and long-run 
GDP per capita has been investigated using pooled mean group (PMG) 
estimators according to the methodology in Gemmell et al. (2016). This is also 
extended from high-income OECD to developing countries. 
In the second chapter, the data on public spending and its composition is 
firstly analysed. Then, regression analysis of public spending and economic 
growth is investigated according to groups of countries with different income 
levels. In the third chapter, the role of government budget constraint is taken 
into account when considering the relationship between public expenditure and 
economic growth. The latter part of the third chapter investigates how change in 
public spending may have an impact on long-run GDP level.  We also later on 
refer to specific literature for this part in the third chapter. The next chapter will 
discuss a disaggregated analysis of public spending and economic growth.  
     
 
67 
 
Chapter 2: A disaggregated analysis of public spending and 
economic growth 
 
In this chapter, we look at both the data analysis of public spending and the 
regression analysis of public expenditure and economic growth. Section 2.1 
discusses the empirical evidence of public spending according to the sample 
groups comprising 75 countries with different income levels that can be seen in 
Table 2-1. These groups will be referred to as Sample 1. The whole sample set 
of countries comprises 37 developing countries and 38 high-income countries. 
The high-income group can be further broken down into 31 high-income OECD 
countries and 7 high-income non-OECD countries.   
 Section 2.2 investigates the permanent growth effects of increased 
government expenditure in the public-policy endogenous growth model using 
Sample 1. We use the main set of control variables that appear in Bose et al. 
(2007). The study in Section 2.2 will be referred to as Study 1. 
 
2.1 Empirical evidence of public spending: size and composition 
 
This section analyses the trend of public spending in groups of Sample 1 
countries with different income levels. We measure total government 
expenditure and classify government spending into types. These types of 
government spending are categorised by the functions or objectives that 
government units intend to accomplish.1 We use data from 75 Sample 1 
countries according to the availability of fiscal data from Government Finance 
Statistics (GFS) and other control variables in our regression analysis.2 
The fiscal data from GFS is subject to change in the analytical framework 
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) from the GFSM 1986 to the GFSM 
2001.3 Our government revenue data is unaffected as it relies exclusively on the 
GFSM 2001 framework.  
                                                            
1 The words ‘type’ and ‘function’ appear interchangeably in our discussion. Sometimes, it might 
be referred to as ‘category’. 
2 The GFS data in our analysis is mainly extracted from the online database of the UK Data 
Service.  
3 GFSM stands for Government Finance Statistics Manual. 
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Table 2-1: List of 75 Sample 1 countries (Study 1) 
  Country Income group Country Income group Country Income group Country Income group
1 Argentina Upper middle income 21 Malaysia Upper middle income 38 Australia High-income: OECD 58 New Zealand High-income: OECD 
2 Bangladesh Low income 22 Mali Low income 39 Austria High-income: OECD 59 Norway High-income: OECD 
3 Belarus Upper middle income 23 Mauritius Upper middle income 40 Belgium High-income: OECD 60 Poland High-income: OECD 
4 Bhutan Lower middle income 24 Moldova Lower middle income 41 Canada High-income: OECD 61 Portugal High-income: OECD 
5 Bolivia Lower middle income 25 Mongolia Lower middle income 42 Chile High-income: OECD 62 Slovak Republic High-income: OECD 
6 Bulgaria Upper middle income 26 Morocco Lower middle income 43 Czech Republic High-income: OECD 63 Slovenia High-income: OECD 
7 Burkina Faso Low income 27 Nepal Low income 44 Denmark High-income: OECD 64 Spain High-income: OECD 
8 Burundi Low income 28 Pakistan Lower middle income 45 Estonia High-income: OECD 65 Sweden High-income: OECD 
9 Cameroon Lower middle income 29 Panama Upper middle income 46 Finland High-income: OECD 66 Switzerland High-income: OECD 
10 Costa Rica Upper middle income 30 Paraguay Lower middle income 47 France High-income: OECD 67 United Kingdom High-income: OECD 
11 Dominican Republic Upper middle income 31 Romania Upper middle income 48 Germany High-income: OECD 68 United States High-income: OECD 
12 Egypt, Arab Rep. Lower middle income 32 South Africa Upper middle income 49 Greece High-income: OECD 69 Croatia High-income: nonOECD 
13 Ethiopia Low income 33 Syrian Arab Republic Lower middle income 50 Hungary High-income: OECD 70 Cyprus High-income: nonOECD 
14 Georgia Lower middle income 34 Thailand Upper middle income 51 Ireland High-income: OECD 71 Latvia High-income: nonOECD 
15 India Lower middle income 35 Tunisia Upper middle income 52 Israel High-income: OECD 72 Lithuania High-income: nonOECD 
16 Indonesia Lower middle income 36 Turkey Upper middle income 53 Italy High-income: OECD 73 Russian Federation High-income: nonOECD 
17 Iran, Islamic Rep. Upper middle income 37 Ukraine Lower middle income 54 Japan High-income: OECD 74 Trinidad and Tobago High-income: nonOECD 
18 Jamaica Upper middle income       55 Korea, Rep. High-income: OECD 75 Uruguay High-income: nonOECD 
19 Jordan Upper middle income       56 Luxembourg High-income: OECD       
20 Lesotho Lower middle income 57 Netherlands High-income: OECD
 
 Note: All Sample 1 countries comprise 37 developing countries (low-income and middle-income) and 38 high-income countries (OECD and non-OECD)
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Our public expenditure data requires some adjustment; this has been taken into 
account, particularly with regard to general public services, and transportation 
and communication spending.  Further details can be found in Appendix 1.  
 
2.1.1 The size of government  
 
To measure the size of government, the ratio of total public spending over GDP 
is a proxy which indicates how large a country’s public sector is relative to its 
economy. For example, the unweighted average of total spending as a 
percentage of GDP between 1972 and 2012 suggests that, on average, the size 
of the government in Sample 1 countries is almost one-third (31.14%) of its 
economy. The size of government in high-income Sample 1 countries (34.82%) 
is higher than that of developing Sample 1 countries (26.63%). This may 
indicate that governments play relatively larger or broader roles in rich 
countries’ economies than they do in poor ones. 
 
 
Figure 2-1: Unweighted 10-year averages of total public spending as percentages of  
GDP for groups of Sample 1 countries 1972-2011 
 
In Figure 2-1, the 10-year averages of total spending indicate that the 
size of government in Sample 1 countries seems to increase significantly from 
the 1970s to the 1980s. Its relative size to GDP is lower in the 1990s, but its 
size in 2000s is still higher than it was in the 1970s. The increasing trend of 
government spending is obvious in developing Sample 1 countries but not in 
Sample 1 countries in other income groups. The ratio of public spending to GDP 
1972-1981 1982-1991 1992-2001 2002-2011
Developing 24.64 26.86 26.35 27.90
High-income 33.14 37.07 34.61 34.27
OECD 33.46 37.33 35.47 34.72
All countries 28.71 31.80 31.04 31.83
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in developing Sample 1 countries increases from 24.64% between 1972 and 
1981 to 27.90% between 2002 and 2011. 
Although government size in high-income Sample 1 countries is greater 
than in developing Sample 1 countries, this does not necessarily apply to all 
types of public spending by function. Table 2-2 shows that there are two main 
functions of spending in high-income Sample 1 countries, namely health and 
social welfare, which are relatively higher than in developing Sample 1 
countries. Spending on general public services and defence in developing 
Sample 1 countries is, in contrast, higher than it is in high-income Sample 1 
countries. The other functions of spending (transportation and communication, 
and education) seem to be similar regardless of level of income across groups 
of Sample 1 countries. The ratio to GDP of each type of spending in high-
income Sample 1 countries is very similar to that in high-income OECD Sample 
1 countries. 
 
Table 2-2: Unweighted annual averages of public spending by type as percentages of GDP  
for groups of Sample 1 countries between 1972 and 2012 
  All  Developing High-income OECD  
Total spending 31.14 26.63 34.82 35.36 
General public services  3.38 3.85 2.99 2.93 
Defence 2.34 2.51 2.21 2.28 
Transportation and communication 1.61 1.64 1.60 1.63 
Education 3.29 3.43 3.17 3.24 
Health 2.72 1.67 3.58 3.72 
Social welfare 8.89 3.84 12.73 13.05 
Other spending 8.91 9.70 8.55 8.52 
  
2.1.2 Disaggregated analysis of public spending 
 
Even though the increasing trend of public spending is obvious in developing 
Sample 1 countries, some types of spending at the disaggregated level may 
decrease over time. This section uses 10-year averages to examine each type 
of public spending trend in both high-income and developing Sample 1 
countries. We investigate trends in six main types of public spending: general 
public services; defence; transportation and communication; education; health; 
and social welfare. These types of spending will also be considered in our 
fiscal-growth regression analysis in Section 2.2. 
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Figure 2-2 shows that spending on social welfare and health has 
increased substantially in the group of all Sample 1 countries during the last 
four decades. Social welfare spending increased from 6.64%GDP in the 1970s 
to 10.26%GDP in the 2000s. This reflects the crucial role played by 
governments in implementing social policy to counteract the problem of ageing 
populations. In contrast, spending on defence, and transportation and 
communication has decreased during the past four decades. The level of 
spending on general public services and education is relatively stable.  
 
 
Figure 2-2: Unweighted 10-year averages of public spending by type as percentages of  
GDP for group of all Sample 1 countries  
 
In Figure 2-3, we can see that social welfare spending increased steadily 
from 1.69%GDP in the 1970s to 6.27%GDP in the 2000s in developing Sample 
1 countries. This might reflect changing population structures, due to increases 
in the ratios of dependents per adult. Defence, and transportation and 
communication spending decreased over time. Spending on general public 
services, health and education did not change significantly. 
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Figure 2-3: Unweighted 10-year averages of public spending by type as percentages of  
GDP for developing Sample 1 countries 
 
As we can see from Figure 2-4, health spending in high-income Sample 
1 countries increased over time, whereas defence, and transportation and 
communication spending decreased during the same period. General public 
services and education spending remained relatively consistent. Spending on 
social welfare remained high relative to other types of spending. The findings 
are similar in high-income OECD Sample 1 countries.  
 
 
Figure 2-4: Unweighted 10-year averages of public spending by type as percentages of  
GDP for high-income Sample 1 countries  
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In summary, social welfare spending has become an increasingly 
important part of governments’ budgets. The evidence for this is both a rising 
trend of spending in developing Sample 1 countries and consistently high levels 
of social welfare spending in high-income Sample 1 countries. Spending on 
defence, and transportation and communication decreased as a percentage of 
GDP. In addition to looking at the ratio of public spending to GDP, we might 
compare each type of spending to the total sum of spending. The composition 
of public spending will then be investigated further in the next subsection.     
 
2.1.3 The composition of public spending 
 
The composition of public spending reveals how important each type of 
spending is from the perspective of the government. This structure could be 
highly dependent on a country’s particular needs at its current stage of 
development (subject to that country’s demographics). For the set of all Sample 
1 countries, social welfare (26.34%), general public services (11.67%) and 
education (10.82%) spending are among the spending types with the highest 
ratios to total spending. On the other hand, spending on general public services 
(15.10%), social welfare (13.71%) and education (12.96%) are the types with 
the highest ratios to the total spending of developing Sample 1 countries. In 
high-income Sample 1 countries, social welfare (35.96%), health (10.11%) and 
education (9.07%) spending are the types of spending with the highest ratios to 
total spending. These three types of spending also have the highest ratios to 
the total spending of high-income OECD Sample 1 countries (see Table 2-3).  
 
Table 2-3: Unweighted annual averages of spending by type as percentages of total spending 
for groups of Sample 1 countries between 1972 and 2012 
  All Developing  High-income OECD  
General public services  11.67 15.10 8.88 8.54 
Defence 8.14 9.89 6.79 6.93 
Transportation and communication 5.28 6.14 4.59 4.62 
Education 10.82 12.96 9.07 9.15 
Health 8.41 6.32 10.11 10.40 
Social welfare 26.34 13.71 35.96 36.21 
Other spending 29.35 35.88 24.61 24.14 
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The following figures demonstrate how the composition of public 
spending in Sample 1 countries evolves over time. 
 
Figure 2-5: Unweighted 10-year averages of public spending by type as percentages of total 
spending for group of all Sample 1 countries 
** Other expenditure includes all types of spending which do not fit into any of the  
six categories above. 
 
In terms of 10-year averages for the group of all Sample 1 countries 
(Figure 2-5), social welfare, general public services and education spending are 
among the highest types of spending. The proportions of social welfare and 
health spending have increased dramatically over time.  
 
 
Figure 2-6: Unweighted 10-year averages of public spending by type as percentages of total 
spending for developing Sample 1 countries 
** Other expenditure includes all types of spending which do not fall into any of the 
six categories above. 
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As shown in Figure 2-6, spending on general public services and social 
welfare are among the highest types of spending in developing Sample 1 
countries. Social welfare spending, in particular, has increased substantially in 
recent decades. In contrast, the proportions of defence, and transportation and 
communication spending have been decreasing. The education, health and 
general public services spending ratios seem to be constant over time. 
 
 
Figure 2-7: Unweighted 10-year averages of public spending by type as percentages of total 
spending for high-income Sample 1 countries 
** Other expenditure includes all types of spending which do not fall into any of the 
six categories above. 
 
In high-income Sample 1 countries (see Figure 2-7), social welfare, 
health and education attract some of the highest amounts of expenditure. While 
the ratios of spending on healthcare and general public services to total 
spending have increased in recent years, the ratios of transportation and 
communication, and defence spending have decreased. The proportions of 
education and social welfare spending have remained approximately the same 
over time.  
 
2.2 A regression analysis of public expenditure and economic growth 
(Study 1) 
 
The relationship between public expenditure and economic growth needs to be 
empirically examined in order to determine the role of the state in stabilising its 
economy through business cycles. Countries at different developmental stages 
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will have different concerns and these should be addressed by efficiently 
allocating spending on specific types of government expenditure. 
Early public expenditure and economic growth studies focussed on the 
aggregate level of expenditure, while paying attention to a combination of 
developed (high-income) and developing countries. The relationship between 
growth and public spending in these studies was concluded to be inconsistent in 
terms of causation between government expenditure and economic growth. 
Many of these studies proved that public expenditure affected economic growth 
adversely. For instance, Landau (1983) found a negative relationship between 
the share of government consumption expenditure in GDP and the rate of 
growth per capita GDP in 104 countries between 1961 and 1976.  In contrast, 
more recent studies have shifted the focus towards analysis at a disaggregated 
level of public expenditure. They have shown that different types of public 
expenditure exert distinct effects on economic growth (Abdullah et al., 2009; 
Bose et al., 2007; Devarajan et al., 1996; Nurudeen & Usman, 2010). The 
different groups of countries were also examined using more sophisticated 
dynamic models employing various econometric techniques. However, the 
regression results still seem to be highly distinguishable. 
In Section 2.1, the analysis of public expenditure data has shown that 
some distinct combinations of the types of government expenditure occur at 
different stages of economic development. For example, social welfare 
spending is a significant part of government expenditure in high-income Sample 
1 countries due to ageing populations. The proportions of transportation and 
communication, and education spending in the government budgets of 
developing Sample 1 countries are significantly higher than those of high-
income Sample 1 countries. This reflects the need for investment in 
infrastructure and human capital in the early stages of a country’s development. 
Since the government plays a crucial role in boosting and stabilising the 
economic growth of its country, it is essential to understand the link between 
public expenditure and economic growth at a disaggreagated level. In this 
section, we investigate such a link by using empirical data relating to public 
expenditure by function according to the IMF’s definitions from the Government 
Finance Statistics.  The main set of control variables aligns with the variables 
used in Bose et al.’s (2007) study.  
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Regression has been employed using an unbalanced panel of annual 
data from 1972 to 2012 for the sample of 75 countries listed in Table 2-1. The 
data has been taken from two main databases, namely Government Finance 
Statistics (GFS) for fiscal variables and World Development Indicators 2015 
(WDI 2015) for dependent and other non-fiscal control variables.  Additional 
information about the data used is included in Appendix 1. 
To understand the permanent effects on growth from public expenditure 
in Study 1, we firstly use the following five static models for the analysis: a 
pooled regression; a cross-section fixed effects model; a cross-section random 
effects model; a two-way fixed effects model; and a two-way random effects 
model. 
Model selection methods used for static models in Study 1 are the 
adjusted R2 and the Hausman test. Using both tests shows that the two-way 
fixed effects model is preferred in most of the specifications. Therefore, the 
following analysis starts with the results of the two-way fixed effects model.  
Growth regressions in previous studies have extensive sets of variables 
included on the right-hand side of the equation. This study mainly includes the 
variables used in the framework proposed by Bose et al. (2007), which featured 
three sets of variables: conditioning variables (I) for growth regression; 
indicators (Z) for monetary policies, trade policies and market distortion; and 
variables of particular interest for the study (M), mainly government expenditure. 
The advantage of using this classification is that the typical set of conditioning 
variables (I) are distinctly separated from the particular set of conditioning 
variables (Z) for the study on the relationship between public expenditure and 
economic growth. We can refer these variants to our base regression (I 
variables) and regression as a robustness check (Z variables). The following 
subsections include model specification, issues of endogeneity and non-
linearity, and our regression results for both developing and high-income 
Sample 1 countries. 
 
2.2.1 Model specification  
 
We begin the analysis with the standard set of control variables in base 
regression. Secondly, the robustness check for base regression is required in 
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order to detect the sensitivity of the analysis. Thirdly, the government budget 
constraint is taken into account to avoid bias from the exclusion of important 
elements of fiscal variables. Lastly, we include government budget constraint 
together with variables for the robustness check. This final specification is 
expected to provide the most reliable estimates, since the biases from both 
omitted variables and the exclusion of government budget constraint are taken 
into account.  
 
 1.) Base regression 
 
In our base regression, independent variables are separated into two sets which 
are: six conditioning variables (I); and variables of particular interest (M) on 
public spending. The growth regression is represented by Equation (1).  
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 There are several forms for the measurement of economic growth which 
could be used as the dependent variable. However, one of the most 
standardised forms is the growth of gross domestic product per capita in 
percentage terms (GRit). The per capita growth rate is generally related to two 
different types of conditioning variables: the initial level of state variables and 
the other control (environmental) variables. Morozumi and Veiga (2016) argue 
that, while state variables describe the initial position of the economy, the 
control variables determine the steady-state level of output per effective worker. 
In our framework of the public-policy endogenous growth model, fiscal variables 
also have potential impacts on the steady-state per capita growth rate. Our 
conditioning variables (I) include both initial levels of state variables and the 
other environmental variables. 
 In the extensions of the neoclassical and endogenous growth models, 
Easterly and Rebelo (1993) claim that the rate of growth is a function of two 
types of state variables: the initial level of physical capital and the initial level of 
human capital. The stock of human capital can be represented in the forms of 
educational attainment and health, particularly in the model of Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (2004). We therefore include initial GDP per capita, initial school 
enrolment rates and initial life expectancy as the proxies for state variables in 
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this study. Initial school enrolment rates and initial life expectancy represent 
initial levels of human capital. 
 We will firstly consider initial GDP per capita. A number of studies include 
initial GDP per capita as a state variable. The coefficient of the initial level of per 
capita GDP represents the rate of convergence; that is, the responsiveness of 
the growth rate to a proportional change in initial GDP per capita (Barro & Sala-
i-Martin, 2004; Morozumi & Veiga, 2016). Barro and Lee (1994) argue that this 
state variable captures a conditional convergence effect, whereby a country 
grows faster if it begins at lower real per capita GDP relative to its initial level of 
human capital. This effect is predicted by neoclassical growth theory for the 
economy during the transition; however, its impact will not affect steady-state 
rate of growth (Kormendi & Meguire, 1985). 
 Most studies use the value of real GDP per capita of a year at the 
beginning of the period as initial GDP per capita (Barro, 1991; Easterly & 
Rebelo, 1993; Kneller et al, 1999; Levine & Renelt, 1992; Morozumi and Veiga, 
2016). This variable might also appear in growth regression in the form of the 
log of initial GDP per capita (Bose et al, 2007) or lagged real per capita GDP 
(Miller and Russek, 1997). We use one-year lag of the log of GDP per capita as 
a proxy of initial GDP per capita. 
 Secondly, we look at initial school enrolment rates. Barro (1991) 
emphasised the important role played by human capital as a key driving force 
behind the research sector’s generation of new products or ideas which underlie 
technological progress in a number of endogenous growth models. New goods 
are introduced to countries with greater initial stocks of human capital at a more 
rapid rate, ultimately leading to faster rates of growth. Nehru et al. (1995) also 
focus on the significant impact of human capital formation on the long-term 
growth of output, especially in developing countries. 
 The two main proxies for human capital in Barro (1991) are the 1960 
values of school enrolment at secondary and primary levels. These are similar 
to the measures used by Levine and Renelt (1992), and Easterly and Rebelo 
(1993). Landau (1983) treated these school enrolment variables as investment 
in education by using the measures of enrolment ratios in primary and 
secondary schools, the percentage of 20 to 24-year-olds within the population 
enrolled in higher education, and a weighted sum of these three. 
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 Alternatively, the measures of educational attainment are based on years 
of schooling (Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 2004; Morozumi & Veiga, 2016). Folster 
and Henrekson (2001) use growth rate of the average years of schooling as the 
growth of human capital 
 The initial school enrolment ratio in our study is a linear combination of 
primary, secondary and tertiary school enrolment ratios. This calculation is 
equivalent to Bose et al.’s (2007) methodology. 
 Thirdly, life expectancy represents the stock of human capital in the form 
of health in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004). The life expectancy variable in their 
study is the reciprocal of life expectancy at age one. These values would 
correspond to the mortality rate per year if mortality were independent of age. 
 In contrast, Barro and Lee (1994) measure life expectancy at birth by an 
average of values prevailing over the five years prior to the start of each 
decade. In our study, this variable enters the equation in the form of the log of 
life expectancy at birth (one-year lag). 
 In addition to these three state variables, we use investment, taxes and 
political instability as control variables in our base regression. We consider 
investment first. The effect of the saving rate in the neoclassical growth model is 
measured empirically by the ratio of real investment to real GDP (Barro & Sala-
i-Martin, 2004).  
 The role of investment in the endogenous growth model is even more 
important, since an increase in capital stocks can raise the level of technology 
within the whole economy. This positive externality could finally enhance the 
steady-state rate of growth. Most literature (Barro & Lee, 1994; Folster & 
Henrekson, 2001; Kneller et al., 1999; Levine & Renelt, 1992; Miller & Russek, 
1997; Morozumi & Veiga, 2016) includes an investment variable as a share of 
GDP as a control variable in growth regression. 
 Secondly, we look at the role of taxes. Cashin (1995) has claimed that 
previous empirical studies of the influence of fiscal policies on growth have 
predominantly concentrated on the effects of government consumption 
spending and have largely ignored the effects of distortionary taxes. The 
importance of considering these effects too is emphasised by Kocherlakota and 
Yi (1997) who found that the implications for exogenous growth are usually 
rejected when both a tax variable and a public capital variable are included in 
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the regression. Thus, failing to include both variables biases the results in 
favour of exogenous growth models.  
 Bose et al. (2007) claim that it is necessary to control tax revenue in 
order to assess fiscal-growth effects properly. The growth-enhancing effect of 
the provision of public goods is subjected to growth-diminishing effect of the 
distortionary taxes raised to fund the provision of the same public goods. 
Hence, tax revenue as a share of GDP is incorporated into our base regression. 
 Lastly, we consider political instability. Two measures of political 
instability have been used by Barro (1991). The first variable measures the 
number of revolutions and coups per year, which have also been measured by 
Levine and Renelt (1992). The second variable measures the number of 
assassinations per million population per year. These measures were 
interpreted as adverse influences on property rights, and thereby as negative 
influences on investment and growth.  
 The two measures can be combined as an index of political instability. 
Bose et al. (2007) calculate this by taking the average of revolutions and coups 
per year and political assassinations per million inhabitants in each decade.  
 Alternatively, Barro and Lee (1994) use the average number of 
successful and unsuccessful revolutions per year over the full sample, 1960-
1985, representing the probability of revolution.  
 The calculation of our political instability index follows the definition used 
by Bose et al. (2007). The political instability index in our study is an average of 
revolutions and coups, and assassinations. 
As a result, the set of control variables in base regression includes initial 
GDP per capita (ILGDPPAX1P), initial school enrolment (IPST1P), initial life 
expectancy (ILLIFE1P), gross capital formation as a share of GDP (K), tax 
revenue as a share of GDP (tax_gdp) and index of political instability (PINST). 
Table 2-4 shows the list of control variables. 
 
Table 2-4: List of control variables for Study 1 
Variables Description of the variables 
ILGDPPAX1P 
IPST1P 
ILLIFE1P 
K  
tax_gdp  
PINST 
Lag one year of log of GDP per capita (2005 USD) 
Lag one year of a linear combination of school enrolment 
Lag one year of log of life expectancy 
Gross capital formation (% of GDP) 
Tax revenue (% of GDP) 
Average of successful coups and assassinations of  executives 
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Growth regression with these six control variables including a type of 
public spending by function (M) at each point in time is exhibited in Equation (2). 
The effect of each type of public spending on economic growth is then analysed 
accordingly. 
The set of variables of interest (M) consists of government expenditure 
by function according to the data from International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) 
Government Finance Statistics (GFS), both at aggregate and disaggregated 
levels. They are each measured as a fraction of GDP. For the aggregate level, 
we use a measure of total expenditure. At the disaggregated level, there are six 
variables included in our regression analysis, which are: general public 
services; defence; transportation and communication; education; health; and 
social welfare (see Table 2-5). 
 
Table 2-5: List of variables for types of government expenditure (Study 1) 
Variables Description of the variables 
    tot_gdp 
1. gps_gdp 
2. def_gdp       
3. trc_gdp 
4. edu_gdp  
5. hea_gdp  
6. soc_gdp 
Total expenditure (% of GDP) 
Spending on general public services (% of GDP) 
Spending on defence (% of GDP) 
Spending on transportation and communication (% of GDP) 
Spending on education (% of GDP) 
Spending on health (% of GDP) 
Spending on social welfare (% of GDP) 
 
2.) Robustness check 
 
In addition to the set of control variables included in a base regression, we can 
also measure the impacts of monetary and trade policies through the ratio of 
broad money and trade. These are Z variables in Bose et al. (2007). 
 First, we consider the ratio of broad money. Some might argue that a 
monetary aggregate captures not only the effect of monetary policy but also the 
development of a financial system.  
 The special role played by the domestic financial development has been 
stressed by King and Levine (1993) and Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990). 
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Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) consider two proxies for this financial 
development. One is the ratio of private financial system credit to GDP and the 
other is a measure of financial deposits (the M3 aggregate less the 
transactions-related M1 aggregate, as a ratio to GDP). 
 Similarly, Calderon and Liu (2003) employ two commonly used measures 
of financial development: the ratio of broad money (M2) to GDP and the ratio of 
credits provided by financial intermediaries to the private sector to GDP. The 
ratio of broad money (M2) to GDP is also used by Easterly and Rebelo (1993). 
De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) argue that credit has a clear advantage 
over measures of monetary aggregates in that it more accurately represents the 
actual volume of funds channelled into the private sector. According to De 
Gregorio and Guidotti’s (1995) argument on sources of private funds, it is more 
appropriate in our analysis to describe the ratio of M2 to GDP as a proxy of 
monetary policy rather than to claim it as a proxy of financial development.  
 Secondly, we look at the role of trade. A measure of the extent of 
international openness is the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP (Barro & 
Sala-i-Martin, 2004; Easterly & Rebelo, 1993; Miller and Russek, 1997). Some 
studies may include trade variables as the ratio of exports to GDP or the ratio of 
imports to GDP separately. 
 
Table 2-6: List of variables for the robustness check (Study 1) 
Variables Description of the variables 
M2 
 
 
 
 
TRADE 
Money and quasi money comprise the sum of currency outside of banks, 
demand deposits other than those of the central government, and the time, 
savings, and foreign currency deposits of resident sectors other than the 
central government.  (% of GDP) 
 
The sum of exports and imports of goods and services (% of GDP) 
 
In our study, the other two control variables (Z), which are M2 as a 
fraction of GDP and trade as a fraction of GDP, are added to the set of 
independent variables (I) (see Equation (3)). As discussed above, these two 
control variables are the proxies for monetary and trade policies. The 
descriptions of these variables are shown in Table 2-6. This specification is 
analysed as a robustness check.  
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3.) Government budget constraint 
 
Most previous studies of the association between government expenditure and 
growth are subject to potential biases because they omit variables that enter the 
government’s budget constraint (Bose et al., 2007). The main elements in 
government budgets are revenue, expenditure, and budget balance. When 
incorporating government budget constraint into growth regression, however, 
one element of budget constraint must be omitted in order to avoid perfect 
multicollinearity. In other words, the regression equations need to include all but 
one of the possibilities for sources and uses of various revenues, various 
expenditures and the surplus (Miller & Russek, 1997). Hence, the coefficient on 
each fiscal variable is the effect of a unit change in the relevant variable offset 
by the effect of a unit change in the omitted fiscal variable, as explained by 
Kneller et al. (1999). The omitted variable should have negligible growth effects, 
which means that the omitted variable is supposed to have an insignificant or 
zero coefficient. Otherwise, the results will be biased because of the implicit 
partial financing by non-neutral elements of the government budget.  
 As in Bose et al.’s (2007) study, non-tax revenue is chosen as the implicit 
financing element. The coefficient of each remaining fiscal variable is the effect 
of a unit change in that relevant fiscal variable offset by the effect of a unit 
change in non-tax revenue as a share of GDP.  
 Budget surplus, i.e. the difference between government revenue and 
total public expenditure, must be added to the set of control variables in base 
regression. Rather than entering each type of spending into the equation 
separately, we must also include the other part of spending (other spending by 
function) in each of the equations as another control variable. The role of 
government budget constraint will be further explored in Chapter 3 by selecting 
different implicit financing elements.  
 The example of growth regression shown in Equation (4) below 
illustrates the impact of general public services spending (gps_gdp) on 
economic growth, including government budget constraint. The budget surplus 
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is represented as a ratio of overall budget surplus/deficit as a fraction of GDP. 
Spending outside of the general public services category is represented as its 
ratio to GDP (otgps_gdp).  
 Similarly, the specification in Equation (4) is also applied to defence, 
transportation and communication, education, health, and social welfare 
spending. The details of these variables are included in Table 2-7. 
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Table 2-7: List of variables for government budget constraint (Study 1) 
Variables Description of the variables 
SURBP 
otgps_gdp 
otdef_gdp 
ottrc_gdp 
 
otedu_gdp 
othea_gdp 
otsoc_gdp 
Budget surplus/deficit (% of GDP) 
Public spending other than general public services spending (% of GDP) 
Public spending other than defence spending (% of GDP) 
Public spending other than transportation and communication spending  
(% of GDP) 
Public spending other than education spending (% of GDP) 
Public spending other than health spending (% of GDP) 
Public spending other than social welfare spending (% of GDP) 
 
 4.) Government budget constraint and robustness check 
 
Finally, both the variables from government budget constraint and the 
robustness check are considered together with the control variables from the 
base regression. The example of growth regression shown in Equation (5) 
illustrates the impact of general public services spending (gps_gdp) on 
economic growth, including government budget constraint, monetary aggregate 
and trade policy. This specification is also employed with the functional 
spending of defence, transportation and communication, education, health, and 
social welfare. 
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2.2.2 Endogeneity and non-linearity 
   
In addition to four different model specifications we use for our fiscal-growth 
studies with classical estimates (two-way fixed effects model), the potential 
endogeneity of some control variables and possible non-linear relationship 
between growth and public spending are also investigated. This verification 
involves some misspecification tests (the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test and the 
RESET test). 
 
  1.) Endogeneity 
 
Linking public spending with growth requires the use of control variables, and 
therefore an underlying endogeneity issue may arise from the problems of 
simultaneity and reverse causality.  
In our set of aforementioned control variables, tax revenue and 
investment are susceptible to this endogeneity problem, as discussed in 
Chapter 1. With such a problem, ordinary least squares method will not yield 
consistent estimates.  
Using the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, we can confirm that our two-way 
fixed effects model for four different specifications is subject to an endogeneity 
problem. We then use instrumental estimates - namely two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) - to take the endogeneity problem into account. One-year lag variables 
are instruments for both tax revenue and investment.  
 
2.) Non-linearity 
 
A potential non-linear relationship between growth and public spending has 
been shown by Barro (1990): growth rate increases with public spending when 
a government is small, but declines if a government becomes large. 
  Since Ramsey’s RESET test has detected the non-linearity for the 
relationship between public spending and economic growth, we include the 
quadratic term of public spending to capture this non-linear impact, both at 
aggregated and disaggregated level. 
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2.2.3 Regression results 
 
We are interested in investigating the different permanent growth impacts of 
various types of public spending between developing and high-income 
countries, using cross-section and time series data. By separately analysing the 
set of results for developing and high-income Sample 1 countries, heterogeneity 
bias in the panel data is partially controlled. Since the estimation of the two-way 
fixed effects model contains an endogeneity problem, we mainly report the 
results with instrumental estimates using two-stage least squares (2SLS). In 
addition, the potential non-linear relationship between public spending and 
growth is examined by using the square term of public spending.  
In each of the following tables (Table 2-8 to 2-11), we report the results 
of a particular type of public spending with six different model specifications. 
The first specification is the two-way fixed effects model of base regression. The 
second to the fifth specifications are instrumental estimates with year and 
country fixed effects of base regression, regression for the robustness check, 
regression with government budget constraint, and regression with government 
budget constraint and a robustness check. In the sixth specification, the square 
term of public spending as a share of GDP is added to the equation of the fifth 
specification in order to identify any non-linear relationship between public 
spending and economic growth.  
Particular attention should be paid to the fifth and the sixth specifications, 
since the biases of the estimates and the endogeneity problem have been dealt 
with.     
Based on the fact that transportation and communication is the only type 
of functional spending that has a statistically significant positive relationship with 
growth, our discussion then focusses only on the role of total spending and 
transportation and communication spending in determining economic growth for 
developing and high-income Sample 1 countries. The reasons for positive 
growth impacts of telecommunication investment are explained by Roller and 
Waverman (2001). This will be further discussed and analysed in Section 4.1 of 
Chapter 4. 
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 1.) Developing Sample 1 countries 
 
We firstly discuss the effects of total spending on economic growth in 
developing countries. As can be seen from Table 2-8, the impact of an increase 
in total spending on economic growth is sensitive to the set of control variables. 
Nonetheless, the positive growth effect of additional spending exists once 
government budget constraint has been taken into account. The instrumental 
estimate in Column (5) of Table 2-8 shows that a one percentage to GDP 
increase in public spending raises per capita GDP growth by 0.14%. However, 
the net growth effects of an increase in public spending would become negative 
from the adverse impact of raising tax revenue as a source of funds for 
additional spending.   
In Column (6) of Table 2-8, the non-linear specification suggests that the 
net negative effects of public spending on growth presented in Column (5) can 
be reversed by the positive coefficient of the square term of total spending when 
the size of total spending is large enough. This can be referred to in cases 
where developing countries might underspend government expenditure. 
Therefore, the positive effect of fiscal policy has not yet been achieved at high 
level of public spending.  
In terms of the effects of state variables, a developing country with a high 
initial GDP per capita will experience low per capita growth. A one percentage 
increase in initial GDP per capita implies a 0.06% to 0.07% decrease in per 
capita GDP growth. This evidence supports the conditional convergence 
hypothesis.  
For initial human capital, initial school enrolment rate has insignificant 
relationship with growth while higher initial life expectancy has a favourable 
impact on economic development. Per capita GDP growth of developing 
Sample 1 countries could increase by as much as 0.13% as a result of a 1% 
rise in life expectancy. 
The OLS estimates in Column (1) of Table 2-8 suggest that a 1% of GDP 
increase in investment can be converted to the increment of 0.23% per capita 
growth. Instrumental estimates have shown that this positive outcome is 
overstated. In fact, the increase might be less than 0.10%. 
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Table 2-8: Growth regressions with total public spending of developing Sample 1 countries 
(1972-2012) 
Estimation method OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Dependent variable GR GR GR GR GR GR 
Endogenous variable   tax_gdp K tax_gdp K tax_gdp K tax_gdp K tax_gdp K 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Regressor b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
            
Initial GDP per capita -6.9673*** -6.2327*** -6.2231*** -7.1247*** -6.9561*** -6.7273*** 
(1.06) (1.11) (1.22) (1.14) (1.25) (1.25) 
Initial school enrolment -0.0100 -0.0215 -0.0228 -0.0407 -0.0365 -0.0270 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Initial life expectancy -0.6912 6.2828 10.9079** 10.2104** 13.4883*** 13.1456*** 
(4.44) (4.87) (4.96) (4.83) (4.88) (4.88) 
Gross capital formation  0.2261*** 0.0876** 0.0699* 0.0471 0.0406 0.0373 
(% of GDP) 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Taxes (% of GDP) -0.0588 -0.0757 -0.0566 -0.2126*** -0.3021*** -0.2794*** 
(0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) 
Political instability -3.3267* -3.4360* -3.5224* -3.5453* -3.6392* -3.6926** 
(1.92) (1.91) (1.89) (1.89) (1.87) (1.87) 
M2 (% of GDP)     -0.0467***   -0.0325** -0.0363** 
    (0.02)   (0.02) (0.02) 
Trade (% of GDP)     0.0476***   0.0431*** 0.0396*** 
    (0.01)   (0.01) (0.01) 
Budget surplus (% of GDP)       0.3349*** 0.3965*** 0.4207*** 
      (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
Total spending (% of GDP) -0.0990*** -0.0851*** -0.0866** 0.0895* 0.1386** -0.0140 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.09) 
Square term of total spending            0.0022** 
(% of GDP) 
          (0.00) 
Number of observations 910 879 870 872 863 863 
       
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses below parameters 
***, **, * Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
 
As expected, an increase in tax revenue deteriorates growth, since it 
distorts investment decisions and can also be a disincentive to labour. The 
negative growth effect of additional taxes is large when taking government 
budget constraint into account. This can be interpreted as showing that the 
detrimental effect is exacerbated when a government’s resources are relatively 
limited.  
Political instability is conceivably a factor that undermines economic 
growth, particularly in developing Sample 1 countries through coups or political 
assassinations. The coefficients for political instability are negatively significant. 
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An increase in the ratio of monetary aggregates to GDP has an adverse 
impact on growth. In this case, it can be argued that M2 as a percentage of 
GDP might not be a legitimate proxy for financial sophistication in developing 
Sample 1 countries. In fact, national government uses money creation as a way 
to monetise its debt in order to pay for budget deficits. In this process, debt 
issued by the government is purchased by created money from the central 
bank. This can lead to hyperinflation, particularly when such transactions are 
carried out unaccountably and excessively. As a result of this hidden tax, 
consumers then lose purchasing power. Therefore, debt monetisation could 
have a growth-deterring impact. 
As one might expect, the growth effect of trade openness is favourable. 
However, the impact might be less than we would have expected. An increase 
of one percent of GDP in trade ratio can boost per capita GDP growth of 
developing Sample 1 countries by 0.04% to 0.05%.  
The improvement of budget balance has a positive effect on economic 
growth. This reflects the importance of fiscal health and the fiscal responsibility 
of a government in determining economic development in developing Sample 1 
countries. 
The impact of an increase in transportation and communication spending 
on economic growth for developing Sample 1 countries is presented in Table 2-
9. As with total spending, an increase in transportation and communication 
spending is positively and significantly related to economic growth, especially 
when government budget constraint is inclusively considered. The instrumental 
estimate in Column (5) of Table 2-9 shows that a 1% of GDP increase in 
transportation and communication spending can raise per capita growth rate by 
0.67%.  
Subsidising the increase of the spending by reducing other types of 
spending, the net positive effect of transportation and communication on 
economic growth is partially reduced. The non-linear estimation in Column (6) of 
Table 2-9 has shown that the partial relationship between transportation and 
communication spending and per capita GDP growth is concave.  
The concavity suggests that the positive impact of transportation and 
communication spending on economic growth is somewhat restrained. Our 
results have shown that any increment increase of transportation and 
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communication spending while its level is above 8% of GDP will have opposing 
effect on growth in developing Sample 1 countries. 
 
Table 2-9: Growth regressions with transportation and communication spending of developing 
Sample 1 countries (1972-2012) 
Estimation method OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Dependent variable GR GR GR GR GR GR 
Endogenous variable   tax_gdp K tax_gdp K tax_gdp K tax_gdp K tax_gdp K 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Regressor b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
            
Initial GDP per capita -7.9854*** -7.3516*** -6.8430*** -8.1701*** -7.5718*** -7.8365*** 
(1.11) (1.16) (1.29) (1.19) (1.31) (1.34) 
Initial school enrolment -0.0225 -0.0183 -0.0150 -0.0200 -0.0125 -0.0001 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Initial life expectancy -6.9163 0.2193 4.2903 4.6440 8.1199 10.0176* 
(4.70) (5.12) (5.17) (5.09) (5.16) (5.27) 
Gross capital formation (% of GDP) 0.2249*** 0.0910** 0.0760** 0.0467 0.0408 0.0226 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Taxes (% of GDP) -0.1599*** -0.1689*** -0.1436** -0.2189*** -0.2895*** -0.3044*** 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) 
Political instability -2.5557 -2.7249 -2.9376 -2.8973 -3.1152 -3.0671 
(2.09) (2.08) (2.06) (2.04) (2.02) (2.03) 
M2 (% of GDP)     -0.0533***   -0.0388** -0.0394** 
    (0.02)   (0.02) (0.02) 
Trade (% of GDP)     0.0395***   0.0380*** 0.0368*** 
    (0.01)   (0.01) (0.01) 
Budget surplus (% of GDP)       0.3682*** 0.4199*** 0.4216*** 
      (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
Transportation and communication  0.1246 0.0453 0.1139 0.6169*** 0.6669*** 1.1504*** 
spending (% of GDP) 
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.19) (0.19) (0.40) 
Other spending (% of GDP)       0.0751 0.1171** -0.1406 
      (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
Square term of transportation and            -0.0688 
communication spending (% of GDP) 
          (0.04) 
Square term of other spending            0.0042** 
(% of GDP) 
          (0.00) 
Number of observations 850 823 814 816 807 807 
       
  
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses below parameters 
***, **, * Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
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The effects of control variables on growth in the regressions with 
transportation and communication spending of developing Sample 1 countries 
are relatively similar to growth regressions with total spending. The only 
difference is that the coefficients of initial life expectancy and political instability 
have become insignificant, although they are still positive and negative 
respectively. 
The results for growth regression with other types of functional spending 
in developing Sample 1 countries can be found in Appendix 2. The increases in 
these spending types have either insignificant or negative significant 
relationships with growth. With linear specifications, the increases in general 
public services, defence and health spending have insignificant effects on per 
capita GDP growth, whereas rises in education and social welfare spending 
have growth-diminishing effects. 
 
2.) High-income Sample 1 countries 
 
The estimates in Table 2-10 illustrate the effects of increases in total spending 
on per capita GDP growth of high-income Sample 1 countries.  
 An increase in total public spending in high-income Sample 1 countries 
has a negative impact on per capita GDP growth, except in the growth 
regression which includes both government budget constraint and the 
robustness check in Column (5), where its coefficient is insignificant. The 
coefficient of the square term of total spending in the non-linear specification is 
positive and significant, suggesting that an increase in total spending when its 
level has already been exceptionally high could promote growth. In order to 
raise total spending, the main source of funds will be tax collection, which has a 
growth-deteriorating effect, although the coefficient of taxes is insignificant. As a 
result, the level of total spending in the range that needs to be matched seems 
to be unattainable. 
 The effects of state variables on per capita GDP growth of high-income 
Sample 1 countries are similar to that of developing Sample 1 countries. A 1% 
increase of initial GDP per capita leads to a decline of per capita growth by 
0.05% to 0.07%. Initial school enrolment rate is not significantly linked with per 
capita GDP growth, whereas an increase in initial life expectancy is growth-
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promoting. A 1% rise in life expectancy may increase per capita GDP growth by 
up to 0.23%. 
 
Table 2-10: Growth regressions with total public spending of high-income Sample 1 countries 
(1972-2012) 
Estimation method OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Dependent variable GR GR GR GR GR GR 
Endogenous variable   tax_gdp K tax_gdp K tax_gdp K tax_gdp K tax_gdp K 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Regressor b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
            
Initial GDP per capita -7.1485*** -5.2028*** -4.9127*** -5.2676*** -5.2940*** -5.0356*** 
(0.77) (0.87) (0.96) (0.90) (0.99) (1.00) 
Initial school enrolment 0.0488*** 0.0262 0.0220 0.0251 0.0153 0.0191 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Initial life expectancy 6.8907 21.3283** 21.0727** 21.6753*** 23.2569*** 21.7850** 
(7.36) (8.30) (8.76) (8.35) (8.82) (8.87) 
Gross capital formation (% of GDP) 0.3699*** 0.0289 0.0377 0.0301 0.0458 0.0308 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
Taxes (% of GDP) -0.0231 0.0460 0.0104 0.0304 -0.0821 -0.1281 
(0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) 
Political instability 1.8894 1.9113 2.4215 1.9764 2.8326 3.2460 
(2.33) (2.47) (2.50) (2.48) (2.50) (2.52) 
M2 (% of GDP)     -0.0124***   -0.0135*** -0.0150*** 
    (0.00)   (0.00) (0.00) 
Trade (% of GDP)     0.0271***   0.0281*** 0.0234*** 
    (0.01)   (0.01) (0.01) 
Budget surplus (% of GDP)       0.0190 0.1085* 0.1213* 
      (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
Total spending (% of GDP) -0.0845*** -0.1487*** -0.1275*** -0.1373*** -0.0614 -0.2043** 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) 
Square term of total spending            0.0017** 
(% of GDP) 
          (0.00) 
Number of observations 1115 1097 920 1097 920 920 
       
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses below parameters 
***, **, * Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
 
 The coefficients of gross capital formation are positive but insignificant. 
Neither taxes nor political instability are significantly related to per capita GDP 
growth. 
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 The robustness check confirms a growth-enhancing effect of trade 
openness which is lower than that of developing Sample 1 countries. However, 
an increase in M2 as a percentage of GDP has a detrimental effect on growth. 
High M2 as a percentage of GDP reflects a tendency for the government to 
engage in inflation financing.  This is a relatively inefficient form of taxation. 
 Budget surplus may also have a positive relationship with economic 
growth, even though the effects might not be as trivial as they are in developing 
Sample 1 countries.   
 The effects of an increase in transportation and communication spending 
on growth in high-income Sample 1 countries are considered by using the 
estimates from Table 2-11. A 1% of GDP increase in transportation and 
communication spending raises per capita growth rate by 1.2%, as can be seen 
from the specification in Column (5).  
 The non-linear specification has demonstrated that the partial 
relationship between transportation and communication spending and growth in 
high-income Sample 1 countries is also concave. The positive growth impact of 
additional transportation and communication spending within high-income 
Sample 1 countries might only be attained when the level of spending is below 
4% of GDP.  
 The impacts of other control variables on growth are congruent with 
those of estimates with total public spending. Therefore, these variables in 
Table 2-11 are not discussed.  
 In contrast to transportation and communication spending, increases in 
spending on general public services, education and social welfare have a 
deteriorating impact on growth with linear specifications. Spending on defence 
and health is not significantly related to per capita GDP growth. The results for 
growth regression with all these types of functional spending of high-income 
Sample 1 countries are included in Appendix 2. 
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Table 2-11: Growth regressions with transportation and communication spending of high-
income Sample 1 countries (1972-2012) 
Estimation method OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Dependent variable GR GR GR GR GR GR 
Endogenous variable   tax_gdp K tax_gdp K tax_gdp K tax_gdp K tax_gdp K 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Regressor b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
            
Initial GDP per capita -7.2272*** -5.3636*** -6.4640*** -5.0866*** -6.5818*** -6.5007*** 
(0.81) (0.90) (1.04) (0.91) (1.07) (1.08) 
Initial school enrolment 0.0317* -0.0007 0.0093 0.0193 0.0315 0.0331 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Initial life expectancy 12.9068* 28.0563*** 31.0129*** 25.0199*** 27.7952*** 25.9299*** 
(7.76) (8.48) (9.16) (8.30) (9.00) (8.99) 
Gross capital formation (% of GDP) 0.3866*** 0.0471 0.0442 0.0061 -0.0029 -0.0030 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Taxes (% of GDP) -0.0726** -0.1146** -0.1437*** 0.0103 -0.1253 -0.1516 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) 
Political instability 1.9546 2.2064 2.7876 2.6683 3.4355 3.8010 
(2.33) (2.47) (2.58) (2.42) (2.52) (2.52) 
M2 (% of GDP)     -0.0151***   -0.0099** -0.0109** 
    (0.00)   (0.00) (0.00) 
Trade (% of GDP)     0.0291***   0.0238*** 0.0217** 
    (0.01)   (0.01) (0.01) 
Budget surplus (% of GDP)       0.0630 0.1589** 0.1660** 
      (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
Transportation and communication  0.0480 0.0819 0.8324*** 0.1222 1.2017*** 2.2411*** 
spending (% of GDP) 
(0.11) (0.12) (0.23) (0.13) (0.26) (0.65) 
Other spending (% of GDP)       -0.1227** -0.0640 -0.2003** 
      (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
Square term of transportation and      -0.3210* 
communication spending (% of GDP) 
          (0.17) 
Square term of other spending (% of GDP)         0.0017** 
          (0.00) 
Number of observations 1073 1057 893 1048 884 884 
       
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses below parameters 
***, **, * Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
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2.2.4 Comparison of Study 1 with previous results  
 
Our fiscal-growth studies estimates can be compared to those in earlier 
literature. The results for developing Sample 1 countries will be primarily 
compared with those obtained by Bose et al. (2007). We should note that the 
two studies draw data from different time periods. While Bose et al. (2007) use 
decade averages over the 1970s and 1980s, our study uses annual data from 
1972 to 2012. Where possible, the estimates for high-income Sample 1 
countries are also discussed. The effects of both public spending variables and 
control variables on economic growth are evaluated respectively. 
 
1.) Public spending 
 
The effects of an increase in total public spending on economic growth are 
mostly found to be growth-diminishing in cross-country studies. The studies of 
Lin (1994), and Jiranyakul and Brahmasrene (2007) are some of the exceptions 
in which a growth-enhancing effect from additional government expenditure was 
found. Most studies using samples of high-income countries find negative 
impacts of increased total spending on growth (Bergh & Karlsson, 2010; Folster 
& Henrekson, 2001; Romero-Avila & Strauch, 2008), whereas the growth 
impacts from increased spending of developing countries are not unanimous.  
 Our results for high-income Sample 1 countries with adverse effects on 
growth from an increase in total public spending are comparable to those in the 
majority of previous studies. The analysis of developing Sample 1 countries 
confirms the sensitivity of the results.  
 Unlike Bayraktar and Moreno-Dodson (2012), and Christie (2014), who 
found that the non-linear term of public spending is insignificantly related to 
growth, we found the coefficients of the square term of total spending to be 
positive and significant for both developing and high-income Sample 1 
countries. 
In Bose et al. (2007), in terms of public spending by function, education, 
transportation and communication, and defence spending have positive 
significant relationships with economic growth in base regression and 
regression for the robustness check. Interestingly, the results change 
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dramatically when the government budget constraint is taken into account, with 
education being the only spending type positively related to growth. In our 
study, only transportation and communication spending promotes growth, as 
can be seen in Table 2-12. This significant change of the estimates has 
underlined the bias of estimates where the role of government budget constraint 
is neglected.  We can further compare the effects of each spending type by 
function in our study to those in other literature.  
 
Table 2-12: Comparison between the results of Bose et al.’s (2007) study and our Study 1 
(expenditure variables) 
Expenditure/ studies Bose et al. (2007) Our study 
Base regression 
 
Education 
 
Transportation and communication 
 
Defence 
 
 
Positively significant 
 
Positively significant 
 
Positively significant 
 
 
Negatively significant 
 
Insignificant 
 
Insignificant 
Robustness check 
 
Education 
 
Transportation and communication 
 
Defence 
 
 
Positively significant 
 
Positively significant 
 
Positively significant 
 
 
Negatively significant 
 
Insignificant 
 
Insignificant 
Government budget constraint 
 
Education 
 
Transportation and communication 
 
Defence 
 
 
Positively significant 
 
Insignificant 
 
Insignificant 
 
 
Negatively significant 
 
Positively significant 
 
Insignificant 
 
The growth-enhancing effect of transportation and communication 
spending found in our study is consistent with that found in pre-existing studies 
(Aschauer, 1989; Easterly & Rebelo, 1993; Nurudeen & Usman, 2010). Our 
results earn further merits in detecting the concave relationship between 
transportation and communication spending and per capita GDP growth in 
Sample 1 countries. Specifically, developing Sample 1 countries may use 
transportation and communication spending to promote growth to a greater 
extent than high-income Sample 1 countries did. This highlights the role played 
by government spending in providing public infrastructure, especially for a 
country at the initial stages of development.     
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Education spending is mostly found to be insignificantly or positively 
related to economic growth in preceding research. Although the positive growth 
impact of education spending in our study is not found in linear regression, non-
linear specification for developing Sample 1 countries has shown education 
spending to have a favourable growth effect at the level of spending below 4% 
of GDP. A few studies (Kelly, 1997; Nurudeen & Usman, 2010) show 
contradicting results with regard to adverse growth impacts of increased 
education spending. Interestingly, the partial non-linear relationship between 
education spending and growth in high-income Sample 1 countrires is convex. 
This might not provide the counter-argument towards the growth-promoting 
effect of education spending in high-income countries. It does, perhaps, suggest 
that these high-income Sample 1 countries spend on education efficiently, by 
mainly using either private funds or public spending. This could also be related 
to economies of scale in spending on education.     
While most studies argue that increased defence spending has a 
negative effect on economic growth (Abdullah et al, 2009; Deger & Smith, 1983; 
Knight et al., 1996), some literature has found a positive (Benoit, 1978) or 
neutral growth impact (Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 2004; Biswas & Ram, 1986). 
Fredriksen and Looney (1982) illustrated that the growth impact of additional 
spending on defence depends on resource constraint. Countries which are 
relatively resource-constrained experience a growth-diminishing impact of an 
increase in defence spending, whereas a positive growth effect is otherwise 
found. Hence, the insignificant growth effect of increased defence spending in 
our developing and high-income Sample 1 countries can be appropriately 
explained by Fredriksen and Looney’s argument. Since each group of countries 
in our study may include both countries with and without resource constraint in 
relative terms, growth impact from increased spending in defence is not 
detected.   
Health spending is generally expected to have a positive relationship with 
economic growth (Abdullah et al, 2009; Nketia-Amponsah, 2009; Nurudeen & 
Usman, 2010). However, Kelly (1997) found a negative growth effect of 
increased health spending. Our estimates exhibit an insignificant relationship 
between health expenditure and the economic growth of developing and high-
income Sample 1 countries. 
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Although Kelly (1997) has found that an increase in social welfare 
spending is growth-conducive, our analysis reveals opposite results. In recent 
decades, social welfare spending has increased dramatically due to population 
ageing. Recent data should be able to detect a negative growth effect of 
increased social welfare spending rather than a positive one.   
The effects of general public services spending on growth are hardly 
mentioned in fiscal-growth studies. In our study, the growth impact of additional 
general public services spending is negative for high-income Sample 1 
countries. This relationship is insignificant for developing Sample 1 countries. 
 
2.) Control variables 
 
The effects of control variables in our fiscal-growth studies can also be 
compared to those reported in earlier studies, including Bose et al. (2007). This 
comparison is illustrated in Table 2-13.  
The state variables in our model specification include initial GDP per 
capita, initial school enrolment rate and initial life expectancy. Most studies 
confirm the conditional convergence hypothesis with negative coefficient for 
initial GDP per capita (Barro, 1991; Barro & Lee, 1994; Folster & Henrekson, 
2001; Kneller et al., 1999; Miller & Russek, 1997; Morozumi & Veiga, 2016). 
Our estimates for both developing and high-income Sample 1 countries also 
provide consistent evidence in comparison with previous studies. 
The relationship between initial school enrolment ratio and growth is 
predominantly found to be insignificant (Barro & Lee, 1994; Gemmell, 1996; 
Morozumi & Veiga, 2016; Pritchett, 2001) apart from in Barro (1991) and 
Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) where positive relationships were found. Our 
results conform to those in the majority of studies. 
While Bose et al. (2007) failed to detect a growth-enhancing effect of an 
increase in initial life expectancy in their sample of developing countries, our 
study has found a positive relationship between initial life expectancy and per 
capita growth which is similar to that found in Barro and Lee (1994), and Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin (2004).  
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Hence, the growth-promoting effect of initial human capital in the 
endogenous growth model is exhibited in our study only through initial life 
expectancy.  
 
Table 2-13: Comparison between the results of Bose et al.’s (2007) study and our Study 1 
(control variables) 
Control variables/ studies Bose et al. (2007)  Our study  
State variables 
 
Initial GDP per capita 
 
Initial school enrolment 
 
Initial life expectancy 
 
 
Insignificant 
 
Negative (some significance)
 
Insignificant 
 
Negatively significant 
 
Insignificant 
 
Positive (some significance) 
Other control variables 
 
Investment 
 
Taxes 
 
Political instability 
 
 
Positively significant 
 
Insignificant 
 
Insignificant 
 
 
Positive (some significance) 
 
Negatively significant 
 
Negative (some significance) 
Robustness check 
 
M2 
 
TRADE 
 
 
Insignificant 
 
Insignificant 
 
 
Negatively significant 
 
Positively significant 
Government budget constraint 
 
Budget surplus 
 
 
Positively significant 
 
 
Positively significant 
   
The other control variables in our base regression are investment, taxes 
and political instability. Vast amount of studies, including Bose et al. (2007), 
have found a positive relationship between investment and growth. When 
controlling for endogeneity, the positive effect of investment on growth in 
developing Sample 1 countries in our study is significantly reduced. For this 
reason, some preceding studies might have overstated the favourable growth 
effect of investment. The relationship between investment and growth in high-
income Sample 1 countries is insignificant, as in the findings of Kneller et al. 
(1999). 
Increased tax revenue mostly has a detrimental effect on growth.  
Distortionary taxation (Abdullah et al, 2009; Cashin, 1995; Kneller et al., 1999) 
and direct taxation (Romero-Avila & Strauch, 2008) are usually presented as 
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proxies for government revenue. We find a negative growth impact for 
additional taxes, especially in developing Sample 1 countries. 
 The results of Barro (1991) and Barro and Lee (1994) show the growth-
retarding effect of an increase in political instability. The estimates for 
developing Sample 1 countries are consistent with previous studies, whereas 
the coefficients of political instability are insignificant for high-income Sample 1 
countries.     
The effects of monetary policy and trade are also examined in the 
regression for the robustness check.  
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) found that an increase in monetary 
aggregates has an insignificant relationship with economic growth. This finding 
is in agreement with that of Bose et al (2007). However, Calderon and Liu 
(2003) use both the ratios of monetary aggregates and credits to GDP to 
represent financial development. They find that financial development has a 
favourable growth impact. The results from our study have demonstrated 
detrimental growth effects from increased M2 as a percentage of GDP. We 
argue that the ratio of monetary aggregates to GDP in developing Sample 1 
countries may instead reveal the growth impact from monetisation of 
government debt. The adverse effect in high-income Sample 1 countries might 
be influenced by the fact that countries with high levels of M2 as percentages of 
GDP are the ones with low per capita GDP growth.   
An increase in trade openness could be growth-promoting. It increases 
opportunities for countries to better utilise their comparative advantages. Our 
results are in agreement with Barro and Sala-i-Martin’s (2004). In contrast, the 
coefficients of trade ratio in Miller and Russek (1997) and Romero-Avila and 
Strauch (2008) are found to be insignificant. 
Budget surplus has been shown to have a favourable growth effect 
(Easterly & Rebelo, 1993; Kneller et al., 1999; Miller & Russek, 1997). This 
positive effect can also be established for both developing and high-income 
Sample 1 countries in our study. This confirms the important role played by 
fiscal responsibility in determining economic growth. 
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2.3 Concluding remarks 
 
When comparing public expenditure as a ratio of GDP between 1972 and 2012, 
the figures have shown that, on average, the size of government in high-income 
Sample 1 countries (34.82%) is greater than in developing Sample 1 countries 
(26.63%). This is mainly driven by the high levels of social welfare and 
healthcare spending in high-income Sample 1 countries. From the composition 
of public spending in the past four decades, it has been shown that social 
welfare spending as a share of total spending has increased significantly in 
developing Sample 1 countries while remaining high in high-income Sample 1 
countries. In contrast, defence spending, and transportation and communication 
spending are decreasing over time, both as percentage of GDP and as a ratio 
of total spending. The proportion of education spending as share of total 
expenditure in developing Sample 1 countries (12.96%) is higher than in high-
income Sample 1 countries (9.07%). Population aging is a global trend which 
will continue to be an important factor determining the level and allocation of 
government spending, especially with regard to potentially high levels of social 
welfare and health spending, for the next decade. This problem could become 
another obstacle for any developing country which tries to escape from the 
middle-income trap, since it becomes more challenging to channel sufficient 
public spending for productive use.  
Under the framework used by Bose et al. (2007), our disaggregated 
analysis of the relationship between public expenditure and economic growth 
for groups of Sample 1 countries with different income levels also takes into 
account the problem of endogeneity from taxes and investment, and the 
potential non-linear relationship between public spending and economic growth. 
As with previous studies, the estimates confirm the growth-diminishing effect of 
an increase in public spending in high-income Sample 1 countries. The non-
linear specification has shown that some developing Sample 1 countries’ 
governments may be underspending on public expenditure provided that the 
square term of their country’s total spending has a positive significant 
coefficient. 
Transportation and communication is the only type of spending for which 
an increase has a favourable growth impact in both developing and high-income 
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Sample 1 countries using linear regression. With non-linear specification, the 
partial relationship between this type of spending and economic growth is 
concave. This suggests that the growth-promoting impact of transport and 
communication spending can be attained up to certain level of spending as a 
share of GDP. Developing countries may have more room to manoeuvre than 
high-income countries. Our results have shown that an increase in 
transportation and communication can be growth-enhancing up to the level of 
spending of 8% of GDP in developing Sample 1 countries and 4% of GDP in 
high-income Sample 1 countries. In our study, other types of spending have 
either insignificant or negative relationships with economic growth. 
The relationship between control variables and economic growth in our 
study is principally consistent with previous studies.  In terms of state variables, 
the evidence of conditional convergence hypothesis is prevalent. Although the 
school enrolment ratios are not significantly related to per capita GDP growth, 
initial life expectancy has a positive significant coefficient, especially for the 
estimates of high-income Sample 1 countries.  
Without controlling for endogeneity, the positive growth impact of 
increased investment shown in prior studies might have been overestimated. An 
increase in tax revenue produces a growth-declining impact, especially for 
developing Sample 1 countries. Political instability can have a negative impact 
on growth in developing Sample 1 countries. While an increase in the trade ratio 
is growth-promoting, additional monetary aggregates can be harmful to growth. 
The underlying reason can be that a significant proportion of government debt is 
monetised. The positive association between budget surplus and growth 
reveals the externalities from government’s financial responsibility.  
To conclude, governments must take into account the increasing 
importance of social welfare and healthcare spending over time, especially in 
developing countries. They need to find the appropriate way in which to finance 
welfare spending; either by decreasing other types of expenditure or by raising 
additional revenue. Moreover, a disaggregated analysis of public expenditure 
and growth suggests the importance of the role played by increased 
transportation and communication spending in enhancing economic growth. 
This emphasises the significance of additional public infrastructure investment - 
something that governments need to be responsible for. It should also be noted 
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that the relationship between public spending and growth might be non-linear. 
As a result, the dynamism of fiscal policies is also required. Lastly, budget 
balance is the factor that not only represents a national government’s fiscal 
position but also indicates better potential for growth in implementing fiscal 
policy. 
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Chapter 3: Public expenditure and economic growth: 
government budget constraint and long-run relationship 
 
The previous chapter focusses on the disaggregated analysis of public 
spending and economic growth. In this chapter, we investigate the permanent 
growth effects of fiscal policy discussed in Section 3.1 by specifically 
considering the role that government budget constraint plays in different implicit 
financing elements. This will be referred to as Study 2. The data for this analysis 
comes from the sample group of 66 countries that can be seen in Table 3-1. 
This group will be referred to as Sample 2. The full set of Sample 2 countries 
comprises 34 developing countries and 32 high-income OECD countries. 
In section 3.2, the relationship between public spending and long-run 
GDP per capita is investigated. While the studies featured in Chapter 2 and 
Section 3.1 of Chapter 3 put emphasis on the fiscal-growth relationship in the 
public-policy endogenous growth model, the analysis in Section 3.2 allows for 
Solow-type transitional dynamics where the effects of fiscal policy can be 
persistent. In this study, long-run and short-run effects of fiscal changes are 
identified separately. The study featured in Section 3.2 will be referred to as 
Study 3. This analysis uses the groups of smaller numbers of countries due to 
data availability. This group comprises 38 countries (17 developing countries 
and 21 high-income OECD countries), as shown in Table 3-7. These sample 
groups will be referred to as Sample 3. This section also includes a review of 
more recent studies, which is different from the strand of literature used for the 
analyses in Chapter 2 and Section 3.1 of Chapter 3.    
In the next section, we consider the permanent growth effects of fiscal 
changes using broad categories of government revenue and government 
expenditure for the developing Sample 2 countries and high-income OECD 
Sample 2 countries, while also taking government budget into account.  
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Table 3-1: List of 66 Sample 2 countries (Study 2) 
  Country Income group   Country Income group   Country Income group   Country Income group 
1 Argentina Upper middle income 18 Jamaica Upper middle income 35 Australia High-income: OECD 51 Italy High-income: OECD 
2 Bangladesh Low income 19 Lesotho Lower middle income 36 Austria High-income: OECD 52 Japan High-income: OECD 
3 Belarus Upper middle income 20 Malaysia Upper middle income 37 Belgium High-income: OECD 53 Korea, Rep. High-income: OECD 
4 Bhutan Lower middle income 21 Maldives Upper middle income 38 Canada High-income: OECD 54 Luxembourg High-income: OECD 
5 Bolivia Lower middle income 22 Mauritius Upper middle income 39 Chile High-income: OECD 55 Netherlands High-income: OECD 
6 Brazil Upper middle income 23 Moldova Lower middle income 40 Czech Republic High-income: OECD 56 New Zealand High-income: OECD 
7 Bulgaria Upper middle income 24 Mongolia Lower middle income 41 Denmark High-income: OECD 57 Norway High-income: OECD 
8 Burundi Low income 25 Morocco Lower middle income 42 Estonia High-income: OECD 58 Poland High-income: OECD 
9 Cameroon Lower middle income 26 Pakistan Lower middle income 43 Finland High-income: OECD 59 Portugal High-income: OECD 
10 Costa Rica Upper middle income 27 Panama Upper middle income 44 France High-income: OECD 60 Slovak Republic High-income: OECD 
11 Dominican Republic Upper middle income 28 Romania Upper middle income 45 Germany High-income: OECD 61 Slovenia High-income: OECD 
12 Egypt, Arab Rep. Lower middle income 29 South Africa Upper middle income 46 Greece High-income: OECD 62 Spain High-income: OECD 
13 Ethiopia Low income 30 Syrian Arab Republic Lower middle income 47 Hungary High-income: OECD 63 Sweden High-income: OECD 
14 Georgia Lower middle income 31 Thailand Upper middle income 48 Iceland High-income: OECD 64 Switzerland High-income: OECD 
15 India Lower middle income 32 Tunisia Upper middle income 49 Ireland High-income: OECD 65 United Kingdom High-income: OECD 
16 Indonesia Lower middle income 33 Turkey Upper middle income 50 Israel High-income: OECD 66 United States High-income: OECD 
17 Iran, Islamic Rep. Upper middle income 34 Ukraine Lower middle income             
 
Note: All Sample 2 countries comprise 34 developing countries (low-income and middle-income) and 32 high-income OECD countries.
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3.1 Public expenditure and economic growth: government budget 
constraint (Study 2) 
 
The disaggregated analysis of public expenditure and growth in Chapter 2 
followed the framework proposed by Bose et al. (2007), which is subject to 
potential biases from the omission of government budget constraint except 
when non-tax revenue is an implicit financing element. In this section, several 
implicit financing elements used in Kneller et al. (1999) are applied to our 
growth regressions.  
Conforming to Kneller et al.’s (1999) study, public expenditure in this 
analysis, is broadly classified as productive, non-productive or other 
expenditure. Government expenditures are productive if they are included as 
arguments in the private production function. This is congruent with Devarajan 
et al. (1996) which define productive expenditure as a component of public 
spending, increase in the share of which will enhance the steady-state rate of 
growth. By this definition, Kneller et al. (1999) categorise expenditure types with 
substantial capital components as productive. On the other hand, an increase in 
the share of non-productive expenditure does not affect the steady-state growth 
rate.     
Government revenue comprises distortionary taxes, non-distortionary 
taxes and other revenue. Though some might argue that all kinds of taxation 
are distortionary in certain aspects, Kneller et al. (1999) claim that the relevant 
distortion when testing the endogenous growth model is that of the incentive to 
invest in both physical and human capital. While distortionary taxes affect 
saving and investment decisions, non-distortionary taxes do not reduce the 
returns on investment. Using these criteria, income and property taxes are the 
main forms of taxation that are treated as distortionary. Consumption taxes are 
classified as non-distortionary from a production standpoint, although there 
might have an effect on the choice between labour and leisure. In addition, we 
also include budget balance in the government budget, i.e. excess government 
revenue after expenditure. Each of these variables is presented as a share of 
GDP. The theoretical definitions of these fiscal variables are included in Table 
3-2. 
 
     
   
108 
 
Table 3-2: Theoretical classification of fiscal aggregates 
Theoretical classification Functional classification 
 
Productive expenditure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Non-productive expenditure 
 
 
 
Other expenditure 
 
Distortionary taxes 
 
 
 
 
Non-distortionary taxes 
 
Other revenues 
 
 
General public services expenditure (GPS) 
Defence expenditure (DEF) 
Education expenditure (EDU) 
Health expenditure (HEA) 
Housing expenditure (HOU) 
Transportation and communication expenditure (TRC) 
 
Social security and welfare expenditure (SOC) 
Recreation expenditure (RCR) 
Economic services expenditure excluding TRC (ECN) 
 
Other unclassified expenditure (OT) 
 
Taxation on income and profit (TIN) 
Social security contributions (SSC) 
Taxation on payroll (TPR) 
Taxation on property (TPP)  
 
Taxation on domestic goods and services (TGS) 
 
Taxation on international trade (TTR) 
Non-tax revenues (NTA) 
Other tax revenues (OTT) 
 
 
Using this framework, the public-policy endogenous growth models 
predict that a growth-enhancing effect can be derived from obtaining revenue 
from non-distortionary taxation rather than distortionary taxation, whereas 
switching expenditure from productive to unproductive forms deteriorates 
economic growth (Kneller et al., 1999). An increase in productive expenditure 
financed by non-distortionary taxation is predicted to have a favourable impact 
on the rate of growth, whereas the predicted growth effect of using distortionary 
tax finaincing to increase productive expenditure is unclear. Non-productive 
expenditure undoubtedly has a growth-damaging impact when funded by 
distortionary taxation, but is predicted to have no growth effect if funded by non-
distortionary taxation.  
Like Kneller et al. (1999), Devarajan et al. (1996) predict that shifting the 
mix of public expenditure towards productive spending will increase the long-
term growth rate, providing that the relative shares of productive and non-
productive expenditure are below their relative output elasticities. Moreover, 
they argue that an increase in total government expenditure will only increase 
the steady-state rate of growth if the productivity of that spending is greater than 
that of the taxes used to finance it. 
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Focussing on the growth effects of the broad categories of fiscal 
variables, the set of non-fiscal control variables are those found in the Barro-
type regression. This includes initial GDP per capita (IGDPPAX1P), gross 
capital formation (K) as a share of GDP and labour force growth (LG). Since this 
study is primarily concerned with the role played by different implicit financing 
elements, we have not used the robustness test where other types of non-fiscal 
control variables are added to the equations.   The list of both dependent and 
control variables in Study 2 is shown in Table 3-3. Annual data between 1991 
and 2012 is analysed. This analysis includes data for fewer years than of the 
analysis featured in the previous chapter, because information about some of 
the control variables was unavailable for earlier years.  
This study, unlike that of Kneller et al. (1999), does not include lending 
minus repayments due to the unavailability of the data from an accessible 
source. The omission of this data means that our government budget constraint 
does not include all constituents. For this reason, it should be noted that the 
interpretation of each implicit financing element in our analysis partially includes 
this net repayment item.  
 
Table 3-3: List of variables for Study 2 
Variables Description of the variables 
GR 
IGDPPAX1P 
K 
LG 
pr_gdp 
upr_gdp 
ot_gdp 
distax_gdp 
tgs_gdp 
otrev_gdp 
SURBP 
Annual GDP per capita growth (%) 
One-year lag of GDP per capita (thousand 2005 USD) 
Gross capital formation (% of GDP) 
Labour force growth (%) 
Productive expenditure (% of GDP) 
Non-productive expenditure (% of GDP) 
Other expenditure (% of GDP) 
Distortionary taxation (% of GDP) 
Non-distortionary taxation (% of GDP) 
Other revenue (% of GDP) 
Budget balance (% of GDP) 
 
The regression technique used in this section is the two-way fixed effects 
model, which is preferred to the pooled regression, the one-way fixed effects 
model, the one-way random effects model, and the two-way random effects 
model, based on the comparison of the adjusted R2 and the Hausman test. 
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3.1.1 Government budget constraint: model specification 
 
As pointed out by Kneller et al. (1999), most early studies testing public-policy 
endogenous growth models fail to take the role of government budget constraint 
into account appropriately. The estimates which focus only on one side of the 
budget constraint suffer from systematic bias relating to the assumption of 
implicit financing elements. When all elements of the government budget are 
included, one element must be omitted in order to avoid perfect collinearity. 
That element is regarded as a source or a use of funds when implementing a 
particular fiscal policy. Miller and Russek (1997) underline the important role 
played by the method of financing in determining the growth effect of public 
spending. In other words, the impacts of fiscal policies can be distorted by the 
way in which these policies are financed.    
The implicit financing elements considered in this analysis are non-
distortionary taxes and non-productive expenditures. This differs from the 
method used by Bose et al. (2007), in which non-tax revenue is used as the 
only implicit financing element.  Our assumption is that the omitted variables are 
neutral, implying that their coefficients should be zero. In fact, non-distortionary 
taxes and non-productive expenditure might be non-neutral. They are 
individually omitted from the regression in the first and the second equations. 
Both are then omitted from the third equation.  
 
itititititit
itititittit
ugdpuprgdpprgdpdistaxgdpotgdpotrev
SURBPLGKPIGDPPAXGR

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_____
1
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43210

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itititititit
itititittit
ugdpprgdptgsgdpdistaxgdpotgdpotrev
SURBPLGKPIGDPPAXGR


_____
1
98765
43210


 (2) 
 
ititititit
itititittit
ugdpprgdpdistaxgdpotgdpotrev
SURBPLGKPIGDPPAXGR


____
1
9765
43210


                 (3) 
 
 The coefficient of each fiscal variable is the effect of a unit change in that 
relevant fiscal variable offset by the effect of a unit change in the omitted fiscal 
variable. 
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 In Equation (1), non-distortionary taxation is chosen as the implicit 
financing element. The coefficient of each remaining fiscal variable is the effect 
of a unit change in that relevant fiscal variable offset by the effect of a unit 
change in non-distortionary taxation as a share of GDP.  
 When non-productive expenditure is an implicit financing element in 
Equation (2), the coefficient of each fiscal variable is the effect of a unit change 
of that fiscal variable offset by the effect of a unit change in non-productive 
expenditure as a share of GDP. 
 Both non-distortionary taxation and non-productive expenditure are 
omitted from Equation (3). The coefficient of each fiscal variable can be 
interpreted as an effect of its change offset by the combining effect of a unit 
change in both non-distortionary taxation and non-productive expenditure as a 
share of GDP.   
The regression results will be discussed for the groups of developing 
countries and high-income OECD countries within Sample 2 in next subsection. 
  
3.1.2 The results for developing Sample 2 countries 
  
The results for developing Sample 2 countries in Table 3-4 show that initial 
GDP per capita, gross capital formation, budget surplus and distortionary taxes 
are significantly related to growth. Labour force growth, other revenue, 
productive expenditure, non-productive expenditure and non-distortionary 
taxation have insignificant coefficients.  Some of the coefficients of other 
expenditure are significantly related to growth. 
The negative coefficients of initial GDP per capita confirm the conditional 
convergence hypothesis within a group of developing Sample 2 countries. An 
increase in gross capital formation by 1% of GDP can enhance GDP per capita 
growth by 0.16%. 
The fiscal variables are not all significantly related to rate of growth. 
There is no evidence that an increase in productive expenditure has a growth-
promoting effect, regardless of the choice of implicit financing element. In 
particular, there is no evidence to support the theoretical prediction that an 
increase in productive expenditure financed by non-distortionary taxation has a 
favourable impact on growth rate for developing Sample 2 countries. The 
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insignificant growth effect of an increase in productive expenditure might arise 
from the mixture of spending by functions which may individually have positive 
or negative impacts. 
 
Table 3-4: Growth regressions of developing Sample 2 countries with  
government budget constraint 
Estimation method Two-way FE Two-way FE Two-way FE 
Dependent variable GR GR GR 
Implicit financing element tgs_gdp upr_gdp tgs_gdp upr_gdp 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Regressor b/se b/se b/se 
  
Initial GDP per capita -3.626*** -3.626*** -3.586*** 
  (0.58) (0.58) (0.58) 
Gross capital formation (% of GDP) 0.155*** 0.155*** 0.162*** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Labour force growth (%) 0.021 0.021 0.026 
  (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Budget balance (% of GDP) 0.500*** 0.315*** 0.365*** 
  (0.14) (0.09) (0.08) 
Other revenue (% of GDP) -0.158 0.027 -0.026 
  (0.14) (0.09) (0.08) 
Other expenditure (% of GDP) 0.327** 0.142 0.175** 
  (0.15) (0.09) (0.08) 
Distortionary taxes (% of GDP) -0.655*** -0.470*** -0.489*** 
  (0.17) (0.11) (0.11) 
Productive expenditure (% of GDP) 0.105 -0.080 -0.014 
  (0.13) (0.10) (0.08) 
Non-productive expenditure (% of GDP) 0.185     
  (0.15)     
Non-distortionary taxes (% of GDP)   0.185   
    (0.15)   
Adjusted-R2 0.238 0.238 0.237 
N 450 450 450 
N_g 34 34 34 
  
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses below parameters 
 ***, **, * Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
 
This can be seen in our disaggregated analysis in Chapter 2, where an increase 
in transportation and communication spending has a growth-promoting effect, 
while an increase in education spending has a growth-deteriorating effect. 
However, an increase in other expenditure is conducive to growth unless it is 
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being financed solely by the reduction of non-productive expenditure. While an 
improvement in budget balance is growth-enhancing, an increase in 
distortionary taxation deteriorates growth in developing Sample 2 countries.  
 
3.1.3 The results for high-income OECD Sample 2 countries  
 
As seen in Table 3-5, in high-income OECD Sample 2 countries, initial GDP per 
capita, gross capital formation and labour force growth are significantly related 
to growth. As in the results for developing Sample 2 countries, there is clear 
evidence of conditional convergence in high-income OECD Sample 2 countries. 
The positive impact of a 1% increase in gross capital formation contributes to 
around 0.26% of GDP per capita growth, which is higher than that of developing 
Sample 2 countries. An increase in labour force growth is conducive to per 
capita growth rate in high-income OECD Sample 2 countries. In contrast, the 
estimates of developing Sample 2 countries show that increased labour force 
growth has an insignificant effect on per capita growth rate. The impacts of 
other fiscal variables on growth depend on different implicit financing elements. 
Fiscal policy effectiveness is clearly shown to be mainly driven by financing 
which involves non-productive expenditure. 
An improvement in budget balance can be conducive to growth if it is 
induced by decreasing non-productive expenditure. The positive effect still 
exists when combining a decrease of non-productive expenditure with an 
increase in non-distortionary taxes. 
An increase in distortionary taxes is obviously growth-deteriorating, 
especially when it is used for non-productive expenditure. 
An increase in other expenditure and productive expenditure is growth-
promoting when financed by a decrease in non-productive expenditure, or a 
combination of a decrease in non-productive expenditure and an increase in 
non-distortionary taxes. A 1% of GDP increase in productive expenditure can 
improve GDP per capita growth by 0.16% to 0.26%, depending on different 
implicit financing elements. This favourable growth impact of shifting spending 
from unproductive to productive forms supports the theoretical prediction 
discussed previously. 
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Table 3-5: Growth regressions of high-income OECD Sample 2 countries with  
government budget constraint 
Estimation method Two-way FE Two-way FE Two-way FE 
Dependent variable GR GR GR 
Implicit financing element tgs_gdp upr_gdp tgs_gdp upr_gdp 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Regressor b/se b/se b/se 
  
Initial GDP per capita -0.233*** -0.233*** -0.218*** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Gross capital formation (% of GDP) 0.257*** 0.257*** 0.255*** 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Labour force growth (%) 0.177** 0.177** 0.164** 
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Budget balance (% of GDP) -0.142 0.237*** 0.179*** 
  (0.11) (0.05) (0.05) 
Other revenue (% of GDP) 0.108 -0.272*** -0.203** 
  (0.13) (0.09) (0.08) 
Other expenditure (% of GDP) -0.088 0.291*** 0.182** 
  (0.12) (0.09) (0.08) 
Distortionary taxes (% of GDP) 0.091 -0.289*** -0.213*** 
  (0.11) (0.06) (0.06) 
Productive expenditure (% of GDP) -0.120 0.260*** 0.161** 
  (0.11) (0.08) (0.07) 
Non-productive expenditure (% of GDP) -0.380***     
  (0.12)     
Non-distortionary taxes (% of GDP)   -0.380***   
    (0.12)   
Adjusted-R2 0.510 0.510 0.502 
N 587 587 587 
N_g 32 32 32 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses below parameters 
***, **, * Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
 
In conclusion, in Study 2, the evidence of an increase in productive 
expenditure being conducive to growth exists only in high-income OECD 
Sample 2 countries. The growth-deteriorating effect of distortionary taxes is 
obvious in countries with different income levels. Gross capital formation is 
positively related to growth, whereas initial GDP per capita is negatively related 
to growth in both groups of Sample 2 countries. 
 
     
   
115 
 
3.1.4 Comparison of our Study 2 results with those of Kneller et al. 
(1999) 
 
The results for our high-income OECD Sample 2 countries can be compared 
with the findings of Kneller et al. (1999). We analyse annual data between 1991 
and 2012, whereas Kneller et al. (1999) use five-year averages between 1970 
and 1995. The relationship between each independent variable and growth is 
listed in Table 3-6. 
 
Table 3-6: Comparison between the study of Kneller et al (1999) and our Study 2 
Variables/ studies Kneller et al. (1999) Our study 
Initial GDP 
 
Investment  
 
Labour force growth 
 
Productive expenditure 
 
Other expenditure 
 
Distortionary taxes 
 
Other revenues 
 
Budget balance 
Negatively significant 
 
Insignificant 
 
Insignificant 
 
Positively significant 
 
Positively significant 
 
Negatively significant 
 
Insignificant 
 
Positively significant 
Negatively significant 
 
Positively significant 
 
Positively significant 
 
Mostly positively significant 
 
Mostly positively significant 
 
Mostly negatively significant 
 
Mostly negatively significant 
 
Mostly positively significant 
 
When considering control variables, initial GDP per capita has a 
significant negative coefficient in both studies. Conditional convergence can be 
identified in both studies in different periods. This evidence is also consistent 
with the findings of other studies which take government budget constraint into 
account, i.e. Miller and Russek (1997), and Morozumi and Veiga (2016). While 
both investment ratio and labour force growth are positively related to economic 
growth in our study, neither is significant in Kneller et al. (1999). Our findings for 
investment ratio is supported by both Miller and Russek (1997), and Morozumi 
and Veiga (2016). While the positive growth effects of investment conform 
appropriately to the theoretical prediction, the favourable growth impacts of 
labour force growth may require an increase in productivity of labour.   
When comparing the estimated coefficients of fiscal variables with 
Kneller et al. (1999), we find that productive expenditure, other expenditure and 
budget surplus are conducive to growth in both studies, while an increase in 
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distortionary taxes reduces rates of growth. Other revenues have an 
insignificant relationship with growth in Kneller et al. (1999). However, this 
variable has a negative significant coefficient in our study. 
 Though the estimated results from our study are similar to those of 
Kneller et al. (1999), we have found that fiscal changes mainly affect GDP per 
capita growth through non-productive expenditure financing for high-income 
OECD Sample 2 countries. The favourable growth impact might be lessened 
when the implicit financing elements combine non-productive expenditure and 
non-distortionary taxes. Both elements seem to generate similar growth effects 
in Kneller et al. (1999).   
The contradicting results of growth effects from fiscal changes regarding 
different implicit financing elements are, however, supported by Miller and 
Russek (1997), and Morozumi and Veiga (2016). In the sample of developed 
countries in Miller and Russek (1997), deficit-financed increases in government 
expenditure do not affect economic growth and tax-financed increases lead to 
lower growth. When combining high-income and developing countries, 
Morozumi and Veiga (2016) found that a rise in total spending financed through 
revenue has a positive effect on growth, while an increase in total spending 
financed by higher deficits has an insignificant growth impact. These findings 
confirm that sources of funds play important roles in determining the growth 
effect of increased public spending, but also show that growth effects can vary 
between the groups of countries used for analysis, especially those with 
different income levels. The different effects seen when studying different 
periods might suggest the existence of fiscal policy decision dynamics. 
 In the next section, we consider the impacts of fiscal changes on the 
level of long-run GDP. 
 
3.2 Public spending and long-run GDP level (Study 3) 
 
3.2.1 Introduction 
 
The fiscal-growth studies in Chapter 2 and Section 3.1 of Chapter 3 focus on 
the public-policy endogenous growth model. In those studies, permanent growth 
effects of fiscal changes are analysed without transitional dynamics. The 
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analysis of fiscal policy impacts in this section allows for Solow-type transitional 
dynamics, but the effects of fiscal policy may be persistent according to the 
framework proposed by Gemmell et al. (2016). 
 Gemmell et al.’s (2016) study was motivated by the recent fiscal stimulus 
enacted after 2009 in order to counteract the global financial crisis. 
Governments’ spending choices in these short-term packages are partially 
influenced by their ambitions to comply with long-term growth objectives. With 
these policy objectives, there are two different questions to be addressed: how 
forceful is the evidence that long-run income levels or growth rates react to 
changes in public spending, and if they do, which expenditure types produce 
most considerable impacts?  Later in this section, we attempt to respond to 
these questions by looking at both developing countries and high-income OECD 
countries. The study in this section will be referred to as Study 3 and use 
Sample 3 countries.  
  
3.2.2 Literature review 
 
In terms of the period of study, recent studies on fiscal policy and long-run size 
of economy (either level of GDP or rate of growth) include recent data, 
especially the Acosta-Ormaechea and Morozumi’s (2013) study which uses 
data from 1970 to 2010. Other studies (Afonso & Jalles, 2014; Arnold et al., 
2011; Gemmell et al., 2011; Gemmell et al., 2016; Xing, 2012) also cover 
periods from the 1970s until 2010. Ojede and Yamarik (2012) focus on an 
earlier period; 1967 to 2008. 
In terms of the sets of fiscal variables used, these studies either put 
emphasis on tax policy (Arnold et al., 2011; Ojede & Yamarik, 2012; Xing, 
2012), public spending (Gemmell et al., 2016), or both types of variables at 
once (Afonso & Jalles, 2014; Gemmell et al., 2011). In addition, Afonso and 
Jalles (2014) look at both functional and economic classes of fiscal variables 
according to the Government Finance Statistics (GFS) definitions provided by 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
As well as being categorised by their focus (on revenue and/or 
expenditure), the effects of fiscal changes can be classified by their impact on 
the size of economy (short-run or long-run impact). Some of these studies focus 
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only on permanent growth effects (Acosta-Ormaechea & Morozumi, 2013; 
Afonso & Jalles, 2014), while others distinguish between the long-run and short-
run impacts of changes in fiscal variables (Arnold et al., 2011; Gemmell et al., 
2011; Gemmell et al., 2016; Ojede & Yamarik, 2012; Xing, 2012). Our study 
pays specific attention to the latter set of studies. 
While many studies that differentiate between the long-run and short-run 
effects of fiscal change capture the size of an economy by using the growth rate 
of GDP or the growth rate of GDP per capita, Arnold et al. (2011), Xing (2012) 
and Gemmell et al. (2016) use the level of per capita GDP. Gemmell et al. 
(2016) claim that using this specification is advantageous because it allows the 
degree of persistence in GDP growth responses to be identified by the data, 
rather than by using a functional form incorporating permanent effects. For this 
reason, our study will focus on the impact on level of GDP per capita. 
The three studies referred to above use cross-country data, whereas 
Ojede and Yamarik (2012) evaluate the growth effects of tax policy at state 
level. Instead of investigating the growth effects of fiscal policy, Lamartina and 
Zaghini (2011) test the validity of Wagner’s law in high-income OECD countries.   
Although there are differences in the model specifications for 
investigating change in fiscal composition and their effects on either the level of 
GDP or economic growth, the findings are, to a certain degree, harmoniously 
aligned. We go on to discuss previous findings, econometric methods, included 
variables in the model, the role played by budget constraint, and other 
econometric issues in these studies. 
 
3.2.2.1 Previous findings 
 
This strand of literature, like the permanent growth effects of fiscal change 
studies in Chapter 2 and Section 3.1 of Chapter 3, mainly considers high-
income countries and, more specifically, high-income OECD countries (Arnold 
et al., 2011; Gemmell et al., 2011, Gemmell et al., 2016; Xing, 2012). Other 
studies, e.g. Acosta-Ormaechea and Morozumi (2013) and Afonso and Jalles 
(2014), consider a wider set of countries.  
Some studies find the reallocation of fiscal composition to be robustly 
related to long-run growth or GDP level, while others do not. In order to 
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understand this incongruity clearly, we need to take several aspects of the 
preceding results into consideration. Firstly, there are two different types of 
fiscal variables being considered, namely public expenditure and public 
revenue. Secondly, we need to consider the way in which an increase in public 
expenditure is financed. We previously refer to this as an implicit financing 
element. For example, Gemmell et al. (2016) find that an increase in total 
spending enhances GDP per capita level in the long run when financed by non-
distortionary taxes. Thirdly, fiscal variable classifications can be interpreted 
differently when we analyse the impacts of changes in these variables on GDP 
or growth of GDP. This depends on the aspect of fiscal change we need to 
evaluate in order to assess its impact. The following paragraphs summarise the 
key findings of the papers mentioned earlier. 
Arnold et al. (2011) find that shifting taxes on income towards 
consumption and immovable property enhances long-run GDP per capita. In 
particular, increasing revenue by raising current taxes on immovable property 
and consumption is least harmful to growth. Arnold et al.’s (2011) findings are 
supported by Xing (2012), suggesting that shifting tax revenue away from 
corporate income, personal income, and consumption taxes, and towards 
property taxes is associated with a higher level of income per capita in the long 
run. 
When investigating state-level data, Ojede and Yamarik (2012) obtained 
different results from Arnold et al. (2011) and Xing (2012). They found that 
increases in sales and property taxes reduce long-run real income growth. 
Gemmell et al. (2011) observe that the growth effects of fiscal policy in 
the short run appear to persist. Although some fiscal variables only have 
transitory effects, others might have persistent growth effects. However, the 
positive growth effects associated with productive spending are often 
counteracted by the negative effects of tax changes. 
Gemmell et al. (2016) raise awareness of the significance of financing 
methods for increasing any type of public expenditure when determining long-
run GDP level. By using pooled mean group estimators (PMG) with 
contemporaneous correlation, they find robust long-run positive effects on GDP 
per capita levels for reallocating total spending towards transportation and 
communication, and education spending. 
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In contrast, Afonso and Jalles (2014) find that revenue has no significant 
impact on growth. Moreover, government expenditures appear to have highly 
significant negative signs. 
Acosta-Ormaechea and Morozumi (2013) find that an increase in 
education spending offset by a fall in social spending seems to be robustly 
related to higher growth rates. These results also hold true at the general 
government level. Their results also show that education spending promotes 
growth as well as public capital does in the long run. Additionally, they note that 
finding proxies for the quality of public spending would be challenging. 
 
3.2.2.2 Improvement of econometric methods 
 
Recent developments in data collection has improved the availability of data, so 
it has become possible to investigate the compositional change of public 
spending and its impact on long-run GDP per capita level or growth.  
The updated data can be used under the assumptions of short-run 
heterogeneity and long-run homogeneity. This econometric method proposed 
by Pesaran et al. (1999) is pooled mean group estimators (PMG). It is a 
compromise between the fixed effects model and the mean group estimator 
(MG). While intercept, short-run coefficients and error variances are allowed to 
differ across groups, the long-run coefficients are equal. This method has been 
analysed by Arnold et al. (2011), Gemmell et al. (2011), Ojede and Yamarik 
(2012), Xing (2012), and Gemmell et al. (2016). 
 
3.2.2.3 Variables included in recent studies 
 
- Dependent variable 
 
The choice of dependent variable is distinctly separable between growth of 
GDP and level of GDP. While most studies use the growth rate of either GDP or 
GDP per capita, Arnold et al. (2011) use a change in log of GDP per capita and 
a change in log of TFP of a given firm. Similarly, Xing (2012) also uses a 
change in log of real GDP per capita as a dependent variable. While Gemmell 
et al. (2011) use a change in the growth rate of GDP in one of their studies, the 
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level of GDP per capita is employed by Gemmell et al. (2016). The dependent 
variable in Ojede and Yamarik (2012) is the change in growth rate of real 
income.  
It is important to note that all of these studies (Arnold et al., 2011; 
Gemmell et al., 2011, Gemmell et al., 2016; Ojede & Yamarik, 2012; Xing, 
2012) estimate the results with an error correction model. When interpreting the 
results, we need to refer back to the equations in terms of the autoregressive 
distributed lag model: i.e. the long-run level of GDP per capita impact from fiscal 
change is analysed in Xing (2012), rather than the growth effect (change in log 
of real GDP per capita).  
Afonso and Jalles (2014) use the real growth rate of GDP per capita, and 
Acosta-Ormaechea and Morozumi (2013) select the growth of output per capita. 
 
- Fiscal variables 
 
Different classes of expenditure and revenue can be considered. Two broad 
categories of each type of fiscal variables are included, following the example of 
Kneller et al. (1999) and based on the framework proposed by Barro (1990); 
namely productive expenditure, unproductive expenditure, distortionary taxes 
and non-distortionary taxes. These categories have already been defined in 
Section 3.1. We will now describe some of the fiscal variables included in recent 
studies. 
Arnold et al. (2011) focus on tax structures which can be classified 
mainly into income taxes, consumption taxes and property taxes. Ojede and 
Yamarik (2012) and Xing (2012) also emphasise on the composition of tax 
revenues.  
Gemmell et al. (2011) use broad categories of revenue and expenditure: 
productive expenditure, non-productive expenditure, distortionary taxes and 
non-distortionary taxes. Gemmell et al. (2016) utilise broad categories of 
revenue similar to those used by Gemmell et al. (2011) and functional 
classifications of public expenditure, namely transportation and communication, 
education, health and housing etc. 
Afonso and Jalles (2014) focus on both aggregate levels and GFS 
(Government Finance Statistics) classifications of fiscal variables. This includes 
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functional and economic classifications of both government expenditure and 
revenue. Acosta-Ormaechea and Morozumi (2013) also look at both economic 
and functional classifications of public expenditure. Economic classifications 
include the compensation of employees, other expenses and the net acquisition 
of non-financial assets. Functional classifications include defence, 
transportation and communication, health, education, and social protection 
expenditures. 
 
- Non-fiscal control variables 
 
A number of factors can be used as non-fiscal control variables. The criteria 
used to decide which should be chosen are highly dependent on the type of 
question or particular model being investigated. Since using pooled mean group 
estimators limits the number of control variables due to a decrease in the 
degree of freedom, this strand of literature often only includes a few non-fiscal 
control variables in analyses. 
Arnold et al. (2011) and Xing (2012) include investment rate, human 
capital and population growth. Gemmell et al. (2011) and Gemmell et al. (2016) 
use investment rate and employment growth. Like Gemmell et al. (2011, 2016), 
Ojede and Yamarik (2012) include growth in private employment and private 
investment share in their set of non-fiscal control variables.  
While Afonso and Jalles (2014) use population growth, investment, 
education and trade openness, Acosta-Ormaechea and Morozumi (2013) 
include initial GDP per capita and initial human capital in their set of non-fiscal 
control variables.  
 
3.2.2.4 The role of government budget constraint 
 
Government budget constraint needs to be considered in order to avoid the 
production of invalid results due to biases occurring as a result of not including 
both revenue and spending variables in the same equation. This issue has been 
explained in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2. Recent studies take government budget 
constraint into account while avoiding perfect multicollinearity in accordance 
     
   
123 
 
with the specification in Kneller et al. (1999). The important role played by the 
implicit financing element is highly relevant in this analysis. 
 
3.2.2.5 Other econometric issues 
 
There are also other econometric issues which should be addressed, such as 
endogeneity and a robustness check.  
Firstly, Afonso and Jalles (2014) investigate the robustness of their 
results by adding variables (labour force participation and unemployment rates) 
into the baseline regression. Similarly, Acosta-Ormaechea and Morozumi 
(2013) add inflation, openness, population growth and terms of trade growth 
into their original set of control variables. Different specifications, including 
lagged fiscal variables and the different developmental levels of countries in the 
sample, might also be considered. 
Secondly, using pooled mean group estimators to analyse the error-
correction model might require some tests as prerequisites. Gemmell et al. 
(2016) tested the order of integration and cointegration, autoregressive 
distributed (ARDL) lag structure, and weak exogeneity. They found that their 
variables are best treated as non-stationary. Imposing two-lags of ARDL tends 
to strengthen the case for significant causal effects from a number of public 
spending categories on the level of long-run GDP per capita. Their estimated 
results offer relatively strong support for the theory that expenditure share 
variables can be considered to be weakly exogenous, allowing interpretation of 
the estimated long-run expenditure parameters as capturing causal effects on 
GDP. The issues tested in Gemmell et al. (2016) will be further investigated in 
Subsection 3.2.4 of our study. Public expenditure composition is analysed in the 
next subsection. 
  
3.2.3 Public expenditure composition of Sample 3 countries 
 
In this subsection, we analyse the data on public expenditure composition for 38 
selected countries in Sample 3 according to the availability of control variables, 
which is mainly affected by labour growth. The set of Sample 3 countries in 
Table 3-7 is divided into two main groups: developing countries and high-
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income OECD countries. The group of developing countries includes 17 
countries, referred to as developing Sample 3 countries. The group of high-
income OECD countries consists of 21 countries, referred to as high-income 
OECD Sample 3 countries. 
 
 Table 3-7: List of Sample 3 countries in Study 3 by group  
Developing countries High-income OECD countries 
Bolivia Morocco Austria* Korea, Rep. 
Brazil South Africa Canada* Luxembourg* 
Cameroon Thailand Chile Netherlands* 
Costa Rica Tunisia Denmark* New Zealand* 
Dominican Republic Turkey Finland* Norway* 
Egypt, Arab Rep. Nepal France* Portugal 
India   Hungary Spain* 
Indonesia   Iceland* Sweden* 
Iran, Islamic Rep.   Ireland UK* 
Malaysia   Israel United States* 
Mauritius   Italy   
  
Note: * Our 14 OECD countries included in Gemmell et al.’s (2016) group of 17 OECD countries 
 
As shown in Figure 3-1, total public spending in the group of Sample 3 
countries has slightly increased in the past four decades. This can be seen from 
the increase in unweighted 10-year average total spending to GDP from 
23.42% in 1972-1981 to 25.44% in 2002-2011 for developing Sample 3 
countries. For high-income OECD Sample 3 countries, the level of total public 
spending to GDP increased from 32.55% in 1972-1981 to 35.19% in 2002-
2011. Public spending in high-income OECD Sample 3 countries increased 
significantly during the 1970s and 1980s, but subsided in later periods. On the 
other hand, the proportion of government spending to GDP in developing 
Sample 3 countries increased consistently during 1992-2001 and 2002-2011. 
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Figure 3-1: Unweighted 10-year averages of total public spending as percentages of GDP  
for groups of Sample 3 countries (1972-2011) 
 
3.2.3.1 The composition of public spending 
 
Table 3-8 presents the average amount of particular types of public spending by 
Sample 3’s groups of countries as percentages of GDP. In percentage terms, 
government spending in high-income OECD Sample 3 countries is obviously 
higher than in developing Sample 3 countries. The same also applies to many 
other types of spending, although not to spending on general public services. 
The level of spending on education as a share of GDP is relatively similar 
across different groups of Sample 3 countries, with an average of around 3.38% 
of GDP.  
 
Table 3-8: Unweighted averages of public spending by type as percentages of GDP for groups 
of Sample 3 countries (1972-2012) 
Developing 
countries 
High-income 
OECD countries 
Total spending 23.96 35.74 
General public services 3.80 2.73 
Defence 2.07 2.41 
Transportation and communication 1.42 1.64 
Education 3.38 3.39 
Healthcare 1.45 3.62 
Social welfare 3.13 12.59 
 
 
1972‐1981 1982‐1991 1992‐2001 2002‐2011
Developing 23.42 23.23 23.34 25.44
OECD 32.55 38.20 36.34 35.19
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The composition of public spending in different groups of countries varies 
depending on the policies and problems that particular governments encounter. 
The unweighted averages of public spending by type as percentages of total 
spending from 1972 to 2012 for developing Sample 3 countries and high-
income OECD Sample 3 countries are shown in Table 3-9. In developing 
Sample 3 countries, general public services (16.2%), education (14.1%) and 
social welfare (11.9%) spending are crucial elements of government budgets. In 
contrast, high-income OECD Sample 3 countries spend a large proportion of 
public expenditure on social welfare (34.7%), healthcare (10.1%) and education 
(9.7%). Social welfare spending accounts for more than a third of total public 
spending in high-income OECD Sample 3 countries. 
 
Table 3-9: Unweighted averages of public spending by type as percentages of total spending for 
groups of Sample 3 countries (1972-2012) 
Developing 
countries 
High-income 
OECD countries 
General public services 16.20 7.65 
Defence 8.69 7.30 
Transportation and communication 6.51 4.71 
Education 14.10 9.67 
Healthcare 6.23 10.05 
Social welfare 11.93 34.72 
 
The public spending composition of developing Sample 3 countries is 
presented in Figure 3-2 using unweighted 10-year averages for the period from 
1972 to 2011. It is clear that social welfare spending as a proportion of total 
public spending has increased significantly over time. In contrast, spending on 
defence, and transportation and communication has decreased significantly 
relative to other types of public spending. 
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Figure 3-2: Unweighted 10-year averages of spending by type as percentages of total spending 
for developing Sample 3 countries (1972-2011) 
 
The proportions of most spending types, including general public 
services, education and social welfare spending, in relation to total spending in 
high-income OECD Sample 3 countries have not changed dramatically in the 
past forty years as can be seen in Figure 3-3. Healthcare spending has 
increased more noticeably over time than other types of expenditure, whereas 
spending on defence has been decreasing. 
 
 
Figure 3-3: Unweighted 10-year averages of spending by type as percentages of total spending 
for high-income OECD Sample 3 countries (1972-2011) 
 
The following subsection explains the estimation method used to analyse 
long-run relationship between fiscal variables and GDP per capita. 
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3.2.4 Public spending and long-run GDP per capita investigating 
heterogeneous panel data: estimation method 
 
In this subsection, we discuss the econometric methods used to study the 
relationship between public spending and long-run levels of GDP per capita in 
Sample 3’s groups of countries. Later (in Subsection 3.2.5), we present the 
estimates separately, according to the Sample 3 country groupings, i.e. 
developing countries and high-income OECD countries. This subsection (3.2.4) 
includes the discussion of pooled mean group estimator (PMG), and tests for 
cointegration and ARDL lag structure. 
 
3.2.4.1 Pooled mean group (PMG) estimator 
 
The endogenous growth model in Devarajan et al. (1996) captures the 
permanent growth effects from fiscal changes without transitional dynamics 
(Gemmell et al., 2016). Allowing for Solow-type transitional dynamics while the 
effects of fiscal change may be persistent requires a more flexible functional 
form than that of Devarajan et al. (1996). Using an autoregressive distributed 
lag (ARDL) model parameterised in error correction form in Gemmell et al. 
(2016) allows both the short-run dynamic and the long-run equilibrium 
relationships between GDP and fiscal variables to be identified separately. The 
ARDL(p,q) specification is: 
 
 ݕ௜,௧ ൌ 	∑ ߙ௜,௝ݕ௜,௧ି௝ ൅ ∑ ߚ௜,௝ ௜ܺ,௧ି௝ ൅ ߤ௜ ൅ ߝ௜,௧௤௝ୀ଴௣௝ୀଵ     (4) 
 
where Xi,t-j includes all explanatory variables. Equation (4) can be expressed in 
error correction form: 
 
݃௜,௧ ൌ ∆ݕ௜,௧ ൌ ∅௜൫ݕ௜,௧ିଵ െ 	ߚ௜ ௜ܺ,௧൯ ൅ ∑ ߙ௜,௝∗ ∆ݕ௜,௧ି௝௣ିଵ௝ୀଵ ൅ ∑ ߚ௜,௝∗௤ିଵ௝ୀ଴ ∆ ௜ܺ,௧ି௝ ൅ ߤ௜	 ൅ ߝ௜,௧   
           (5) 
 
where ∅௜ captures the error correcting speed of adjustment and βi captures the 
long-run equilibrium relationship between y and X with short-run effects 
measured by β*i,j. The estimates of long-run coefficient βi are not affected by the 
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choice between Xi,t and Xi,t-1 in determining the long-run relationship. While 
Arnold et al. (2011), Ojede and Yamarik (2012), and Xing (2012) use Xi,t, 
Gemmell et al. (2011, 2016) prefer Xi,t-1. We use Xi,t in our study, since it 
provides better computational convenience in our statistical package than using 
Xi,t-1.       
Blackburne and Frank (2007) suggest several approaches which can be 
taken in order to estimate Equation (5). Firstly, a fixed effect (FE) estimation 
approach could be used when data from each group is pooled and only the 
intercepts are allowed to differ across groups. Pesaran and Smith (1995) show 
that these regressions are likely to be biased if the assumption of homogeneity 
of the short-run parameter estimates across countries is rejected. Secondly, the 
model might be fitted separately for each group and the arithmetic average of 
coefficients could be calculated by using mean group estimators (MG). The MG 
estimators allow both short and long-run parameter heterogeneity. Thirdly, 
Pesaran et al. (1999) proposed a PMG estimation that combines both methods 
of pooling (FE) and averaging (MG). The intercept, short-run coefficients and 
error variances are allowed to differ across groups, but the long-run coefficients 
are constrained to be equal across groups. Furthermore, Pesaran et al. (1999) 
have also demonstrated that allowing for short-run parameter heterogeneity 
results in more reliable estimates of the long-run responses.  
We present the results of PMG estimates, as the Hausman test prefers 
PMG to MG (see Appendix 3). The implication of the results from the Hausman 
test is that the assumption of homogenous long-run parameter estimates across 
countries is valid. The PMG method selected is then comparable to Gemmell et 
al.’s (2016) study. 
This part of our study investigates the long-run relationship between 
public spending and the GDP per capita level of the 38 countries in Sample 3 
(see Table 3-7) which are classified as developing countries (17 countries) and 
high-income OECD countries (21 countries). These groups of Sample 3 
countries were selected based on the availability of control and fiscal variables. 
The groups of developing countries and high-income OECD countries in 
Sample 3 have been analysed separately, in a similar way to Gemmell et al. 
(2016), by looking at the effects of total public expenditure and public 
expenditure composition. Our study period is 1972-2012. 
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Our dependent variable gi,t is the change in log of GDP per capita. 
Although the growth rate of per capita GDP is the dependent variable, as shown 
in Equation (5), the regression measures the impacts of fiscal and other 
variables on long-run per capita GDP level. Equation (5) is just a re-
parameterisation of Equation (4).  As discussed earlier, Gemmell et al. (2016) 
argue that using level specification allows the identification of the degree of 
persistence in GDP growth responses. 
The non-fiscal control variables included in this study are labour force 
growth (LG) and investment ratio to GDP (K). Labour force growth before 1990 
is assumed to be constant (from the average of available data) in a number of 
Sample 3 countries where accurate data is not readily available. When taking 
government budget constraint into account, our fiscal control variables include 
the ratio of total expenditure to GDP, distortionary taxes to GDP, non-
distortionary taxes to GDP and budget surplus to GDP. The theoretical 
classification of fiscal variables are discussed in Section 3.1. In the cases where 
we consider public spending composition, the expenditure share of a particular 
type of public spending in relation to total public spending is added individually. 
The list of variables included in Study 3 is shown in Table 3-10.  
 
Table 3-10: List of variables for Study 3 
Variables Description of the variables 
y  
K 
LG 
tot_gdp 
distax_gdp 
tgs_gdp 
SURBP 
TOT 
gps_tot 
def_tot 
trc_tot 
 
edu_tot 
hea_tot 
soc_tot 
Log of GDP per capita (2005 USD) 
Gross capital formation (% of GDP) 
Labour force growth (%) 
Total public spending (% of GDP) 
Distortionary taxation (% of GDP) 
Non-distortionary taxation (% of GDP) 
Budget balance (% of GDP) 
Total public spending in local currency unit 
Spending on general public services (% of TOT) 
Spending on defence (% of TOT) 
Spending on transportation and communication  
(% of TOT) 
Spending on education (% of TOT) 
Spending on health (% of TOT) 
Spending on social welfare (% of TOT)  
 
The first part of the analysis of each group of Sample 3 countries looks at 
the total public expenditure effect with four different implicit financing elements: 
budget deficit; distortionary taxes; non-distortionary taxes; and a mix of both 
distortionary and non-distortionary taxes. In the second part of the analysis, we 
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use budget deficit as an implicit financing element, focussing on the impact of 
shifting expenditure towards a particular type of public spending composition on 
the long-run GDP per capita level. There are two Sample 3 groups of countries 
considered: developing countries and high-income OECD countries. The model 
specification will be explained further in Subsection 3.2.5. 
Gemmell et al. (2016) raise an endogeneity concern with regard to the 
potential for simultaneity between GDP per capita and the independent 
variables, especially the fiscal and investment variables. According to certain 
conditions relating to the cointegrating relationship, estimates of the long-run 
parameter vector derived from regression of models from Equation (5) are 
consistent.  In addition, serial correlations can be sufficiently dealt with by using 
appropriate orders of the ARDL model (Pesaran & Shin, 1998). This implies that 
the endogeneity problem can be overcome by using an ARDL with sufficiently 
long lags, provided that the regressors are not cointegrated among themselves. 
Consistent with Gemmell et al. (2016), the variables are firstly checked to 
ascertain whether they are I(0) or I(1) and whether they are cointegrated. The 
appropriate ARDL lag structure is then considered. 
 
3.2.4.2 Tests for cointegration and ARDL lag structure 
 
Before discussing the results, we test the order of integration and cointegration, 
and the ARDL lag structure. The groups of developing countries and high-
income OECD countries within Sample 3 are separately tested. Alhough tests 
have been performed with regard to both the effects of total expenditure and 
functional spending, our discussion focusses on the former.   
 
- Testing the order of integration and cointegration 
 
We firstly test whether our variables are I(0) or I(1). A non-stationary series is 
integrated of order d, denote I(d), if it becomes stationary after being differenced 
d times (Greene, 2012). Like Choi (2001), we use the Fisher-type unit root test, 
since it can be applied to unbalanced panels. The p-values from the unit root 
test applied to each group in the panel data are combined to derive an overall 
test of whether the panel series contains a unit root. The null hypothesis is that 
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every panel contains a unit root, while the alternative is that at least one panel is 
stationary. While the evidence of non-stationarity is found in all variables of 
developing Sample 3 countries, the null hypothesis of investment ratio, labour 
force growth and budget surplus is rejected for high-income OECD Sample 3 
countries. However, the test rejects the null of non-stationarity for each of the 
variables after taking first differences. 
Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) can distinguish series that appear to be 
stationary, series that appear to have a unit root, and series for which data is 
not sufficiently informative, by testing both the unit root hypothesis and the 
stationary hypothesis. Though Kwiatkowski et al.’s (1992) methodology is 
beyond our scope, it suggests that our unit root test might have low statistical 
power. This implies that we might falsely reject the null hypothesis of unit root. 
Hence, our variables are most suited to being treated as non-stationary.   
For the cointegration test, we implement Westerlund’s (2005) method 
using variance ratio test statistics. The advantage that this method has over the 
other tests is that it does not require a correct specification of the data 
generating process. Other tests require some forms of modelling and estimation 
to correct for the heteroscedasticity and serial correlation properties of the data. 
Therefore, the outcomes of other cointegration tests can be very sensitive to 
these choices. The null hypothesis of Westerlund’s (2005) test is no 
cointegration, while the alternative hypothesis is that the variables are 
cointegrated in all panels. Another variant of Westerlund’s test has the 
alternative hypothesis that the variables are cointegrated in some of the panels. 
According to variance ratio test statistics, we reject the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration for all of our PMG specifications.  
With unit root and cointegration tests, our model appears to fulfil the 
conditions which allow the ARDL model to overcome endogeneity concerns. 
 
- Testing the ARDL lag structure 
  
As discussed earlier, the appropriate modification of the orders of the ARDL 
model is sufficient to deal with the residual serial correlation and the problem of 
endogenous regressors (Pesaran & Shin, 1998). 
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 Gemmell et al. (2016) discuss the argument that augmentation may be 
viewed as applying to an initial ARDL(p,q) model where lags are chosen a 
priori. For example, an initially selected ARDL(1,1) might suffer from 
endogeneity. This can be corrected by running the ARDL(p,m) model where 
m≥1. The numbers of lags p and m can be chosen by using the Schwarz 
Criterion. 
However, there is data limitation in our samples, in that second lag 
cannot be applied to all independent variables. This is partly due to unbalanced 
panel data. For this reason, our analysis focusses on the ARDL(1,1) model. Our 
tests on appropriate lag structure using the time series of each country suggest 
that only a few sample countries require second lag of independent variables. 
This indirectly implies that the endogeneity problem might not be an issue using 
the ARDL(1,1) model in our study. In fact, ARDL(1,1) model is also used by 
Arnold et al. (2011) and Xing (2012). 
 
3.2.5 Public spending and long-run GDP per capita investigating 
heterogeneous panel data: estimated results 
 
Using the ARDL(1,1) model, the error correction form can be specified in order 
to analyse the long-run GDP impacts of both changes in  total government 
spending and changes in the shares of different spending types for developing 
Sample 3 countries and high-income OECD Sample 3 countries.  
Firstly, the equations in error correction form, for impact of changes in 
total spending, can be specified according to different implicit financing 
elements. The equation in which budget balance is an implicit financing element 
is represented by Equation (6). While Equation (7) has distortionary taxation as 
an implicit financing element, non-distortionary taxation is a source of funds in 
Equation (8). Equation (9) omits both the distortionary and non-distortionary 
taxation variables. 
 
∆ݕ௜,௧	 ൌ 	∅௜൫ݕ௜,௧ିଵ െ ߚଵܭ௧ െ	ߚଶܮܩ௧ െ ߚଷݐ݋ݐ_݃݀݌௧ െ ߚସ݀݅ݏݐܽݔ_݃݀݌௧ െ	ߚହݐ݃ݏ_݃݀݌௧൯
൅ ߚଵ௜∗ ∆ܭ௜,௧ ൅ ߚଶ௜∗ ∆ܮܩ௜,௧ ൅ ߚଷ௜∗ ∆ݐ݋ݐ_݃݀݌௜,௧ ൅ ߚସ௜∗ ∆݀݅ݏݐܽݔ_݃݀݌௜,௧
൅ ߚହ௜∗ ∆ݐ݃ݏ_݃݀݌௜,௧ ൅ ߤ௜ ൅ ߝ௜,௧ 
                    (6) 
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∆ݕ௜,௧	 ൌ 	∅௜൫ݕ௜,௧ିଵ െ ߚଵܭ௧ െ	ߚଶܮܩ௧ െ ߚଷݐ݋ݐ_݃݀݌௧ െ ߚସܷܴܵܤ ௧ܲ െ	ߚହݐ݃ݏ_݃݀݌௧൯ ൅ ߚଵ௜∗ ∆ܭ௜,௧
൅ ߚଶ௜∗ ∆ܮܩ௜,௧ ൅ ߚଷ௜∗ ∆ݐ݋ݐ_݃݀݌௜,௧ ൅ ߚସ௜∗ ∆ܷܴܵܤ ௜ܲ,௧ ൅ ߚହ௜∗ ∆ݐ݃ݏ_݃݀݌௜,௧ ൅ ߤ௜ ൅ ߝ௜,௧ 
                    (7) 
 
∆ݕ௜,௧	 ൌ 	∅௜൫ݕ௜,௧ିଵ െ ߚଵܭ௧ െ	ߚଶܮܩ௧ െ ߚଷݐ݋ݐ_݃݀݌௧ െ ߚସܷܴܵܤ ௧ܲ െ	ߚହ݀݅ݏݐܽݔ_݃݀݌௧൯
൅ ߚଵ௜∗ ∆ܭ௜,௧ ൅ ߚଶ௜∗ ∆ܮܩ௜,௧ ൅ ߚଷ௜∗ ∆ݐ݋ݐ_݃݀݌௜,௧ ൅ ߚସ௜∗ ∆ܷܴܵܤ ௜ܲ,௧
൅ ߚହ௜∗ ∆݀݅ݏݐܽݔ_݃݀݌௜,௧ ൅ ߤ௜ ൅ ߝ௜,௧ 
(8) 
 
∆ݕ௜,௧	 ൌ 	∅௜൫ݕ௜,௧ିଵ െ ߚଵܭ௧ െ	ߚଶܮܩ௧ െ ߚଷݐ݋ݐ_݃݀݌௧ െ ߚସܷܴܵܤ ௧ܲ൯ ൅ ߚଵ௜∗ ∆ܭ௜,௧ ൅ ߚଶ௜∗ ∆ܮܩ௜,௧
൅ ߚଷ௜∗ ∆ݐ݋ݐ_݃݀݌௜,௧ ൅ ߚସ௜∗ ∆ܷܴܵܤ ௜ܲ,௧ ൅ ߤ௜ ൅ ߝ௜,௧  
(9) 
 
Secondly, the impacts of changes in the shares of different spending 
types are investigated. As in Gemmell et al. (2016), budget balance is the 
implicit financing element. It has been claimed that omitting budget balance 
facilitates interpretation, because deficit-funded tax or expenditure changes 
have intuitive economic translations. The shares of each public spending 
category are then added to each equation. Equation (10) illustrates the equation 
in which the share of general public spending is considered. We also estimate 
the impacts of changes in the shares of defence, transportation and 
communication, education, health, and social welfare spending. These are also 
the main types of spending that we considered in Chapter 2. 
 
∆ݕ௜,௧	 ൌ 	∅௜൫ݕ௜,௧ିଵ െ ߚଵܭ௧ െ	ߚଶܮܩ௧ െ ߚଷݐ݋ݐ_݃݀݌௧ െ ߚସ݀݅ݏݐܽݔ_݃݀݌௧ െ	ߚହݐ݃ݏ_݃݀݌௧
െ ߚ଺݃݌ݏ_ݐ݋ݐ௧ሻ ൅ ߚଵ௜∗ ∆ܭ௜,௧ ൅ ߚଶ௜∗ ∆ܮܩ௜,௧ ൅ ߚଷ௜∗ ∆ݐ݋ݐ_݃݀݌௜,௧ ൅ ߚସ௜∗ ∆݀݅ݏݐܽݔ_݃݀݌௜,௧
൅ ߚହ௜∗ ∆ݐ݃ݏ_݃݀݌௜,௧ ൅ ߚ଺௜∗ ∆݃݌ݏ_ݐ݋ݐ௜,௧ ൅ ߤ௜ ൅ ߝ௜,௧ 
(10) 
 
We will firstly discuss the long-run GDP impacts of both changes in total 
government spending and changes in the shares of different spending types for 
developing Sample 3 countries, followed by a discussion of estimates for high-
income OECD Sample 3 countries.  Our results of high-income OECD Sample 
3 countries will then be compared with previous results from Gemmell et al. 
(2016) in Subsection 3.2.7.  
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3.2.5.1 Developing Sample 3 countries (1972-2012)  
 
For the 17 developing Sample 3 countries, the results from the test for total 
public expenditure effects in Table 3-11 suggest that there is no evidence that 
an increase in total spending is positively related to long-run GDP per capita.  
 
Table 3-11: PMG for developing Sample 3 countries testing for total public expenditure effects 
Estimation method Pooled mean group estimates 
Dependent variable Annual GDP per capita growth rate (ᅪy) 
Implicit financing element SURBP DISTAX TGS DISTAX, TGS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Regressor b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Long-run effects         
Investment ratio 0.1446* 0.0407*** 0.1111*** 0.0057 
  (0.08) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) 
Labour growth -0.5451 -0.0886* 0.2051*** -0.3935* 
  (0.34) (0.05) (0.07) (0.22) 
Total expenditure -0.2278** 0.0124 -0.0725** -0.0799 
  (0.11) (0.01) (0.03) (0.05) 
Budget balance   0.1315*** -0.1079*** 0.5004*** 
    (0.03) (0.04) (0.19) 
Distortionary taxes 0.2194**   0.0790***   
  (0.10)   (0.03)   
Non-distortionary taxes 0.1615*** 0.1720***     
  (0.06) (0.03)     
Error correction term -0.0062* -0.0232*** -0.0077 -0.0051** 
  (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Short-run effects         
 (first difference)         
Investment ratio 0.0042*** 0.0041*** 0.0042*** 0.0048*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Labour growth -0.0002 -0.0028 -0.0045 -0.0028 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Total expenditure -0.0033** -0.0034** -0.0025 -0.0025 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Budget balance   -0.0010 0.0030 -0.0002 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Distortionary taxes 0.0072   0.0090*   
  (0.01)   (0.01)   
Non-distortionary taxes -0.0005 -0.0036     
  (0.00) (0.00)     
Log-likelihood 1191.82 1347.73 1194.65 1334.68 
N 496 572 496 572 
n_g 17 17 17 17 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses below parameters 
 ***, **, * Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
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Instead, when increased total spending is financed by either budget 
deficit (Column (1)) or non-distortionary taxes (Column (3)), the long-run GDP 
per capital level might deteriorate. The adverse long-run effects on GDP per 
capita from budget deficit financing (at -0.2278) are greater than the effects 
from non-distortionary taxes financing (-0.0725). 
As seen in Table 3-11, the estimated coefficient of budget surplus in 
Column (2) is positive, whereas that in Column (3) is negative. This implies that 
improving budget balance but simultaneously increasing distortionary taxes to 
finance additional spending has different impacts on GDP per capita than 
improving of budget balance but simultaneously increasing non-distortionary 
taxes.  
The positive effects of gross capital formation on GDP are evident. The 
estimated coefficients of ∅ indicate speeds of convergence to equilibrium of 
around less than 2.3% per year. This implies that the effects of fiscal shock by 
permanent increases in total spending on the level of GDP per capita could be 
highly persistent in developing Sample 3 countries. 
 As stated earlier, we investigate the potential long-run impacts of public 
spending composition on GDP per capita by focussing on the specification in 
which changes in total public spending are implicitly financed by changes in the 
budget balance. To save space, the results for public expenditure composition 
in the tables present only the parameters for total public expenditure and the 
functional spending of interest. 
As illustrated by Table 3-12, there is an evidence that an increase in the 
share of a particular type of spending could improve the level of per capita GDP 
in the long run for developing Sample 3 countries. This could be done through 
increases in the spending shares of healthcare and general public services. A 
1% permanent increase in the share of general public services to total spending 
could improve the long-run GDP per capita level by 1.5%. A permanent 
increase in health spending has a more substantial favourable impact on long-
run GDP (8.7%). In contrast, an adverse effect on long-run GDP per capita is 
found with defence spending (-5.5%) and education spending (-8.5%). 
Increases in the shares of transportation and communication, and social welfare 
do not have significant impacts on long-run GDP per capita. The low value of 
convergence rates again confirms the enduring effects of fiscal policy shock in 
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developing Sample 3 countries. The positive value of estimated error correction 
coefficient in Column (5) for the change in the share of health spending might 
suggest divergence from a long-run equilibrium relationship after fiscal change. 
As a result, it is important to take care when interpreting the enhancing effect of 
an increase in the share of health spending on long-run GDP in developing 
Sample 3 countries. 
 
Table 3-12: PMG for developing Sample 3 countries using public expenditure composition 
Estimation method Pooled mean group estimates 
Dependent variable Annual GDP per capita growth rate (ᅪy) 
Implicit financing element Budget surplus/ deficit 
Share of GPS DEF TRC EDU HEA SOC 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Regressor b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Long-run effects             
Total expenditure 0.0064 -0.0171*** 0.0249*** 0.0518* 0.0446*** 0.0186** 
  (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) 
Expenditure share 0.0148*** -0.0553*** -0.0209 -0.0849** 0.0865*** -0.0090 
  (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) 
Error correction term -0.0197 -0.0800*** -0.0120 -0.0046 0.0032 -0.0165 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) 
Short-run effects             
 (first difference)             
Total expenditure -0.0035** -0.0025 -0.0038** -0.0051*** -0.0031 -0.0043*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Expenditure share -0.0005 0.0035 -0.0017 -0.0039 -0.0001 -0.0012 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Log-likelihood 1155.63 1176.05 1155.80 1158.78 1152.41 1161.76 
N 479 480 473 475 470 474 
n_g 17 17 17 17 17 17 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses below parameters 
 ***, **, * Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
  
 
3.2.5.2 High-income OECD Sample 3 countries (1972-2012) 
 
Looking at the total public expenditure effects on the 21 high-income OECD 
Sample 3 countries presented in Table 3-13, the only case in which an increase 
in public spending enhances the long-run level of GDP per capita is when the 
increase is financed by non-distortionary taxes. The long-run GDP per capita 
level could be raised by 1.2% with a 1% permanent increase in total spending 
as a share of GDP when financed by non-distortionary taxation. 
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Table 3-13: PMG for high-income OECD Sample 3 countries testing for total public  
expenditure effects 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses below parameters 
 ***, **, * Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
 
An increase in total spending using financing methods related to budget 
deficit or distortionary taxation has a harmful effect on long-run GDP per capita 
levels in high-income OECD Sample 3 countries. The long-run GDP impact is 
most damaging when the increased total spending is funded by a combination 
of distortionary and non-distortionary taxation (-5.5%).  As also seen in the 
results for developing Sample 3 countries, the speeds of convergence to 
Estimation method Pooled mean group estimates 
Dependent variable Annual GDP per capita growth rate (ᅪy) 
Implicit financing element SURBP DISTAX TGS DISTAX, TGS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Regressor b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Long-run effects         
Investment ratio 0.0216*** 0.0176*** 0.0515*** 0.0521*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Labour growth 0.0379* 0.0382** 0.0165 0.0347 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) 
Total expenditure -0.0264*** -0.0414*** 0.0122** -0.0547*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Budget balance   -0.0252*** 0.0471*** -0.0162 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Distortionary taxes -0.0111   -0.0692***   
  (0.01)   (0.01)   
Non-distortionary taxes 0.1578*** 0.1717***     
  (0.01) (0.01)     
Error correction term -0.0295*** -0.0344*** -0.0255*** -0.0202*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Short-run effects         
 (first difference)         
Investment ratio 0.0059*** 0.0060*** 0.0057*** 0.0059*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Labour growth 0.0008 0.0008 0.0012 0.0013* 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Total expenditure -0.0031*** -0.0024** -0.0052*** -0.0032*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Budget balance   0.0010* -0.0022* 0.0001 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Distortionary taxes 0.0017*   0.0039**   
  (0.00)   (0.00)   
Non-distortionary taxes -0.0076*** -0.0090***     
  (0.00) (0.00)     
Log-likelihood 2153.14 2326.02 2128.86 2264.77 
N 751 812 751 812 
n_g 21 21 21 21 
     
   
139 
 
equilibrium are low, at around 2.0% to 3.4% per year. The effect of fiscal policy 
shock could be long-lasting in high-income OECD Sample 3 countries. The 
convergence rates are higher than in developing Sample 3 countries.  
 
Table 3-14: PMG for high-income OECD Sample 3 countries using public  
expenditure composition 
Estimation method Pooled mean group estimates 
Dependent variable Annual GDP per capita growth rate (ᅪy) 
Implicit financing element Budget surplus/ deficit 
Share of GPS DEF TRC EDU HEA SOC 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Regressor b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Long-run effects             
Total expenditure -0.0224*** -0.0266*** -0.0206*** -0.0255*** -0.0272*** -0.0288*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Expenditure share -0.0217*** 0.0075 -0.0161 0.1587*** 0.0019 -0.0065 
  (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.00) 
Error correction term -0.0336*** -0.0308*** -0.0298*** -0.0191*** -0.0293*** -0.0308*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Short-run effects             
 (first difference)             
Total expenditure -0.0029*** -0.0032*** -0.0030*** -0.0034*** -0.0032*** -0.0035*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Expenditure share 0.0025*** -0.0246 0.0002 -0.0037 -0.0001 -0.0026*** 
  (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Log-likelihood 2158.86 2104.88 2121.31 2143.91 2155.40 2174.53 
N 742 717 728 740 742 742 
n_g 21 21 21 21 21 21 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses below parameters 
  ***, **, * Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively  
 
The results of the functional spending analysis of high-income OECD 
Sample 3 countries in Table 3-14 suggest that in the long term, increases in the 
share of spending for general public services will deteriorate the GDP per capita 
level. On the other hand, more could be spent on education relative to other 
types of spending while increasing the long-term level of GDP per capita, given 
the ratio of total spending to GDP. A 1% permanent increase in the share of 
spending for education will raise the long-run GDP per capita level by 15.9% in 
high-income OECD Sample 3 countries. This strong positive impact may need 
further verification. The convergence rates are similar to those in the analysis of 
change in total public spending.  
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3.2.6 Breakdown of non-distortionary taxes for high-income OECD 
Sample 3 countries 
 
Because financing from non-distortionary taxes (TGS) for additional public 
expenditure can enhance GDP per capita level in the long run for high-income 
OECD Sample 3 countries, we also consider which kind of non-distortionary tax 
financing is conducive to increasing long-run GDP levels. As in the anlysis in 
Subsection 3.2.5, the ARDL(1,1) model is applied to the pooled mean group 
(PMG) estimates, including the first difference of all control variables when 
considering short-run effects. The implicit financing element of non-distortionary 
taxes consists of three key components: general taxes on goods and services 
(GTGS); excise taxes on goods and services (ETGS); and other non-
distortionary taxes (OTGS).  
Figure 3-4 presents the 10-year unweighted averages of the composition 
of non-distortionary taxes in high-income OECD Sample 3 countries. The 
composition of non-distortionary taxes for high-income OECD Sample 3 
countries between 1972 and 2012 comprises, on average, 59.5% of general 
taxes on goods and services, 31.0% of excise taxes and 9.5% of other non-
distortionary taxes. The proportion of general taxes has increased over time. On 
the contrary, excise taxes and other non-distortionary taxes have steadily 
decreased.  
 
 
Figure 3-4: Unweighted 10-year averages of non-distortionary taxes composition for  
 high-income OECD Sample 3 countries  
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The specification of equations is similar to that in the analysis in 
Subsection 3.2.5 for long-run GDP impacts of the changes in total public 
spending using non-distortionary taxes as a source of funding (Equation (8)). 
The implicit financing elements considered in this subsection include general 
taxes, excise taxes and other non-distortionary taxes. They are all included 
additionally and separately in the equations as a share of GDP complementing 
Equation (8). The descriptions of variables are listed in Table 3-15.  
 
Table 3-15: List of variables for the composition of non-distortionary taxation 
Variables Description of the variables 
gtgs_gdp  
etgs_gdp 
otgs_gdp 
General taxes on goods and services (% of GDP) 
Excise taxes on goods and services (% of GDP) 
Other non-distortionary taxes (% of GDP) 
 
The error correction form equations can be specified by Equation (11) to 
Equation (13) according to implicit financing elements: general taxes in 
Equation (11), excise taxes in Equation (12) and other non-distortionary taxes in 
Equation (13). The estimates in Table 3-16 also include the results of Equation 
(8) in Column (1) in order to compare the financing of non-distortionary taxation 
and its constituents.  
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           (11) 
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൅ ߤ௜ ൅ ߝ௜,௧ 
(12) 
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൅ ߤ௜ ൅ ߝ௜,௧ 
(13) 
    
As seen in Table 3-16, the results from the PMG estimation for high-
income OECD Sample 3 countries show that the positive impact on GDP per 
capita from additional public spending only occurs when it is financed by an 
increase in excise taxes. A 1% of GDP increase in total spending financed by 
excise taxes will raise long-run GDP per capita by 4.4% (Column (3)). This 
positive effect is higher than the 1.2% increase from non-distortionary taxes 
financing at aggregate level shown in Column (1).  While financing incremental 
spending by using other non-distortionary taxes has a negative impact on the 
level of GDP per capita in the long run, an increase in total spending financed 
by general taxes does not have significant effect on the long-run GDP per 
capita level.  
Our analysis demonstrates that the favourable impact of changes in total 
spending through financing by non-distortionary taxes is highly influenced by 
the role played by excise taxes. The speed of adjustment to equilibrium long-run 
relationship is consistent with the findings in Subsection 3.2.5. The convergence 
rates are around 1.7% to 3.3% per year. 
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Table 3-16: PMG for high-income OECD Sample 3 countries with broad categories of fiscal 
variables (non-distortionary taxes breakdown)  
Estimation method Pooled mean group estimates 
Dependent variable Annual GDP per capita growth rate (ᅪy) 
Implicit financing element TGS GTGS ETGS OTGS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Regressor b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Long-run effects         
Investment ratio 0.0515*** 0.0229** 0.0063 0.0125 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Labour growth 0.0165 0.0790*** 0.0056 0.0561 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) 
Total expenditure 0.0122** -0.0077 0.0443*** -0.1556*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) 
Budget balance 0.0471*** 0.0269** 0.0651*** -0.0762*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) 
Distortionary taxes -0.0692*** -0.0293** -0.0595*** 0.0535** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
General taxes     0.0329* 0.2733*** 
      (0.02) (0.05) 
Excise taxes   0.2921***   0.4369*** 
    (0.05)   (0.08) 
Other taxes   -0.0087 0.1041***   
    (0.05) (0.02)   
Error correction term -0.0255*** -0.0196*** -0.0331** -0.0169*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Short-run effects         
 (first difference)         
Investment ratio 0.0057*** 0.0059*** 0.0059*** 0.0062*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Labour growth 0.0012 0.0010 0.0016* 0.0007 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Total expenditure -0.0052*** -0.0050*** -0.0052*** -0.0019 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Budget balance -0.0022* -0.0015 -0.0017 0.0015* 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Distortionary taxes 0.0039** 0.0033* 0.0026 -0.0003 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
General taxes     -0.0062** -0.0059** 
      (0.00) (0.00) 
Excise taxes   -0.0096*   -0.0115** 
    (0.01)   (0.00) 
Other taxes   -0.0108 -0.0235   
    (0.01) (0.02)   
Log-likelihood 2128.8558 2138.6254 2145.9160 2140.5469 
N 751 731 731 736 
n_g 21 21 21 21 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses below parameters 
***, **, * Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
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3.2.7 Comparison with the results of Gemmell et al. (2016) 
 
The literature investigating impacts of fiscal changes on long-run GDP levels 
focusses on government revenues. To the best of my knowledge, Gemmell et 
al. (2016) is the only study that can be directly compared with our analysis of 
the effects of changes in government expenditure on the long-run GDP per 
capita. 
 While Gemmell et al. (2016) include data for 17 OECD countries 
between 1970 and 2008, we extend this to include data for 21 OECD countries 
between 1972 and 2012. It must be noted that their data is not nested in our 
sample. 14 out of 17 countries in their sample are included in our high-income 
OECD Sample 3 countries, as shown in Table 3-7. 
 Firstly, we compare the estimates for the long-run level of GDP impacts 
of changes in total government spending. Our results for high-income OECD 
Sample 3 countries have shown that increasing total spending only has a 
favourable effect on the long-run GDP per capita level when the spending is 
financed by non-distortionary taxation. This finding is consistent with that of 
Gemmell et al. (2016). While they have found that a 1% permanent increase in 
total spending as a share of GDP financed by non-distortionary taxes will raise 
the long-run GDP per capita level by 2.0%, our analysis has shown that the 
impact is positive, but somewhat lower, at 1.2%. The speed of convergence to 
equilibrium in both studies is similarly low, at around 3.9% to 9.2% a year in 
Gemmell et al. (2016) and 2.0% to 3.4% in our study. Our results indicate that 
this may persist longer than Gemmell et al. (2016) suggest.  
Secondly, we look at the long-run GDP impacts of shifting spending from 
the remaining categories into particular functions. Gemmell et al. (2016) find 
evidence of potentially positive GDP effects from changes in transportation and 
communication spending, and education spending. We also find that changing 
the share of education spending can have a favourable effect, although the 
impact from changing the share of transporation and communication spending 
is insignificant. This might demonstrate that the GDP-enhancing effect of an 
increase in the share of transportation and communication spending reported in 
Gemmell et al. (2016) is not robust when additional high-income OECD 
countries are included. Furthermore, their results might be specific to the period 
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of 1970 to 2008. In contrast, the positive impact on long-run GDP per capita 
from a change in education spending share is reaffirmed. However, the GDP- 
promoting effect of 15.9% in our study might be overstated, compared with the 
2.0% in Gemmell et al. (2016). Both studies observe significant negative long-
run associations between GDP and share of general public services spending. 
 
3.3 Concluding remarks 
 
In this chapter, we investigated the relationship between public expenditure and 
the sizes of economies in two different circumstances. First, in Study 2 with 
groups of Sample 2 countries, the permanent growth impacts of fiscal changes 
in the public-policy endogenous growth model are investigated using broad 
categories of fiscal variables, namely productive expenditure, non-productive 
expenditure, distortionary taxes and non-distortionary taxes. The effects on 
growth are considered under the government budget constraint, according to 
Kneller et al.’s (1999) theoretical definitions, using several implicit financing 
elements. Secondly, we investigated the relationship between public spending 
and long-run GDP per capita level within the framework proposed by Gemmell 
et al. (2016) in Study 3 using the Sample 3 groups of countries. 
With regard to government budget constraint in Study 2, the evidence for 
an increase in productive expenditure being conducive to growth exists only for 
high-income OECD Sample 2 countries. This applies to additional spending 
financed solely by reducing non-productive expenditure or by combining this 
with an increase in non-distortionary taxes. The growth-deteriorating effect of 
distortionary taxes is obvious across countries. These findings for productive 
expenditure and distortionary taxes in high-income OECD Sample 2 countries 
are consistent with those of Kneller et al (1999).  
When examining the relationship between public spending and the level 
of long-run GDP per capita when the first differences of control variables are all 
included in short-run effects in Study 3, we see that an increase in total 
spending which is financed by non-distortionary taxes only enhances the level 
of GDP per capita in the case of high-income OECD Sample 3 countries. This is 
driven by excise taxes financing, in particular.  
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Given that total spending is level, increases in the shares of healthcare 
and general public services spending can improve the levels of GDP per capita 
in developing Sample 3 countries. On the other hand, increasing the share of 
education spending in a high-income OECD Sample 3 country is conducive to 
increasing the level of GDP per capita. This result differs from those of Gemmell 
et al. (2016); they found that a positive long-run effect on output level could be 
achieved in their OECD countries by reallocating total spending towards both 
transportation and communication, and education spending. This might imply 
that the favourable GDP impacts of changes to the transporation and 
communication spending share for OECD countries found by Gemmell et al. 
(2016) are not robust.   
The speed of adjustment to the long-run equilibrium relationship in our 
analysis in Study 3 is exceptionally low for both developing Sample 3 countries 
and high-income OECD Sample 3 countries. The impacts of fiscal changes on 
GDP can be extremely persistent. This also extends to transitory growth effects, 
which could also persist during this transition.  
It is worth noting that the ARDL(1,1) model used in Study 3 excludes the 
possibility that fiscal changes on GDP per capita have longer, persistent effects 
which could be captured by, for example, the second lag. In other words, 
endogenity might exist within our estimated parameters. However, we find that 
second difference is rarely required for the regressors using time series data to 
identify ARDL lag structure. Hence, there is reason to believe that endogeneity 
is not a major concern in our study.  
 In summary, our study shows that increasing revenue through 
distortionary taxes should be avoided, since it reduces the rate of economic 
growth. Moreover, the growth impacts of fiscal changes vary by different implicit 
financing elements.  
Governments of high-income OECD countries may be able to improve 
GDP per capita levels in the long run by using non-distortionary taxes to 
increase total spending. Changing the composition of public spending while 
holding the total spending constant, could also enhance the long-run GDP per 
capita level. In high-income OECD countries, this could be done by increasing 
the proportion of education spending. In developing countries, this could be 
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done by increasing in the share of general public services or healthcare 
spending.  
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Chapter 4: Telecommunication infrastructure and economic 
development 
 
The evidence of positive growth impacts from an increase in transportation and 
communication spending in both developing and high-income countries in 
Chapter 2 helps to improve our understanding of the role played by 
telecommunication infrastructure in economic development.  
In this chapter, we further investigate the relationship between 
telecommunication infrastructure and aggregate output by particularly looking at 
the output contribution of two different types of communication technologies: 
fixed telephones and mobile phones. This will be attempted by using a 
simultaneous-equations based estimation strategy. There are three main 
objectives in using this method.  First, our study takes a structural approach to 
the estimation of fixed telephones and mobile phones’ contributions in a 
production function type setting.  We do this by establishing cointegrating 
relationships between variables to reflect the underlying theoretical structure.  
Second, the endogeneity issue is addressed by estimating a system of 
equations, using three-stage least squares (3SLS).  Third, non-linear effects of 
mobile phones and fixed telephones on production are tested. 
 
Table 4-1: List of Sample 4 countries for the analysis of telecommunication  
and economic development (Study 4) 
Developing countries High-income OECD countries 
Brazil Morocco 
Costa Rica Peru 
Egypt. South Africa 
India Syrian Arab Republic 
Indonesia Thailand 
Lesotho Tunisia 
Malaysia Turkey 
Mauritius Venezuela 
Mexico 
 
Australia Italy 
Austria Japan 
Belgium Korea, Rep. 
Canada Luxembourg 
Chile Netherlands 
Denmark New Zealand 
Finland Norway 
France Portugal 
Germany Spain 
Greece Sweden 
Iceland Switzerland 
Ireland United Kingdom 
Israel United States 
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In the following analysis, 26 high-income OECD and 17 developing 
countries are examined in two different periods of time: 1975-1990 and 1990-
2012. The list of countries is shown in Table 4-1. These groups will be referred 
to as Sample 4. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The telecommunication industry has grown significantly over the past few 
decades. The share of telecommunication revenue to GDP in high-income 
OECD countries increased from 1.29% in 1975 to 2.23% in 2012.4  The figures 
for developing countries increased even more: from 0.67% to 3.08% of GDP.5 
Fixed telephone subscriptions in high-income OECD countries increased 
significantly between 1975 and 2000; however, the level of penetration has 
gradually decreased since then.6 The adoption of fixed telephones in 
developing countries was much slower and reached its highest penetration in 
2009. Mobile-cellular telephone infrastructure was launched in the 1980s; 
however, the usage of mobiles has accelerated quickly, surpassing fixed 
telephone subscriptions in the 2000s in both high-income OECD and 
developing countries.7 
The expansion of the telecommunication industry is related to increases 
in economic activities. Telecommunication investment leads to economic 
development for several reasons as discussed by Roller and Waverman (2001). 
Firstly, it leads to higher consumption of telecommunication final outputs and 
intermediate goods for providing telecommunication services. This would also 
increase demand for goods and services used in telecommunication 
infrastructure production. Secondly, the economic returns are higher than the 
return from telecommunication investment itself, in part because improved 
communication makes production more efficient and improves business 
operation. Furthermore, with network externalities, the output dividend from 
telecommunication investment could be non-linear. It is interesting to note that 
increasing returns at a higher level of telecommunication infrastructure may 
                                                            
4 There are 26 high-income OECD countries included in this study. (see Table 4-1)   
5 There are 17 developing countries included in this study. (see Table 4-1) 
6 In this study and various studies, fixed telephone can also be referred to as fixed-line, main 
line, access line, telephone line and main telephone. 
7 Mobile phone may be referred to as mobile-cellular and cellular.  
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exist. This is different from the diminishing returns from other types of 
infrastructure. Consequently, it is important to understand the impact of 
telecommunication investment at the macroeconomic level. 
The study of the relationship between telecommunication infrastructure 
and economic development potentially suffers from the problems of reverse 
causality and spurious correlation as pointed out in Roller and Waverman 
(2001). Using a simultaneous model to investigate the relationship between 
telecommunication investment and economic growth can resolve simultaneity. 
Controlling for country specific effects will lessen the problem of spurious 
correlations. By doing this, the heterogeneity or individual effects which may be 
unobserved are taken to be constant over time (Greene, 2012). 
The next section reviews related literature on telecommunications and 
economic development. 
 
4.2 Review of literature on telecommunications and economic 
development 
 
The level of economic development varies across countries because of 
differences in long-term economic growth rates. However, the cause of the 
unequal rates of growth has not been precisely verified (Norton, 1992). In order 
to identify a major reason for the unequal rates, the growth of the economy has 
been linked with telecommunications by recent empirical and theoretical 
literature; for example, a significantly positive relationship between 
telecommunication infrastructure and growth was found by Datta and Agarwal 
(2004). Another example is an earlier study conducted by Norton (1992) in 
which the relationship between transaction costs, telecommunications, and 
economic growth was identified.  
Understanding the development of the previous literature on 
telecommunication and economic development is an essential part of explaining 
the disparities in economic growth rates across countries.  Therefore, the 
similarities and differences in the studies of the interaction between 
telecommunications and economic development have been systematically 
analysed. 
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4.2.1 Telecommunication infrastructure as a general purpose 
technology 
 
Infrastructure is widely accepted to be an important factor contributing to 
economic growth. There are a number of elements that constitute infrastructure 
including roads, railway lines, electricity infrastructure and telephones. 
Considering a specific type of infrastructure can help us clearly understand the 
impact of infrastructure on economic development. In this study, we focus on 
telecommunication infrastructure. 
Unlike most types of infrastructure, telecommunication is classified as 
general purpose technology (GPT). By this definition, telecommunication 
infrastructure consists of the three main characteristics described by Bresnahan 
and Trajtenberg (1995) as “pervasiveness, inherent potential for technical 
improvements, and innovational complementarities.” With these three special 
characteristics, telecommunications contribute a long-term positive impact on 
economic development. 
However, the benefits gained from the introduction of GPT could come 
with costs incurred in the first stage of its adoption. This manifests itself in the 
example of the ICT (information and communication technology) sector. 
According to Basu and Fernald (2007), ICT investment could worsen Total 
Factor Productivity (TFP) since it directs the resources of the firms towards 
organizational change and the learning process for the new technology. This 
possibility of worsening TFP has influenced further research on the productivity 
loss and gain, as we can see from the work of Ristuccia and Solomou (2010) on 
electricity diffusion. Though it is not directly applied to telecommunication 
infrastructure, the results shown by Risuccia and Solomu (2010) raise a 
concern about the cost accompanying the economy-wide positive impact of 
telecommunication on growth when it is introduced. That initial phase might take 
much more time than what we would expect. Thus, this concern should be 
taken into account in future research. 
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4.2.2 Relationship between telecommunications and economic 
development 
 
The relationship between telecommunications and economic development has 
been approached using several different frameworks. In this section, attention is 
given to two different classifications: the types of telecommunication 
infrastructure and the groups of countries which have been selected for 
studying the relationship between telecommunications and economic 
development. 
The first type of telecommunication infrastructure that was widely studied 
is the telephone line (Datta & Agarwal, 2004; Hardy, 1980; Madden & Savage 
1998; Norton, 1992).  Later, researchers attempted to combine telephone lines 
and mobile-cellular together as “teledensity” to identify a link to economic 
development (Lam & Shiu, 2010; Sridhar & Sridhar, 2007; Zahra et al., 2008). 
Recent literature has shifted the focus of the study of telecommunication 
infrastructure to broadband penetration (Atif et al., 2012; Czernich et al., 2011; 
Koutroumpis, 2009). Some studies consider different types of information and 
communication technology (ICT). While Vu (2011) examines the growth effects 
of ICT penetration by separately considering the penetration rates of personal 
computers, mobile phones and internet users, Jacobsen (2003) uses both main 
lines and stock of telecommunication infrastructure including; main lines, mobile 
phones and personal computers, to investigate the relationship between 
telecommunications and economic development. As telecommunication 
technology advances, it is clear that the variables for telecommunication 
infrastructure selected by researchers have also evolved accordingly. However, 
the problem of unavailability of cross-country data is still a main issue that most 
studies need to take into account especially for developing countries where a 
new telecommunication technology might have been adopted recently.  
Focussing on the group of countries as shown in Table 4-2, the studies 
of telecommunication infrastructure and economic development have been 
highly concentrated on high-income countries. Early research focussed on 
identifying the linkage of these two factors in high-income OECD countries 
(Datta & Agarwal, 2004; Roller & Waverman, 2001). There have been a few 
attempts to explore similar relationships in developing countries. Sridhar and 
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Sridhar (2007) studied the linkage between telephone penetration and 
economic growth in developing countries, whereas Madden and Savage (1998) 
considered the relationship of telecommunication investment and growth in CEE 
(Central and Eastern Europe) countries. A few studies compare the growth 
impacts of telecommunications between developing and developed countries 
(Dedrick et al., 2013; Dimelis & Papaioannou, 2010; Jacobsen, 2003).  
 
Table 4-2: List of literature studying the relationship between telecommunications 
and economic development 
Group of countries/ 
country specific 
Authors 
OECD countries Roller & Waverman (2001) 
Datta & Agarwal (2004) 
Koutroumpis (2009) 
Czernich et al. (2011) 
Atif et al. (2012) 
Developed and developing 
countries together 
Hardy (1980) 
Norton (1992) 
Zahra et al. (2008) 
Lam & Shiu (2010) 
Gruber & Koutroumpis (2011) 
Vu (2011) 
Developed and developing 
countries separately 
Jacobsen (2003) 
Dimelis & Papaioannou (2010) 
Dedrick et al. (2013) 
Developing countries Waverman et al. (2005) 
Sridhar & Sridhar (2007) 
Central and Eastern Europe Madden & Savage (1998) 
China Ding et al. (2008) 
United States Greenstein & Spilller (1995) 
Yilmaz & Dinc (2002) 
Crandall et al. (2007) 
Gillett et al. (2007) 
 
4.2.3 Measurement for telecommunications 
 
The variables used to measure telecommunications in the studies of the 
relationship between telecommunication and economic development vary 
across time and the groups of countries being studied. These measures can be 
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broadly classified into two groups as shown in Table 4-3. The first group 
emphasises deployment of telecommunication infrastructure while the other 
concerns capital stock and investment in telecommunication. Different 
measurements are applied to all types of telecommunication infrastructure.  
 
Table 4-3: List of telecommunication variables found in related studies 
Telecommunication 
variables 
Description Authors 
Telecommunication deployment 
Radios Radios per 1,000 people at time t-1 Hardy (1980) 
Telephone lines Telephones per million people at time t-1  
 
Access lines per 100 inhabitants 
 
Main lines per 100 inhabitants 
 
Main lines per capita 
 
Penetration rate per capita of main 
telephone lines 
 
Access lines per 100 inhabitants 
 
Main telephones per 100 inhabitants 
 
Number of telephones per capita 
 
Fixed-line penetration 
 
Fixed telephone subscriptions per 100 
inhabitants 
Hardy (1980) 
 
Norton (1992) 
 
Madden & Savage (1998) 
 
Roller & Waverman (2001) 
 
Jacobsen (2003) 
 
 
Datta & Agarwal (2004) 
 
Sridhar & Sridhar (2007) 
 
Ding et al. (2008) 
 
Gruber & Koutroumpis (2011) 
 
Atif et al. (2012) 
Cellular penetration Cellular phone subscribers per capita 
 
Mobile telecoms penetration rate 
 
Number of cellular subscribers per 100 
inhabitants 
 
Mobile phone penetration % of population 
 
Penetration per 100 inhabitants of mobile 
phones 
 
Cellular penetration in percentages 
Jacobsen (2003) 
 
Waverman et al. (2005) 
 
Sridhar & Sridhar (2007) 
 
 
Gruber & Koutroumpis (2011) 
 
Vu (2011) 
 
 
Dedrick et al. (2013) 
Teledensity Number of fixed-line and mobile phone  
subscribers per 100 persons 
 
Number of fixed-line and mobile phone  
subscribers per 100 persons 
Sridhar & Sridhar (2007) 
 
 
Lam & Shiu (2010) 
Squared telephone 
lines 
The square of access lines per 100 
inhabitants 
Datta & Agarwal (2004) 
Squared mobile phone 
penetration 
The quadratic term of penetration per 100 
inhabitants of mobile phones 
 
Vu (2011) 
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Telecommunication 
variables 
Description Authors 
Waiting list for main 
lines  
Waiting list for main lines per capita 
 
Waiting list for main lines per capita 
 
Waiting list for main lines per 100 
population 
Roller & Waverman (2001) 
 
Jacobsen (2003) 
 
Sridhar & Sridhar (2007) 
Change in fixed-line 
penetration rate 
Growth of main line penetration 
 
Annual change in fixed-line penetration 
rate 
Sridhar & Sridhar (2007) 
 
Lam & Shiu (2010) 
Change in mobile 
phone penetration rate 
Growth of cellular penetration 
 
Annual change in mobile phone 
penetration rate 
Sridhar & Sridhar (2007) 
 
Lam & Shiu (2010) 
Growth of total telecom Growth of the summation of main line 
and cellular penetration 
Sridhar & Sridhar (2007) 
Price of telephone 
service 
Price of telephone service in 1985 USD 
measured as service revenue per main 
line 
 
Telephone revenue per mainline, 
constant USD 
Roller & Waverman (2001) 
 
 
 
Jacobsen (2003) 
Personal computers Penetration rate per capita of personal 
computers 
 
Penetration per 100 inhabitants of 
personal computers 
Jacobsen (2003) 
 
 
Vu (2011) 
Squared personal 
computer penetration 
The quadratic term of penetration per 100 
inhabitants of personal computers 
Vu (2011) 
 
Internet penetration Penetration per 100 inhabitants of 
internet users 
 
Internet penetration in percentages 
Vu (2011) 
 
 
Dedrick et al. (2013) 
Squared internet user  
penetration 
The quadratic term of penetration per 100 
inhabitants of internet users 
Vu (2011) 
Broadband penetration Total number of broadband subscribers 
per 100 inhabitants 
 
The share of population subscribed to 
broadband 
 
Broadband connection excluding mobile 
broadband 
Koutroumpis (2009) 
 
 
Czernich et al. (2011) 
 
 
Atif et al. (2012) 
Broadband introduction First emergence of broadband 
 
Years since broadband introduction 
Czernich et al. (2011) 
 
Czernich et al. (2011) 
Broadband per capita Broadband lines/ population Crandall et al. (2007) 
Broadband price  Koutroumpis (2009) 
Herfindahl Index The sum of squares of broadband 
connections per platform divided by the 
square of the total number of broadband 
connections 
Koutroumpis (2009) 
Telecommunication 
Infrastructure Index 
Index of teledensity and number of 
internet users 
 
 
Zahra et al. (2008) 
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Telecommunication 
variables 
Description Authors 
Telecommunication 
Infrastructure Index 
squared 
The square of Index of teledensity and 
number of internet users 
Zahra et al. (2008) 
Voice telephone 
penetration 
 Czernich et al. (2011) 
Cable TV penetration  Czernich et al. (2011) 
FIBRE Fibre optic deployment at the company 
level  
Greenstein & Spiller (1995) 
Telecommunication stock and investment
IT capital stock Telecommunication capital stock 
 
Telecommunication capital stock 
Yilmaz & Dinc (2002) 
 
Dedrick et al. (2013) 
Broadband investment Stock of telecommunication investment Koutroumpis (2009) 
ICT investment Growth rate of ICT capital per worker Dimelis & Papaioannou (2010) 
Telecommunication 
investment 
Share of telecommunication investment 
in GDP 
 
Investment in telecom infrastructure in 
billion 1985 USD 
 
Annual telecommunication investment in 
billion 1995 USD 
Madden & Savage (1998) 
 
 
Roller & Waverman (2001) 
 
 
Jacobsen (2003) 
 
4.2.3.1 Measuring telecommunication deployment 
 
There are three aspects of telecommunication deployment identified by the 
literature survey which are introduction of telecommunication service, 
telecommunication penetration and the price of telecommunication. 
Firstly, the introduction of telecommunication service is used by Czernich 
et al. (2011) where broadband introduction is a dummy variable.  
Secondly, penetration is used to quantify how widely the service of a 
particular telecommunication feature has been utilised by the population in a 
country. The following presents measure for penetration in different forms. 
 
1.) Penetration per 100 inhabitants  
Penetration per 100 inhabitants is the measure that has been widely 
used across different types of telecommunication infrastructure as 
follows: 
(1.1) Main lines or fixed-lines per 100 inhabitants is the earliest 
example and it has been used recurrently.  
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(1.2) The penetration of mobile-cellular per 100 inhabitants is used 
in more recent literature.  
(1.3) A few studies combine both figures together; Sridhar and 
Sridhar (2007) and Lam and Shiu (2010) use teledensity in 
terms of the number of fixed-line and mobile phone 
subscribers per 100 inhabitants.  
(1.4) The waiting list for main line subscribers also appears in Roller 
and Waverman (2001) and Sridhar and Sridhar (2007).  
(1.5) Other types of telecommunication infrastructure are radios 
(Hardy, 1980), personal computers, internet users, broadband, 
voice telephony and cable TV. They are measured as fractions 
per 100 inhabitants. 
 
2.) Penetration per capita 
Instead of measuring by using penetration per 100 inhabitants, the 
reach of the service can be measured against each individual or in 
per capita terms. This has appeared in some cases of main line 
subscribers, waiting list of main line subscribers, personal computers 
and broadband lines. 
 
3.) Penetration in percentage terms 
The percentage term is another variable for measuring the 
penetration rate of a population as a whole. Dedrick et al. (2013) used 
cellular penetration and internet penetration in percentages as 
measurements of the telecommunication variable.  
 
4.) The square of penetration per 100 inhabitants 
The square of access lines per 100 inhabitants is one of the 
measures for telecommunication used by Datta and Agarwal (2004). 
The square terms of mobile phones, personal computers and internet 
users per 100 inhabitants are used in Vu (2011).  
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5.) Change in penetration per 100 inhabitants 
The rate of change in penetration for main line and cellular and the 
summation of both main line and cellular have been used in several 
studies to identify the relationship between telecommunication and 
growth.  
 
Lastly, the prices of the telecommunication services appeared in some of 
the literature, especially in simultaneous equations of demand and supply 
(Gruber & Koutroumpis, 2011; Roller & Waverman, 2001; Sridhar & Sridhar, 
2007). Revenue per subscription is used as a proxy of price in Roller and 
Waverman (2001) and Jacobsen (2003).  
 
4.2.3.2 Measuring telecommunication stock and investment  
  
Stock and investment in telecommunications are the indicators of the availability 
of the telecommunication services. In terms of stock, telecommunication capital 
is a representative of the physical availability of the services. On the other hand, 
telecommunication investment determines the change in capital stock of 
telecommunication. 
Telecommunication capital stock is measured by IT capital in Yilmaz and 
Dinc (2002) and Dedrick et al. (2013). This measure is not as widely used as 
telecommunication investment. Examples of the use of telecommunication 
investment can be found in studies by Roller and Waverman (2001) and 
Jacobsen (2003), where telecommunication investment is measured in billion 
USD, and Madden and Savage (1998) who use share of telecommunication in 
GDP. Alternatively, Koutroumpis (2009) chooses stock of telecommunication 
investment to represent broadband investment.  Lastly, ICT investment is 
measured by the growth rate of ICT capital per worker in Dimelis and 
Papaioannou (2010). 
Except for the two main measures of telecommunications that have been 
discussed previously, other indexes have been computed by authors 
specifically for the study of the relationship between telecommunication and 
economic development. For example, the Herfindahl Index is computed from 
broadband connections per platform in Koutroumpis (2009), telecommunication 
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infrastructure index is computed from teledensity and the number of internet 
users in Zahra et al. (2008). 
Even though various measurements have been used for 
telecommunication variables, most of them are similar to the definitions 
generally used for penetration, capital and investment. 
 
4.2.4 Conditioning variables in the study of telecommunications and 
economic development 
 
Similar to the studies of the relationship between other variables and economic 
development, the study of the relationship between telecommunications and 
economic growth/output incorporates a wide range of macroeconomic variables. 
These control variables as shown in Table 4-4 can be classified broadly into 
economic indicators, social indicators and other relevant indicators. 
 
Table 4-4: List of conditioning variables in related studies 
Conditioning 
variables 
Description Authors
Economic conditions 
Growth t-1 Lagged growth of real GDP per capita 
 
One-year lag of growth rate of real GDP 
per capita 
 
Lagged growth of real GDP per capita 
Datta & Agarwal (2004) 
 
Ding et al. (2008) 
 
 
Zahra et al. (2008) 
GDP t-1 
 
 
 
Gross domestic product per head at t-1 
 
Lagged real GDP per capita 
 
Lagged real GDP per capita 
 
Lagged level of output per capita 
Hardy (1980) 
 
Datta & Agarwal (2004) 
 
Zahra et al. (2008) 
 
Dimelis & Papaioannou (2010) 
LGDP t-1 Log of value of real GDP per capita in 
1995 RMB 
Ding et al. (2008) 
Initial GDP Initial year per capita income at 1975 
prices 
 
Initial real GDP per capita in 1991 
 
GDP per capita in 1996 
 
GDP per capita at the initial year of 
subperiod 
 
GDP per capita at the initial year of 
subperiod squared 
 
 
Norton (1992) 
 
 
Madden & Savage (1998) 
 
Czernich et al. (2011) 
 
Vu (2011) 
 
 
Vu (2011) 
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Conditioning 
variables 
Description Authors
SOE Share of industrial output by state-
owned enterprises in total industrial 
output 
Ding et al. (2008) 
Standard 
deviation of real 
output 
 Norton (1992) 
Agriculture Agriculture sector’s value-added share 
in GDP 
Vu (2011) 
Money supply 
growth 
Mean money supply growth Norton (1992) 
Standard 
deviation of 
money supply 
shocks 
 Norton (1992) 
Growth of 
inflation 
Mean growth of inflation rate Norton (1992) 
Government 
consumption 
Mean growth of government spending 
to output 
 
Share of government consumption in 
GDP 
 
Share of government consumption in 
GDP 
 
Share of government consumption in 
GDP 
 
Government consumption %GDP 
Norton (1992) 
 
 
Madden & Savage (1998) 
 
 
Datta & Agarwal (2004) 
 
 
Zahra et al. (2008) 
 
 
Dimelis & Papaioannou (2010) 
Exports Mean growth of exports Norton (1992) 
Imports Net imports Dedrick et al. (2013) 
Trade openness Total of exports and imports 
  
Openness of trade as a share of GDP 
 
Merchandise trade to GDP ratio 
Datta & Agarwal (2004) 
 
Dimelis & Papaioannou (2010) 
 
Vu (2011) 
Investment Share of fixed investment in GDP 
 
Share of fixed investment in GDP 
 
Share of fixed investment in GDP 
 
Log of capital formation to GDP 
 
Growth of capital formation to GDP 
 
Ratio of gross fixed capital formation to 
GDP 
 
Gross capital formation 
Madden & Savage (1998) 
 
Datta & Agarwal (2004) 
 
Ding et al. (2008) 
 
Czernich et al. (2011) 
 
Czernich et al. (2011) 
 
Vu (2011) 
 
 
Atif et al. (2012) 
Lagged fixed 
investment 
Share of fixed investment of previous 
year in current GDP 
Zahra et al. (2008) 
Public capital Public capital stocks Yilmaz & Dinc (2002) 
Private capital Private capital stocks Yilmaz & Dinc (2002) 
Stock of capital Log of capital 
 
Sridhar & Sridhar (2007) 
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Conditioning 
variables 
Description Authors
 
Fixed stock of capital in million 2000 
USD 
 
Gruber & Koutroumpis (2011) 
Non-IT capital 
stocks 
Non-residential capital stock net of 
telecommunications capital 
 
Capital stock net of telecoms capital 
 
Non ICT stock of capital 
 
Non IT capital stocks 
Roller & Wavermen (2001) 
 
 
Waverman et al. (2005) 
 
Koutroumpis (2009) 
 
Dedrick et al. (2013) 
Growth of 
domestic capital 
Growth rate of domestic capital per 
worker 
Dimelis & Papaioannou (2010) 
Growth of 
foreign capital 
Growth rate of foreign capital per worker Dimelis & Papaioannou (2010) 
FDI Share of foreign direct investment 
divided by total fixed investment 
 
Growth rate of foreign capital per worker 
 
Foreign direct investment 
Ding et al. (2008) 
 
 
Dimelis & Papaioannou (2010) 
 
Dedrick et al. (2013) 
Social indicators 
Education Share of college graduates in adult 
population 
 
Log of years of education 
 
Growth of years of education 
 
Gross secondary school enrolment rate 
 
Tertiary education as a proportion of the 
population aged 25 to 64 
 
Tertiary education 
Crandall et al. (2007) 
 
 
Czernich et al. (2011) 
 
Czernich et al. (2011) 
 
Vu (2011) 
 
Atif et al. (2012) 
 
 
Dedrick et al. (2013) 
Human capital Human capital measured by the 
average years of schooling for the 
population aged 6 and above 
Ding et al. (2008) 
Labour Total labour force in millions 
 
Total labour force in millions 
 
Total labour force 
 
Log of labour 
 
Population aged 15-64 with full or part 
time work in thousands  
 
Labour (thousands people) 
 
Labour hours 
Roller & Waverman (2001) 
 
Jacobsen (2003) 
 
Waverman et al. (2005) 
 
Sridhar & Sridhar (2007) 
 
Koutroumpis (2009) 
 
 
Gruber & Koutroumpis (2011) 
 
Dedrik et al. (2013) 
Employment Share of total employment to total 
population 
 
Share of total employment to total 
population 
Ding & Haynes (2006) 
 
 
Ding et al. (2008) 
Growth of 
working age 
Change in growth of working-age 
population 
Czernich et al. (2011) 
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Conditioning 
variables 
Description Authors
population 
Urban 
population 
Share of urban population to total 
population 
Ding et al. (2008) 
Population 
share 
Share of the country in the world 
population 
Vu (2011) 
Population 
growth 
Mean annual population growth 
 
Growth of population  
 
Growth of population 
 
Annual population growth rate 
 
Annual population growth rate 
 
Growth rate of population in low-income 
,middle-income and high-income 
countries 
Norton (1992) 
 
Madden & Savage (1998) 
 
Datta & Agarwal (2004) 
 
Ding & Haynes (2006) 
 
Ding et al. (2008) 
 
Zahra et al. (2008) 
Immigration Immigration per million persons Dedrick et al. (2013) 
Other relevant indicators 
Transportation 
density  
Transportation density as measured by 
the length of rail, highway and waterway 
networks per square kilometre 
 
Transportation density as measured by 
the length of rail, highway and waterway 
networks per square kilometre 
Ding & Haynes (2006) 
 
 
 
Ding et al. (2008) 
Tax Climate 
Index 
State Business Tax Climate Index Crandall et al. (2007) 
TI Transparency Index Dimelis & Papaioannou (2010) 
Institution The country’s Rule of Law Index Vu (2011) 
BRCC Dummy variable for Baltic States Madden & Savage (1998) 
 
4.2.4.1 Controlling economic conditions  
 
Economic indicators appear repeatedly in the literature studying the relationship 
between economic development and telecommunication. This type of indicator 
can be classified into six categories which are economic outputs, monetary 
variables, fiscal variables, trade variables, capital and investment variables, and 
foreign direct investment. 
 
1.) Economic outputs 
As a control variable, output is typically measured in lagged terms or 
initial value. There are a few different measures of output in terms of 
its share and standard deviation. 
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(1.1) Lagged growth rate of real GDP per capita appears in the 
studies of Datta and Agarwal (2004), Ding et al. (2008) and 
Zahra et al. (2008). 
(1.2) Lagged real GDP per capita is included in the model used in 
Datta and Agarwal (2004) and Zahra et al. (2008). This 
variable may appear in logarithmic form (Ding et al., 2008). 
Alternatively, Hardy (1980) used gross domestic product per 
head at time t-1. 
(1.3) Initial GDP per capita is used frequently as a control variable. 
The choice of year selected by researchers as an initial period 
varies according to the specific time period. Vu (2011) also 
includes the quadratic term of intial GDP. 
(1.4) Share of industrial output by state-owned enterprises is a 
different form of determining economic output which is used in 
Ding et al. (2008). 
(1.5) Agriculture sector’s value-added share in GDP is included in 
the study of Vu (2011). 
(1.6) Standard deviation of real output is used by Norton (1992). 
 
2.) Monetary variables 
Three different values for monetary variables are used in Norton 
(1992) as follows:  
(2.1)    Mean of money supply growth  
(2.2)    Standard deviation of money supply shocks 
(2.3)    Growth of inflation rate 
 
3.) Fiscal variables 
Government spending is used as a fiscal variable in the group of 
control variables.  There are two examples of measurements used in 
our list of literature as follows: 
(3.1)    Share of government consumption in GDP 
(3.2)    Mean growth of government spending to output. 
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4.) Trade variables 
International trade is measured in three different forms as follows: 
(4.1)    Exports 
(4.2)    Imports 
(4.3)    Trade openness (the total value of exports and imports) 
 
5.) Capital and investment variables 
Capital and investment are significant contributors to economic 
development. The following are examples of variables used to 
represent them. 
(5.1)   Investment is measured as a share of fixed investment in GDP  
in Madden and Savage (1998), Datta and Agarwal (2004) and 
Ding et al. (2008). 
(5.2)   Lagged fixed investment is a share of fixed investment from the  
previous year in current GDP. (Zahra et al., 2008) 
(5.3)   Capital formation has been measured using different functional  
forms. While Atif et al. (2012) use level gross capital formation 
as a measure of investment, Vu (2011) includes the ratio of 
gross fixed capital formation to GDP. Sridhar and Sridhar 
(2007) use log of capital, whereas Czernich et al. (2011) use 
log of capital formation to GDP and growth of capital formation 
to GDP.  
(5.4)   Public and private capital stocks are used in Yilmaz and Dinc  
(2002). 
(5.5)   Non-IT capital stocks have also been measured in various  
forms. Non-residential capital stock net of telecommunications       
capital is used in Roller and Waverman (2001).  Waverman et 
al. (2005) used total physical capital stock net of telecom   
capital. Non-ICT stock of capital is used in Koutroumpis 
(2009). Similarly, non-IT capital stock is used in Dedrick et al. 
(2013). 
(5.6)   Fixed stock of capital is used in Gruber and Koutroumpis      
 (2011), while log of capital is found in Sridhar and Sridhar      
 (2007). 
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(5.7)   Growth of capital per worker is used in Dimelis and  
          Papaioannou (2010). 
 
6.) Foreign direct investment  
The impact from external sector is controlled in several studies using 
foreign direct investment. (Dedrick et al., 2013; Dimelis & 
Papaioannou, 2010; Ding et al., 2008) 
 
4.2.4.2 Controlling social impacts 
 
Social indicators are also important in determining economic development. This 
group of indicators can be separated into human development and 
demographic variables.  
  
1.) Human development  
Education is an essential process for human development. The level 
of education attained by the population in a country is a justified 
measure for human development. 
(1.1) Education in years is used in Czernich et al. (2011) in two 
different forms: log of years of education and growth of years 
of education. 
(1.2) Education as a proportion of population is used in Atif et al. 
(2012) by measuring tertiary education as a proportion of the 
population aged 25 to 64. 
(1.3) Gross secondary school enrolment is used in Vu (2011). 
 
2.) Demographic variables 
There are also different measures used for demographic variables, 
for example, labour force, employment, population and immigration. 
(2.1)   Labour force (Dedrik et al., 2013; Gruber & Koutroumpis, 2011;  
     Jacobsen, 2003; Koutroumpis, 2009; Roller & Waverman,  
     2001; Sridhar & Sridhar, 2007; Waverman et al., 2005) 
(2.2)   Employment as a share of total population (Ding et al., 2008) 
 
     
   
166 
 
(2.3)   Urban population as a share of total population (Ding et al.    
, 2008) 
(2.4)   Share of the country in the world population (Vu, 2011) 
(2.5)   Population growth (Datta & Agarwal, 2004; Ding & Haynes,  
2006; Ding et al., 2008; Madden & Savage, 1998; Norton, 
1992; Zahra et al., 2008) 
(2.6)   Immigration (Dedrick et al., 2013) 
 
4.2.4.3 Controlling other effects 
 
There are also other important indicators in the literature which cannot be 
classified as economic or social indicators. 
 
1.) Institutional variables 
(1.1)    Tax climate (Crandall et al., 2007) 
(1.2)    Transparency Index (Dimelis & Papaioannou, 2010) 
(1.3)    The country’s Rule of Law Index (Vu, 2011) 
 
2.) Geographical variable 
Dummy variable for Baltic States (Madden & Savage, 1998) 
 
3.) Transportation variable 
 Transportation density as measured by the length of rail, highway and 
waterway networks per square kilometre (Ding & Haynes, 2006; Ding 
et al., 2008) 
 
4.2.5 Dependent variables 
 
In order to measure the impact of telecommunication variables on economic 
development, researchers have to choose the appropriate dependent variable 
representing economic development.  As shown in Table 4-5, two main groups 
of dependent variables used in the study of the relationship between 
telecommunications and economic development are the level of economic 
outputs and the growth rates of outputs.  
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Table 4-5: List of dependent variables in related studies 
Dependent variables Description Authors  
GDP Level of output (GDP) 
 
GDP in million USD 
 
GDP in million 2000 USD 
Waverman et al. (2005) 
 
Koutroumpis (2009) 
 
Gruber & Koutroumpis (2011) 
Log of GDP Log of GDP in billion 1985 USD  
 
Log of GDP in billion 1995 USD 
 
Log of real GDP in USD 
Roller & Waverman (2001) 
 
Jacobsen (2003) 
 
Sridhar & Sridhar (2007) 
GDP per capita Gross domestic product per head 
 
GDP per capita PPP adjusted 
Hardy (1980)  
 
Dedrick et al. (2013) 
GDP per worker Real GDP per employed person Atif et al. (2012) 
Log of GDP per capita   Czernich et al. (2011) 
Growth rate of 
domestic product 
Mean annualised growth rate in real 
gross domestic product per capita 
 
Growth of real GDP per capita 
 
Growth of real GDP per capita 
 
Annual growth rate of real GDP per 
capita 
 
Growth in real GDP per capita 
 
Growth of GDP per capita 
 
Average GDP growth rate 
Norton (1992) 
 
 
Madden & Savage (1998) 
 
Datta & Agarwal (2004) 
 
Ding et al. (2008) 
 
 
Zahra et al. (2008) 
 
Czernich et al. (2011) 
 
Vu (2011) 
Growth rate of output 
per worker 
 Dimelis & Papaioannou (2010) 
TFP growth Average TFP growth Lam & Shiu (2010) 
 
4.2.5.1 The level of economic outputs 
 
Economic output is a direct measure of the size of the economy. The level of 
output could be either measured directly or measured in per capita terms. 
 
1.) Gross domestic product (GDP) is measured directly in a specific 
currency (Gruber & Koutroumpis, 2011; Koutroumpis, 2009; 
Waverman et al., 2005). Otherwise, it can appear in a logarithmic 
form, for example, the logarithm of real GDP (Jacobsen, 2003; Roller 
& Waverman, 2001; Sridhar and Sridhar, 2007).    
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2.) The level of output per capita is measured in various forms, for 
example, GDP per capita (Dedrick et al., 2013; Hardy, 1980), real 
GDP per employed person (Atif et al., 2012) and the log of real GDP 
per capita (Czernich et al., 2011). 
Additionally, Hardy (1980) also used energy consumption per capita as 
an indicator of economic development. 
 
 4.2.5.2 Growth rates of outputs 
 
Avoiding the impact of the significant difference in the size of economies across 
countries, growth rates of outputs are used instead of measurement in level 
terms. There are two categories of growth rates used: output growth and total 
factor productivity (TFP) growth. 
 
1.) Output growth 
Output growth is measured in terms of growth of GDP per capita 
(Czernich et al., 2011; Datta & Agarwal, 2004; Ding et al., 2008; 
Madden & Savage, 1998; Norton, 1992; Zahra et al., 2008) and 
growth of output per worker (Dimelis & Papaioannou, 2010). 
Alternatively, Vu (2011) measures average GDP growth rate. 
 
2.) TFP growth is measured as an average of TFP growth in Lam and 
Shiu (2010). 
 
4.2.6 Estimation Methods 
 
The regression analysis used in studying the relationship between 
telecommunication and growth includes both static and dynamic models. Table 
4-6 presents estimation methods used in each study. 
 
4.2.6.1 Static models 
 
For static models, there are two main types of regression used which are cross-
section and panel data regressions 
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1.) Cross-section regression is used by Norton (1992) 
 
2.) Panel data regression  
For static panel data regression, there are three main techniques 
used: OLS, fixed effect and random effect models. These three 
techniques are combined differently in the literature, for example, 
Madden and Savage (1998) use the OLS method, Atif et al. (2012) 
utilise the static fixed effects model, OLS and fixed effect LSDV are 
employed in Ding et al. (2008), and Dedrick et al. (2013) apply both 
fixed and random effects models. 
 
4.2.6.2 Dynamic models 
 
For dynamic models, GMM, the dynamic model and IV estimates are the three 
main technique used. 
 
1.) Generalised method of moments (GMM) 
There are several kinds of GMM methods that have been used in 
recent literature. While Vu (2011) applies Arellano-Bond GMM 
method for the estimations, Roller and Waverman (2001) use non-
linear GMM estimates. Koutroumpis (2009) and Gruber and 
Koutroumpis (2011) utilise three-stage least squares (3SLS) GMM. 
System GMM is used in Ding et al. (2008). Waverman et al. (2005) 
also use the GMM method for the system of equations. 
 
2.) Dynamic model 
The dynamic panel data method is employed in Datta and Agarwal 
(2004) and Lam and Shiu (2010). 
 
3.) Instrumental variable (IV) estimates 
The IV estimates are used in three forms which are IV models, two- 
stage least squares (2SLS) and three stage least squares (3SLS). 
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(3.1) Instrumental variable models 
Single equation IV estimates are used in Koutroumpis (2009), 
whereas the second stage of the IV model is used in Czernich et 
al. (2011). Gruber and Koutroumpis (2011) use IV estimates for 
the system of equations. 
 (3.2) Two-stage least squares is used in Dedrick et al. (2013). 
 (3.3) The three-stage least squares system of equations is used in 
Sridhar and Sridhar (2007) 
 
A few studies also combine different techniques between static and dynamic 
models or different combinations within static or dynamic models. 
  
Table 4-6: List of estimation methods in related studies 
Authors Estimation methods Description
Norton (1992) Cross-section regression Kormendi & Meguire (1985) 
framework including 
telecommunication variables 
Madden & Savage 
(1998) 
OLS 
 
 
Roller & Waverman 
(2001) 
Non-linear GMM estimates in a 
simultaneous model 
 
Jacobsen (2003) SUR Seemingly unrelated regression 
applied to a system 
Datta & Agarwal 
(2004) 
Dynamic panel data method 
Waverman et al. 
(2005) 
GMM method  
Sridhar & Sridhar 
(2007) 
3SLS system of equations  
Ding et al. (2008) System GMM panel data estimator 
 
OLS and fixed effect (LSDV)     
estimation  
Zahra et al. (2008) Dynamic fixed effect and random 
effect models 
 
Koutroumpis (2009) Single equation IV estimates 
 
3SLS GMM 
 
Dimelis & 
Papaioannou 
(2010) 
System GMM panel data estimator  The method proposed by Arellano & 
Bover (1995) which is an 
augmented extension of the 
Arellano & Bond (1991) first 
difference GMM estimator  
Lam & Shiu (2010) Dynamic panel data model 
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Authors Estimation methods Description
Czernich et al. 
(2011) 
OLS estimation   
 
Second stage of the instrumental 
variable model 
Gruber & 
Koutroumpis (2011) 
IV estimates 
 
3SLS GMM 
Vu (2011) Cross-country regression with fixed 
effects 
 
GMM estimators 
OLS with country-specific and time-
fixed effects 
 
Arellano-Bond GMM estimators 
Atif et al. (2012) Static fixed effects model 
 
Linear dynamic model 
Dedrick et al. 
(2013) 
Fixed effects and random effects 
models 
 
2SLS 
 
 
4.2.7 Simultaneous equations for telecommunication infrastructure 
and economic development 
 
The study of the relationship between telecommunication infrastructure and 
economic growth is similar to that of public infrastructure because it is subject to 
reverse causality and simultaneity bias. The effects of telecommunication on 
economic development will be biased when investment in telecommunication 
infrastructure is not modelled (Roller & Waverman, 2001). Though these studies 
might claim that the analysis is on the relationship between telecommunication 
infrastructure and economic growth, in fact, their specifications are based on 
aggregate output rather than the rate of growth.   
A simultaneous model for telecommunication infrastructure and 
aggregate output is needed to take into account the issue of simultaneity. This 
was firstly attempted by Roller and Waverman (2001) using a micromodel jointly 
estimated with a macro production equation. By doing this, Roller and 
Waverman (2001) argue that telecommunications sector is endogenized into 
the aggregate economy.   The model consisted of four equations, namely 
aggregate production function, demand for telecommunication infrastructure, 
supply of telecommunications investment and telecommunication infrastructure 
production function. Subsequent studies (Gruber & Koutroumpis, 2011; 
Jacobsen, 2003; Koutroumpis, 2009; Sridhar & Sridhar, 2007; Waverman et al., 
2005) have applied the model with different groups of countries and telecom 
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infrastructures similar to Roller and Waverman (2001). The only key difference 
appears in Waverman et al. (2005) where the investment equation is simplified 
from both supply and investment equations. The list of studies is shown in Table 
4-7 by chronological order. 
 
Table 4-7: List of studies using simultaneous equations 
Authors Study 
periods 
Countries Telecom infrastructures 
Roller & Waverman 
(2001) 
1970-1990 21 OECD countries Fixed telephone 
Jacobsen (2003) 1990-1999 84 countries Fixed telephone 
Mobile phone 
Personal computer 
Waverman et al. (2005) 1996-2003 38 developing countries Mobile phone 
Sridhar & Sridhar 
(2007) 
1990-2001 63 developing countries Fixed and mobile phones 
Koutroumpis (2009) 2002-2007 22 OECD countries Broadband infrastructure 
Gruber & Koutroumpis 
(2011) 
1990-2007 192 countries Mobile phone 
  
In further analysis, our study focusses on fixed telephone and mobile 
phone infrastructures in the system of equations. Then, the simultaneous 
equations are compared only among the studies which investigate the model 
under these types of telecommunication infrastructure. The aggregate 
production function, demand for telecom infrastructure, supply of telecom 
investment and telecom infrastructure production function are compared among 
different studies accordingly. We may consider variables included in these 
equations separately. 
Firstly, the aggregate production function is the key equation for 
establishing the link between telecom infrastructure and aggregate output. 
Previous studies consistently use the level of GDP to represent output. The 
penetration rate is a proxy for telecommunication infrastructure. Capital and 
labour are the main inputs. The measurement of capital is usually netted out of 
telecommunication capital.  Waverman et al. (2005) also additionally included 
external indebtedness and the rule of law as control variables in the aggregate 
production function. Due to network externalities, some studies also consider 
critical mass effect at different levels of penetration (Gruber & Koutroumpis, 
2011; Jacobsen, 2003; Roller & Waverman, 2001). The list of variables in the 
aggregate production function of related studies is presented in Table 4-8.   
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Table 4-8: Aggregate production function in related studies 
Authors Dependent 
variables 
Telecommunication 
variables 
Control variables 
Roller & Waverman 
(2001) 
Real GDP Fixed telephone penetration 
rate 
Real capital stock 
 
Total labour force 
 
Time trend 
Jacobsen (2003) Real GDP Fixed telephone penetration 
rate 
 
Personal computer 
penetration rate 
 
Mobile phone penetration 
rate 
Total labour force 
 
 
Time trend 
Waverman et al. 
 (2005) 
Level of GDP Mobile phone penetration 
rate 
Capital net of telecom capital 
 
 
Total labour force 
 
Rule of law 
 
External indebtedness 
 
Time trend 
Sridhar & Sridhar 
(2007) 
Real GDP Penetration Gross fixed capital net 
telecom 
 
Total labour force 
Gruber & 
Koutroumpis (2011) 
Real GDP Mobile phone penetration 
 
Fixed-line penetration 
Fixed stock of capital 
 
Labour 
 
Secondly, the demand for telecommunication is measured by the 
penetration rate. The waiting list for main lines is also included in Roller and 
Waverman (2001), Jacobsen (2003) and Sridhar and Sridhar (2007). There is 
an alternative specification in Jacobsen (2003) which the demand includes the 
penetration rates of main lines, mobile phones, personal computers and waiting 
list for main lines. The price of the service of a particular infrastructure is used 
as a determinant of demand. Its inclusion is useful in measuring price elasticity 
of demand. In the studies of demand for mobile phone telecommunication, 
fixed-line services price and fixed-line penetration may also be included. GDP 
per capita is always included as a control variable; therefore, we can estimate 
income elasticity of demand for telecommunication services.  Table 4-9 
presents variables included in the demand equation of related studies.  
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Table 4-9: Demand for telecommunication infrastructure in related studies 
Authors Dependent variables Telecommunication 
variables 
Control variables 
Roller & Waverman 
(2001) 
Main lines and waiting list 
per capita 
Price of telephone service Real per capita GDP 
Jacobsen (2003) Main lines and waiting list 
per capita 
 
Telestock and waiting list 
per capita 
Price of telephone service Real per capita GDP 
Waverman et al. 
(2005) 
Mobile telecoms 
penetration 
Mobile service price 
 
Fixed-line price 
GDP per capita 
 
Time trend 
Sridhar & Sridhar 
(2007) 
Teledensity and waiting 
list for main lines 
Real price of 
telecommunication 
services 
Real GDP per capita 
Gruber & 
Koutroumpis (2011) 
Mobile phone penetration Mobile service price 
 
Fixed-line penetration 
GDP per capita 
 
Urbanisation 
 
Thirdly, the supply of telecom investment is measured by investment in 
telecommunication infrastructure. However, Gruber and Koutroumpis (2011) 
use mobile phone services revenue to represent supply of telecommunication 
infrastructure. This is mainly due to poor availability of the data for mobile phone 
infrastructure investment especially from developing countries. The price of the 
service and the waiting list for main lines jointly determine the supply of telecom 
investment. Some other control variables have also been included, for example, 
GDP per capita and urbanisation are included in Gruber and Koutroumpis 
(2011). Geographic area and government deficit are included in Roller and 
Waverman (2001), while Jacobsen (2003) includes only geographic area. The 
list of variables in the supply function is shown in Table 4-10. 
 
Table 4-10: Supply of telecommunication investment in related studies 
Authors Dependent variables Telecommunication 
variables 
Control variables 
Roller & 
Waverman 
(2001) 
Investment in telecom 
infrastructure 
Waiting list per capita  
 
Price of telephone service 
Geographic area 
 
Government deficit 
Jacobsen 
(2003) 
Investment in telecom 
infrastructure 
Waiting list per capita  
 
Price of telephone service 
Geographic area 
 
Sridhar & 
Sridhar (2007) 
Real telecommunication 
investment 
Waiting list for main lines per 
100 population 
 
Revenue per user 
 
Gruber & 
Koutroumpis 
(2011) 
Mobile revenue Mobile service price Urbanisation 
 
GDP per capita 
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Lastly, telecom infrastructure production is measured as a change in the 
penetration rate. The main determinant of telecom infrastructure production is 
telecommunication investment. Alternatively, mobile revenue (Gruber & 
Koutroumpis, 2011) or the price of telecoms (Waverman et al., 2005) has been 
incorporated. Geographical area is additionally added as a control variable in 
Roller and Waverman (2001), Jacobsen (2003) and Waverman et al. (2005). 
This equation in Waverman et al. (2005) has simplified supply and investment 
equations from Roller and Waverman (2001). Table 4-11 presents variables 
included in the telecommunication infrastructure production function. 
 
Table 4-11: Telecommunication infrastructure production function in related studies 
Authors Dependent variables Telecommunication 
variables 
Control variables 
Roller & Waverman 
(2001) 
Change in stock of 
telecom infrastructure 
Investment in telecom 
infrastructure 
Geographic area 
Jacobsen (2003) Change in stock of 
telecom infrastructure 
Investment in telecom 
infrastructure 
Geographic area 
Waverman et al. 
(2005) 
Growth rate of mobile 
phone penetration 
Price of telecoms Geographic area 
 
Time trend 
Sridhar & Sridhar 
(2007) 
Growth of telecom 
penetration 
Real telecommunication 
investment 
 
Gruber & 
Koutroumpis (2011) 
Change in mobile 
phone penetration 
Mobile revenue  
 
4.2.8 Results from previous studies using simultaneous equations 
 
The results from previous studies discussed in this section focus on the 
literature using a simultaneous model which is the main method for our further 
analysis. This is classified into different types of telecommunication 
infrastructure, namely fixed telephone and mobile-cellular telephone 
infrastructures and inclusion of both fixed telephone and mobile-cellular 
telephone infrastructures. 
 
4.2.8.1 Fixed telephone infrastructure 
 
Using evidence from 21 high-income OECD countries between 1970 and 1990, 
a significantly positive causal link between telecommunication infrastructure and 
economic development is found by Roller and Waverman (2001). The existence 
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of non-linearities in telecommunications is also verified, suggesting a critical 
mass phenomenon (Roller & Waverman, 2001). Similarly, the positive impacts 
of main line on national output are also found by Sridhar and Sridhar (2007) for 
a group of 63 developing countries. Since the penetration rate for fixed 
telephones in those developing countries was low during the period of study, 
Sridhar and Sridhar (2007) did not investigate the critical mass effect. 
 
 4.2.8.2 Mobile phone infrastructure 
 
Using the aggregate production function approach with 38 developing countries, 
Waverman et al. (2005) find positive impacts of mobile phone penetration on 
output. This result is also supported by the findings of Sridhar and Sridhar 
(2007) and Gruber and Koutroumpis (2011). Additionally, Gruber and 
Koutroumpis (2011) show that the output dividend is smaller for countries with a 
low mobile phone penetration. In other words, the mobile telecommunication 
contribution to the aggregate output of countries with high mobile phone 
penetration is higher than that of countries with low mobile phone penetration.  
  
 4.2.8.3 Telecom infrastructure 
 
In Sridhar and Sridhar (2007), an increase in total telecom infrastructure 
penetration, which includes both mobile phone and main line penetration, 
enhances national output for the sample of developing countries. 
Alternatively, the study of Jacobsen (2003) combines three different 
types of telecommunication infrastructures namely: main telephone lines, 
mobile phones and personal computers. It has been found that the development 
of main telephone lines has the largest output effects which are higher than 
those of mobile phones. On the contrary, no significant impacts are found for 
increased personal computers at low penetration rate. However, a significant 
effect on output exists when the penetration rate passes a certain level, 
supporting the argument for network extrernalities. Futhermore, there are larger 
output effects from telecommunication infrastructure development in developing 
countries than in developed countries.  
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4.3 Analysis of telecommunication infrastructure and economic 
development (Study 4) 
 
In this section, this study attempts to assess the impacts of telecommunication 
infrastructure on economic development by using simultaneous equations. This 
will be referred to as Study 4. The samples consist of 17 developing and 26 
high-income OECD Sample 4 countries from Table 4-1 with data from 1975 to 
2012. The types of telecommunication infrastructure of interest are fixed 
telephone and mobile-cellular telephone. While the set of equations for fixed 
telephone infrastructure is analysed using the framework proposed by Roller 
and Waverman (2001), the analysis of mobile telephone infrastructure uses the 
set of equations that appeared in Gruber and Koutroumpis (2011). The models 
under both frameworks are explained later on in this section and are followed by 
the results from estimation.  
While Roller and Waverman (2001) found the positive impact of fixed 
telephone infrastructure on aggregate output in high-income OECD countries 
between 1970 and 1990, Gruber and Koutroumpis (2011) also found the 
positive effects of mobile telecommunication on GDP using a worldwide dataset 
between 1990 and 2007. In this study, we expect to find that the positive 
impacts of fixed telephone infrastructure on economic development in the 
earlier years, especially before 1990, decreased in the later stage after 1990, 
when mobile telephones were already introduced. The effects of mobile 
telecommunication on economic development in high-income countries could 
also be different from low-income countries. However, we do not have explicit 
conjecture as to whether the contribution on output from an increase in mobile 
phone penetration would be higher or lower in developing countries than that of 
high-income OECD countries.  
We expect that an increase in mobile phone penetration may initially 
replace the productive use of fixed telephones for businesses. Moreover, the 
increase in mobile phone penetration could be for consumption as opposed to 
business use or investment, which does not have directly positive effects on 
aggregate production. With high fixed telephone penetration, mobile 
infrastructure might not be highly conducive to increases in aggregate output. 
On the contrary, mobile infrastructure should generate positive impacts on GDP 
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when fixed telephone penetration remains low. We attempt to verify these 
hypotheses later in our study.   
 
Figure 4-1: Fixed telephone line subscriptions per 100 inhabitants for  
groups of Sample 4 countries (1975-2012) 
Source: ITU 
  
Before analysing the fixed telephone and mobile phone models, we will 
explain from Figure 4-1 how telecom penetration rates have evolved over time. 
Fixed telephone subscriptions in high-income OECD Sample 4 countries 
increased from 23.3% in 1975 and reached its peak at 55.0% in 2000. From 
then on, the penetration rate decreased gradually to 44.9% in 2012. It is 
interesting to note that for developing Sample 4 countries, the highest rate was 
only 16.0%, which was not reached until 2009. The rate declined slightly 
thereafter to 14.6% in 2012. 
 
 
Figure 4-2: Mobile-cellular telephone subscriptions per 100 inhabitants for groups of  
Sample 4 countries (1980-2012) 
Source: ITU 
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Figure 4-2 shows that mobile-cellular subscriptions have increased 
greatly over the past few decades. From its introduction in the 1980s, 
penetration in high-income OECD Sample 4 countries reached a saturation 
level of 101.5% in 2006. The penetration rate in high-income OECD Sample 4 
countries continued to increase gradually from 2006 though it levelled out in 
2012 at 120.4%. For developing Sample 4 countries, mobile phone penetration 
was at 106.3% in 2012 reaching a saturation level in the middle of the year. The 
difference of the mobile phone penetration rates between both groups of 
Sample 4 countries in 2012 was much smaller than that difference of fixed 
telephone penetration. 
Mobile telephone penetration in high-income OECD Sample 4 countries 
surpassed fixed telephone penetration in 2000. For developing Sample 4 
countries, the mobile phone penetration rate overtook the fixed telephone rate 
one year later in 2001. The rise of mobile phone infrastructure was in the same 
period with the fall of fixed telephone subscriptions, especially for high-income 
OECD Sample 4 countries between 1990 and 2012.  
 
4.3.1 The models 
 
The variables listed in Table 4-12 are for both the model for fixed telephones 
and the model for mobile phones. The data for telecommunication variables 
was collected from the database of the International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU). The database used is the World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators 
database 2014 which covers annual data from 1975-2012 of 175 countries 
around the world. The database includes fixed telephone networks, mobile-
cellular telephone subscriptions, quality of service, Internet, traffic, staff, prices, 
revenue, investment, and statistics on ICT access and use by households and 
individuals.  
 Unlike previous studies, our analysis also takes into account stationarity 
and cointegration of variables in the model. Since the macroeconomic variables 
included in the model are trended variables, it is likely that these variables might 
have non-stationarity processes. As a result, this might lead us to the problem 
of spurious regressions, unless we can find cointegrating relationships between 
dependent and the set of independent variables.   
     
   
180 
 
 Firstly, the model for fixed telephones is explained. The second part 
explains the simultaneous equations for mobile phones. Lastly, we compare 
both models together. 
 
Table 4-12: List of variables for Study 4 
Variables  Description Sources  
GDP 
GDPC 
K 
 
L 
TELX 
MED 
HIGH 
MOBX 
MMED 
MHIGH 
t 
WLX 
TELP 
MOBP 
MOBR 
TTI 
 
GA 
URB 
GD 
USCAN 
GDP (billion 2005 USD)8 
GDP per capita (2005 USD) 
Gross capital formation net of telecom investment  
(billion 2005 USD) 
Total employment (in millions) 
Fixed telephone subscriptions per capita 
Dummy variable = 1 when 0.2 < TELX ≤  0.4 
Dummy variable = 1 when TELX > 0.4 
Mobile-cellular telephone subscriptions per capita 
Dummy variable = 1 when 0.05< MOBX≤ 0.3 
Dummy variable =1 when MOBX >0.3  
Time trend 
Waiting list for fixed telephone lines per capita 
Revenue from fixed telephone services per subscription  
Mobile-cellular post-paid connection charge 
Revenue from mobile networks (billion 2005 USD) 
Annual investment in telecommunication services   
(billion 2005 USD) 
Land area (sq. km in thousands) 
Urban population (% of total population) 
Surplus or deficit (billion 2005 USD) 
Dummy variable for USA and Canada from 1983 
World Bank 
World Bank 
World Bank 
/ITU 
PWT9 
ITU 
 
 
ITU 
 
 
 
ITU 
ITU 
ITU 
ITU 
ITU 
 
World Bank 
World Bank 
IMF 
 
4.3.1.1 The simultaneous equations for fixed telephone (Roller and 
Waverman, 2001) 
 
According to Roller and Waverman (2001), the structural model for fixed 
telephones includes the following four equations: the aggregate production 
function, the demand for telecommunication infrastructure, the supply of 
telecommunication investment and the telecommunication infrastructure 
production function. We apply this model to developing Sample 4 countries and 
high-income OECD Sample 4 countries for the period between 1975 and 1990. 
 
- Aggregate production function 
     ܩܦ ௜ܲ௧ ൌ ݂ሺܭ௜௧, 	ܮ௜௧, ܶܧܮ ௜ܺ௧, ݐሻ                                       (1) 
                                                            
8 A billion in this study equals to 109.  
9 Referred to PWT9.0 of Feenstra et al. (2015) 
     
   
181 
 
For the aggregate production function, the aggregate output (GDP) is related to 
gross capital formation net of telecommunication investment (K), employment 
(L), stock of fixed telephone infrastructure (TELX) and time trend (t). 
 
 -    Demand for telecommunication infrastructure 
ܶܧܮ ௜ܺ௧ ൅	ܹܮ ௜ܺ௧ ൌ ݃ሺܩܦܲܥ௜௧, ܶܧܮ ௜ܲ௧, ݐሻ       (2) 
 
The demand for fixed telephones (the number of fixed telephone lines and 
waiting list per capita) is a function of GDP per capita (GDPC) and fixed 
telephone service price. The existence of excess demand at a particular price 
suggested that the waiting list must be added to the penetration rate. Fixed 
telephone revenue per subscription (TELP) is used as a proxy of price.  
 
- Supply of telecommunication investment 
ܶܶܫ௜௧ ൌ ݄ሺܶܧܮ ௜ܲ௧, ܩܣ௜௧, ܩܦ௜௧,ܹܮ ௜ܺ௧, ݐ	ሻ     (3) 
 
Supply is determined by economic, political and geographical variables.  
Investment in telecommunication (TTI) is related to geographic area (GA), 
government deficit (GD), waiting list per capita (WLX) and price of fixed 
telephone service (TELP).  
 
- Telecommunication infrastructure production function 
					߂ܶܧܮ ௜ܺ௧ ൌ ݇ሺܶܶܫ௜௧, ܩܣ௜௧, ݐሻ                 (4) 
 
For telecommunication infrastructure production, change in stock of fixed 
telephone infrastructure is determined by telecommunication investment (TTI) 
and geographical area (GA). 
 The empirical implementation of the model corresponding to Equation (1) 
to Equation (4) involves an estimation of the following system of equations, 
Equation (5) to (8), taking into account non-stationarity and cointegration tests 
for the variables included in the model. 
 Baltagi (2005) suggests that the Fisher test for unit roots has the 
advantage over the IPS (Im, Pesaran and Shin) test in that it does not require a 
balanced panel. Since we deal with unbalanced panel data, we implement the 
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Fisher test for unit roots. Based on Fisher-type unit root test (Choi, 2001), the 
variables included in our model are suggested to be integrated of order 1 and 
should be treated as non-stationary. There is only an exception 
for	߂݈݋݃ሺܶܧܮ ௜ܺ௧ሻ that is stationary or I(0).    
 Cointegration means that despite being individually non-stationary, a 
linear combination of two or more time series can be stationary (Gujarati & 
Porter, 2009). The cointegrating relationship suggests that there is a long-run, 
or equilibrium, relationship between those time series. We perform several 
cointegration tests following Kao (1999), Pedroni (1999, 2004) and Westerlund 
(2005) for the variables in Equation (1) to Equation (3). The evidence for 
cointegration is found in all of these equations. As a result, only dependent 
variables in telecommunication production function (Equation (4)) i.e. TTIit 
needs to be transformed to avoid spurious regression. All equations in the 
system also include country-specific fixed effects. We discuss each equation as 
follows. 
  
- Aggregate production function  
݈݋݃ሺܩܦ ௜ܲ௧ሻ ൌ 	ܽ଴௜ ൅ ܽଵ logሺܭ௜௧ሻ ൅	ܽଶ logሺܮ௜௧ሻ ൅ ܽଷ logሺܶܧܮ ௜ܺ௧ሻ ൅	ܽସݐ ൅ ߝଵ௜௧	  (5) 
 
݈݋݃ሺܩܦ ௜ܲ௧ሻ ൌ 	ܽ଴௜ ൅ ܽଵ logሺܭ௜௧ሻ ൅	ܽଶ logሺܮ௜௧ሻ ൅ ሺܽଷ ൅ ܽହܯܧܦ ൅ ܽ଺ܪܫܩܪሻ ∗
																																		logሺܶܧܮ ௜ܺ௧ሻ ൅	ܽସݐ ൅ ߝଵ௜௧         (5’) 
 
The assumption of constant returns to scale (CRTS) is often applied when 
dealing with macroeconomic problems (Hicks, 1989).10 This is in agreement 
with the studies examining the contribution of infrastructure to aggregate output 
(Canning, 1999; Shahiduzzaman & Alam, 2014). The CRTS property is 
exhibited in our aggregate production function. Hence, the CRTS assumption 
implies a parameter restriction of a1+a2+a3 = 1 in Equation (5). While the 
parameters a1 and a2 represent the output contribution from capital formation 
net of telecom investment and labour, the parameter a3 indicates output 
contribution from fixed telephone infrastructure.  
                                                            
10 Hicks (1989) argues that microeceonomics studies pay closed attention to scale economies, 
while macro-problems often allow to leave this out and apply the constant returns to scale 
method.  
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 The existence of non-linearities in telecommunications can be tested by 
using Equation (5’). The dummy variables MED and HIGH represent medium 
and high fixed telephone penetration rates. If ܽହ  and ܽ଺ are greater than zero, 
critical mass theory is supported (Roller & Waverman, 2001). Then, the growth 
dividend of fixed telephone infrastructure increases with the level of penetration. 
It must be noted that the meaning of non-linearity is only restricted to the 
additional output impact from higher level of fixed telephone penetration rates. 
The relationship between variables in the equation is still linear and the 
parameters MED and HIGH enter the model with multiplicative relations. 
  
- Demand for telecommunication infrastructure 
 ݈݋݃ሺܶܧܮ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ܹܮ ௜ܺ௧ሻ ൌ 	ܾ଴ ൅ ܾଵ ݈݋݃ሺܩܦܲܥ௜௧ሻ ൅	ܾଶ ݈݋݃ሺܶܧܮ ௜ܲ௧ሻ ൅	ܾଷݐ ൅	ߝଶ௜௧    (6) 
 
The parameter b1 in the demand equation represents income elasticity. If b1 has 
positive value, fixed telephone is a normal good. We expect that the demand for 
fixed telephone increases with income. On the contrary, fixed telephone 
infrastructure is said to be inferior good when b1 is negative. 
 Price elasticity of demand for fixed telephone is determined by the 
parameter b2 in Equation (6). The negative correlation between price and 
demand implies that the higher the price, the lower the demand. The demand is 
elastic if the value of b2 is lower than -1 suggesting that there might be close 
substitutes for fixed telephone infrastructure. 
 
- Supply of telecommunication investment 
݈݋݃ሺܶܶܫ௜௧ሻ ൌ
	ܿ଴ ൅ ܿଵܩܦ௜௧ ൅ ܿଶ ሺ1 െ ܷܵܥܣܰሻ ∗ሺܹܮ ௜ܺ௧ሻ ൅
																											ܿଷ ሺ1 െ ܷܵܥܣܰሻ	݈݋݃ሺܶܧܮ ௜ܲ௧ሻ ൅ ܿସ ܷܵܥܣܰ ∗ ݈݋݃ሺܶܧܮ ௜ܲ௧ሻ 	൅ ܿହݐ ൅	ߝଷ௜௧   
    (7) 
Since the telecommunication services in the United States and Canada are 
provided by private firms, price elasticity of supply for these two countries might 
be different from other countries. We separately identify price elasticities of 
supply for the United States and Canada (c4), and the other countries (c3) in 
Equation (7).   
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 The effect of budget balance on telecommunication investment is 
obscure. As pointed out by Jacobsen (2003), it might be argued that budget 
deficit constrains telecommunication investment; therefore, the parameter c1 
should be positive.  However, large investment in telecommunications can also 
be a direct cause of budget deficit since it involves other spending programmes. 
 The impact of an increase in waiting list on telecommunication 
investment is denoted by parameter c2. We assume that there is no watiting list 
if fixed telephone services are provided by private firms. 
 Since the equation with country fixed effects cannot include a time-
invariant variable, the variable for land area (GA) is then omitted from the 
supply equation. 
 
- Telecommunication infrastructure production function 
	߂݈݋݃ሺܶܧܮ ௜ܺ௧ሻ ൌ 	݀଴ ൅ ݀ଵ Δlogሺܶܶܫ௜௧ሻ ൅	݀ଶݐ ൅ ߝସ௜௧                (8) 
 
Similar to supply equation, the variable for land area is omitted in the 
telecommunication infrastructure production function. The variable log (TTIit) is 
transformed to make the series stationary. An increase in the growth rate of 
investment is expected to have positive impacts on the growth rate of fixed 
telephone penetration (d1>0). 
 
4.3.1.2 The simultaneous equations for mobile phones (Gruber & 
Koutroumpis, 2011) 
 
From Gruber and Koutroumpis (2011), the model for mobile phones includes 
the following simultaneous equations for the aggregate production function, the 
demand for mobile phone infrastructure, the supply of mobile phone 
infrastructure and the mobile phone infrastructure production function. This 
model is applied to developing Sample 4 countries and high-income OECD 
Sample 4 countries for the period between 1990 and 2012. 
 
- Aggregate production function 
ܩܦ ௜ܲ௧ ൌ ݂ሺܭ௜௧, ܮ௜௧,ܯܱܤ ௜ܺ௧, ܶܧܮ ௜ܺ௧, ݐሻ       (9) 
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For the aggregate production function, aggregate output is linked to gross 
capital formation net of telecommunication investment (K), employment (L), 
stock of mobile phone infrastructure (MOBX) and stock of fixed phone 
infrastructure (TELX). Since there exists not only mobile phone as a type of 
telecommunication infrastructure in the period of 1990 to 2012, we need to take 
into account other types of telecommunication infrastructure. Fixed telephone 
infrastructure controls for other infrastructure. Furthermore, a time trend (t) is 
also included. The aggregate production function in the simultaneous equations 
for fixed telephone is not nested in this equation because the periods of the 
studies are different. In addition, mobile phone infrastructure was not introduced 
until the late 1980s. Hence, it is appropriate to focus only on fixed telephone 
infrastructure in the period between 1975 and 1990. 
 
-    Demand for mobile phone infrastructure   
ܯܱܤ ௜ܺ௧ ൌ ݃ሺܩܦܲܥ௜௧, ܷܴܤ௜௧, ܶܧܮ ௜ܺ௧,ܯܱܤ ௜ܲ௧, ݐሻ     (10) 
 
For the demand equation, mobile phone penetration is a function of the mobile-
cellular connection charge (MOBP), urbanisation (URB), GDP per capita 
(GDPC) and fixed-line penetration (TELX). Fixed-line penetration may capture 
the effects of network externalities in mobile phone usage.  
 
-    Supply of mobile phone infrastructure  
                                ܯܱܤܴ௜௧ ൌ ݄ሺܩܦܲܥ௜௧, ܷܴܤ௜௧,ܯܱܤ ௜ܲ௧, ݐ	ሻ     (11) 
 
For the supply equation, mobile phone revenue is related to the mobile-cellular 
connection charge (MOBP), urbanisation (URB) and GDP per capita (GDPC). 
Mobile phone revenue (MOBR) is taken as a proxy of mobile phone 
infrastructure investment. The reason why mobile phone infrastructure 
investment is not used, is mainly due to data unavailability. 
 
- Mobile phone infrastructure production function 
   Δܯܱܤ ௜ܺ௧ ൌ ݇ሺܯܱܤܴ௜௧, ݐሻ                 (12) 
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For mobile phone infrastructure production, the change in mobile phone 
penetration is a function of mobile phone revenue.  
 
The following equations, Equation (13) to (16), represent the empirical 
implementation of the model of simultaneous equations in response to Equation 
(9) to Equation (12). 
 The Fisher-type unit root test suggests that variables in our model are 
non-stationary apart from ݈݋݃ሺܯܱܤ ௜ܺ௧ሻ, ݈݋݃	ሺܯܱܤܴሻ௜௧ and ߂݈݋݃	ሺܯܱܤ ௜ܺ௧ሻ which 
are stationary.  
While the cointegration test can confirm that there is a long-run 
relationship between dependent and independent variables in aggregate 
production function for developing Sample 4 countries, we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration at 5% significance level for high-income OECD 
Sample 4 countries which is at the margin (p-value = 0.055). However, the 
cointegrating relationship between dependent and independent variables in the 
aggregate production function for high-income OECD Sample 4 countries is 
confirmed using 10% significance level. We can still argue that there exists a 
cointegrating relationship between dependent and independient variables in 
aggregate production function. Hence, transformation of variables in aggregate 
production function to be stationary is not needed. 
 For the fact that independent variables in demand, supply and mobile 
phone infrastructure production equations are non-stationary while the 
dependent variables are stationary; we need to transform these regressors into 
first difference. By doing this, we avoid the problem of spurious regressions. 
However, this would leave the demand and supply equations mixing the 
variables in both the forms of rate of changes and levels. As a result, 
݈݋݃ሺܯܱܤ ௜ܺ௧ሻ and  ݈݋݃	ሺܯܱܤܴ௜௧ሻ are also transformed into first difference. The 
disadvantange of doing this is that we cannot directly interpret the elasticities of 
demand and supply from our estimates.  Similar to the system of equations for 
fixed telephone, we include country-specific fixed effects in all equations for 
mobile phone as follows.     
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- Aggregate production function 
	݈݋݃ሺܩܦ ௜ܲ௧ሻ ൌ 	ܽ଴௜ ൅ ܽଵ݈݋݃	ሺܭ௜௧ሻ ൅	ܽଶ݈݋݃	ሺܮ௜௧ሻ ൅ ܽଷ݈݋݃	ሺܯܱܤ ௜ܺ௧ሻ ൅
																																												ܽସ݈݋݃	ሺܶܧܮ ௜ܺ௧ሻ ൅ ܽହݐ ൅	ߝଵ௜௧    (13) 
 
     ݈݋݃ሺܩܦ ௜ܲ௧ሻ ൌ ܽ଴௜ ൅ ܽଵ ݈݋݃ሺܭ௜௧ሻ ൅ ܽଶ ݈݋݃ሺܮ௜௧ሻ ൅ ሺܽଷ ൅ ܽ଺	ܯܯܧܦ ൅ ܽ଻	ܯܪܫܩܪሻ ∗
																																݈݋݃	ሺܯܱܤ ௜ܺ௧ሻ ൅	ܽସ݈݋݃	ሺܶܧܮ ௜ܺ௧ሻ ൅ ܽହݐ	 ൅	ߝଵ௜௧       (13’) 
 
The constant returns to scale is also applied to the aggregate production 
function implying that the summation of parameters a1, a2, a3 and a4 is equal to 
1 in Equation (13). Each of these parameters indicates its own contribution to 
aggregate output.  
Non-linearities of mobile phone telecommunication infrastructure may be 
tested by estimating Equation (13’). MMED and MHIGH represent medium and 
high penetration rates of mobile phones. A critical mass effect exists when ܽ଺ 
and ܽ଻	 are greater than zero. When ܽ଺ and ܽ଻	 are positive, the output dividend 
from mobile phone penetration increases with the level of penetration. As 
discussed earlier, the meaning of non-linearity in this context is restrained to 
only multiplicative relations between MMED and MHIGH, and MOBX.  
 
-    Demand for mobile phone infrastructure   
      ߂ ݈݋݃ሺܯܱܤ ௜ܺ௧ሻ ൌ ܾଵ߂ ݈݋݃ሺܩܦܲܥ௜௧ሻ ൅ ܾଶ ߂݈݋݃ሺܯܱܤ ௜ܲ௧ሻ ൅ ܾଷ ߂݈݋݃ሺܶܧܮ ௜ܺ௧ሻ ൅ 
																																						ܾସ߂݈݋݃	ሺܷܴܤ௜௧ሻ ൅	ܾହݐ ൅	ߝଶ௜௧      (14) 
 
Apart from an increase in the growth rate of mobile-cellular connection charge, 
all variables should exert positive effects on the rate of growth of mobile phone 
penetration. We expect b1, b3 and b4 to be positive, while b2 is likely to be 
negative. 
 
- Supply of mobile phone infrastructure  
߂݈݋݃	ሺܯܱܤܴሻ௜௧ ൌ 	 ܿଵ߂݈݋݃	ሺܩܦܲܥ௜௧ሻ ൅	ܿଶ߂݈݋݃	ሺܯܱܤ ௜ܲ௧ሻ ൅ ܿଷ߂݈݋݃	ሺܷܴܤ௜௧ሻ	 
																																													൅ܿସݐ ൅ ߝଷ௜௧           (15) 
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The increase in the growth rates of mobile connection charge, urbanisation, and 
GDP per capita are expected to have positive impacts on the rate of growth of 
revenue from mobile networks (c1, c2 and c3 >0). 
  
- Mobile phone infrastructure production function 
    ߂݈݋ ݃ሺܯܱܤ ௜ܺ௧ሻ ൌ ݀ଵ߂݈݋ ݃ሺܯܱܤܴ௜௧ሻ ൅ ݀ଶݐ ൅ ߝସ௜௧    (16) 
The growth rate of mobile phone penetration rate should be increased as a 
result of an increase in the rate of growth of mobile phone services revenue 
(d1>0).  
However, the transformation of variables taken into account stationarity 
and cointegration makes the dependent variables in both demand and mobile 
phone infrastructure production function become the same. We need to omit the 
equation for mobile phone infrastructure production function from our system. It 
is worth noting that the estimated parameters in the aggregate production 
function, our main equation of interest, are highly similar with or without mobile 
phone infrastructure production function. 
 
4.3.1.3 The difference between models for fixed telephone and 
mobile phone infrastrutures 
 
There are differences between the mobile phone model and the fixed telephone 
model which need to be compared in each equation starting from the aggregate 
production function, the demand for telecommunication infrastructure, the 
supply of telecommunication infrastructure and the telecommunication 
infrastructure production function. 
For the aggregate production function in Equation (9), fixed telephone 
penetration is also included in the mobile phone equation because fixed 
telephone infrastructure existed long before mobile phone infrastructure. It can 
represent other types of telecommunication infrastructure not included in the 
model. However, the equation for fixed telephones does not include mobile 
phone infrastructure since the mobile phone infrastructure did not exist until late 
1980s.  
For the demand equation of mobile phone infrastructure in Equation (10), 
the dependent variable does not include the waiting list per capita with mobile 
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phone penetration. This is because excess demand for mobile service does not 
exist and there is no waiting list. However, urbanisation and fixed telephone 
penetration are additionally included. While the ratio of urban population can 
mutually determine the demand for mobile telephone communication, fixed 
telephone penetration can reflect network externalities from mobile phone 
usage.  
The dependent variable for the supply of mobile phone infrastructure in 
Equation (11) is mobile phone services revenue. This is different from the fixed 
telephone equation where investment is used. We use mobile phone revenue 
as a proxy of mobile phone investment since the available data for investment is 
very limited. Urbanisation and GDP per capita are also included in the equation. 
However, geographical area, government surplus and the waiting list for main 
lines are excluded from mobile phone supply. Since a majority of investment in 
mobile phone infrastructure is from the private sector, the government budget 
has minimal effect on the supply of mobile phones and can be dropped from the 
regression. While geographic area determines the coverage of fixed telephones 
services, the supply of mobile phone services is highly related to the density of 
population. Hence urbanisation should be included in supply of mobile phone 
services rather than geographic area.     
Lastly, the independent variable of telecom infrastructure for mobile 
phone production from Equation (12) is mobile phone revenue. Neither 
geographic area nor urbanisation is included in this equation. This is consistent 
with having mobile revenue as a dependent variable in the supply equation. The 
specification is similar to fixed telephone production function where investment 
in telecommunications is included as an independent variable. Nonetheless, this 
equation for mobile phone infrastruture needs to be omitted when we look at the 
empirical implementation.  
In the following analysis, 17 developing Sample 4 countries and 26 high-
income OECD Sample 4 countries are examined in two different periods of 
time: 1975-1990 and 1990-2012. Selected countries have substantial available 
data from both periods of time. The first period of 1975-1990 is dominated by 
fixed telephone infrastructure. The second period covers 1990-2012 when the 
mobile-phone infrastructure has become increasingly important especially after 
the 1990s.  We focus on the analysis of the relationship between mobile phone 
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infrastructure and economic development while taking into account the 
existence of fixed telephone infrastructure. The system of equations is 
estimated via three-stage least squares (3SLS). All dependent variables are 
treated as endogenous variables. Other variables are treated as exogenous to 
the system. The equations in our system control for country specific-fixed 
effects while including a time trend. The alternative specification includes both 
country-specific and time-specific fixed effects. The assumption of linear 
relationship between time and dependent variable, where a time trend is 
included in the equations, might be too restrictive across a sufficiently long 
period of time. Our discussion will then focus on specifications in which both 
country and time fixed effects are included. 
 
4.3.2 The regression analysis of telecommunication infrastructure 
and economic development 
 
In this section, the impacts of fixed telephone and mobile phone infrastructures 
on economic outputs are analysed controlling for country-specific fixed effects 
and either time trend or time-specific fixed effects.  
 
4.3.2.1 Fixed telephones  
 
In this analysis of fixed telephones and their impacts on economic development 
under the framework proposed by Roller and Waverman (2001), the samples 
used are for the period of 1975 to 1990. 
 
- The impacts of fixed telephones on aggregate output between 
1975 and 1990 
 
The analysis of the impacts of the fixed telephones on aggregate output starts 
with the set of developing Sample 4 countries. The results are shown in Table 
4-13.  
The estimated aggregate production function shows that increases in 
capital, labour and fixed telephone penetration enhance aggregate output. The 
effects of increases in all the inputs on aggregate output are similar in both 
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cases where we include time trend and time-specific fixed effects. The 
estimated coefficient for L(L) is 0.57 which is higher than that of combining from 
both L(K) and L(TELX). It suggests that contribution of human capital to 
aggregate output is higher than that of physical capital in developing Sample 4 
countries.  
 
Table 4-13:  Simultaneous equations for impacts of fixed telephones on aggregate output  
from 1975-1990 for developing Sample 4 countries 
Specification/ 
Equation Country fixed with t Two-way fixed  
  (1) (2) 
b/se b/se 
      
L(GDP)     
L(K) 0.2299*** 0.2312*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) 
L(L) 0.5670*** 0.5676*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) 
L(TELX) 0.2031*** 0.2011*** 
  (0.03) (0.02) 
T 0.0006   
  (0.00)   
L(TELX+WLX)     
L(GDPC) 0.8579*** 0.8619*** 
  (0.10) (0.09) 
L(TELP) 0.0433 0.0928** 
  (0.04) (0.04) 
T 0.0661***   
  (0.00)   
L(TTI)     
GD -0.0034 -0.0046 
  (0.00) (0.00) 
(1-USCAN)*WLX -9.2988* -9.5158* 
  (5.28) (5.23) 
(1-USCAN)*L(TELP) 0.7335*** 0.5798** 
  (0.23) (0.23) 
T 0.0314**   
  (0.01)   
ᅪ L(TELX)     
ᅪ	L(TTI) -0.0087** -0.0078* 
  (0.00) (0.00) 
T -0.0010   
  (0.00)   
N 197 197 
 
Notes: (1) Country fixed effects with time trend (2) Country fixed effects and year fixed effects 
Standard errors in parentheses below parameters 
***, **, * Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
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It must be noted without constant returns to scale restriction, the coeffiecients 
for L(L) and L(TELX) are much lower. Particularly, the estimated coefficients of 
L(L) are around 0.21-0.25. We do not examine the critical mass effect of fixed 
telephone penetration in this sample of countries since the penetration rates of 
fixed telephone per capita are lower than 0.2. 
An increase in GDP per capita has a positive impact on the demand for 
fixed telephones. The fixed telephone infrastructure can be viewed as a normal 
good because its demand increases with income. The price elasticity of demand 
is estimated at 0.04 with time trend or 0.09 with time-specific fixed effects, thus 
showing that the demand is almost perfectly inelastic. It can be interpreted that 
fixed telephone infrastructure was a type of communication technology that did 
not have any close substitutes for the period between 1975 and 1990 in 
developing Sample 4 countries.  
The negative relationship between budget balance and investment in the 
supply function, suggests that telecom investment could be associated with 
government deficit. Similar to the explanation given by Roller and Waverman 
(2001), telecommunication investment involves expenditure in other related 
projects, leading to a higher budget deficit. However, the coefficients of budget 
balance are not significant in this case. Excess demand from a waiting list has a 
negative relationhip with supply. This might be interpreted as being that having 
a waiting list is a result of supply constraints as suggested by Jacobsen (2003). 
In contrast, an increase in price generates higher supply. However, supply is 
inelastic since the coefficient of L(TELP) is lower than 1. 
The production function of telecommunication infrastructure is negatively 
related to growth rate of telecommunication investment. However, the growth 
effects of this is minimal. A 1% increase in growth rate of investment might 
reduce growth rate of fixed telephone penetration by 0.008% to 0.009%. 
The results for high-income OECD Sample 4 countries appear in Table 
4-14. The estimates of the aggregate production function show that increases in 
capital, labour and fixed telephone penetration enhance aggregate output. The 
coefficient for each input is similar comparing the equations with time trend 
(Column (1) and (2)) and the equations with time-specific fixed effects (Column 
(3) and (4)).  The effect on output from the increased penetration in high-income 
OECD Sample 4 countries (0.30-0.33) is much higher than that of developing 
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Sample 4 countries (0.20) for the same period of time (1975-1990). It is not a 
surprising result since the fixed telephone infrastructure is more prevalent in 
high-income OECD countries than that of developing countries.  
 
Table 4-14:  Simultaneous equations for impacts of fixed telephones on aggregate output 
 from 1975-1990 for high-income OECD Sample 4 countries 
Specification/ Equation 
Country fixed 
with t 
Country fixed 
with t 
Two-way 
fixed 
Two-way 
fixed 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
b/se b/se b/se b/se 
          
L(GDP)         
L(K) 0.1507*** 0.1515*** 0.1401*** 0.1424*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
L(L) 0.5336*** 0.5493*** 0.5313*** 0.5459*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
L(TELX) 0.3156*** 0.2991*** 0.3286*** 0.3117*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
MED*LTELX   -0.0164***   -0.0157*** 
    (0.01)   (0.00) 
HIGH*LTELX   -0.0311***   -0.0290*** 
    (0.01)   (0.01) 
T 0.0058*** 0.0059***     
  (0.00) (0.00)     
L(TELX+WLX)         
L(GDPC) 1.2710*** 1.2694*** 1.3866*** 1.3846*** 
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
L(TELP) -0.2379*** -0.2397*** -0.2169*** -0.2194*** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
T 0.0119*** 0.0119***     
  (0.00) (0.00)     
L(TTI)         
GD 0.0011 0.0011 0.0010 0.0010 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
(1-USCAN)*WLX 5.5283** 5.5071** 5.1447** 5.1030** 
  (2.54) (2.54) (2.54) (2.54) 
(1-USCAN)*L(TELP) 0.4488*** 0.4505*** 0.4770*** 0.4793*** 
  (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) 
USCAN*L(TELP) 0.4058*** 0.4077*** 0.4380*** 0.4405*** 
  (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) 
T 0.0397*** 0.0397***     
  (0.00) (0.00)     
ᅪ L(TELX)         
ᅪ	L(TTI) -0.0040 -0.0040 -0.0037 -0.0037 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
T -0.0014*** -0.0014***     
  (0.00) (0.00)     
N 365 365 365 365 
 
Notes: (1), (2) Country fixed effects with time trend (3), (4) Country fixed effects and year fixed effects 
Standard errors in parentheses below parameters 
 ***, **, * Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
     
   
194 
 
Unlike the findings of Roller and Waverman (2001), marginal output 
effects do not exist once telecommunication infrastructure has reached 
universal service. Instead, there could be diminishing returns with medium and 
high fixed telephone penetration considering critical mass (Column (2) and (4)). 
An increase in GDP per capita has a positive impact on demand. Income 
elasticity of demand in high-income OECD Sample 4 countries is higher than 
that of developing Sample 4 countries. Demand for fixed telephone in 
developed countries is more responsive to change in income than that of 
developing countries. The coefficients of price elasticity of demand is 
approximately around -0.22 to -0.24 suggesting that demand is inelastic.  
However, the price elasticity of demand is still higher than that of developing 
Sample 4 countries. This suggests that in high-income OECD Sample 4 
countries, it might be easier to find the substitutable communication technology 
for fixed telephone. 
Similar to developing Sample 4 countries, telecommunication 
infrastructure investment is not significantly related to government deficits. The 
positive coefficients could have been interpreted as constraint from investment 
from budget deficits. However, the results confirm that the effects of budget 
balance on telecommunication investment is ambiguous. Waiting lists are 
positively related to investment implying that investment will be increased as a 
result of excess demand of fixed telephone in high-income OECD Sample 4 
countries. Prices are significantly and positively associated with supply. 
However, supply is inelastic. 
The estimated fixed telephone production shows that the growth rate of 
investment is not significantly related to the rate of change in fixed telephone 
penetration for high-income OECD Sample 4 countries. 
 
- Comparison with the results of Roller and Waverman (2001) 
 
The results for high-income OECD countries can be compared between our 
study and Roller and Waverman (2001) as shown in Table 4-15. While the 
annual data of Roller and Waverman (2001) covers the period from 1970 to 
1990, our data is between 1975 and 1990. 
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Capital, labour and fixed telephone penetration are conducive to growth 
in both studies. A higher growth dividend is found when telecommunication 
service has reached the level of high penetration in the study of Roller and 
Waverman (2001). On the contrary, we find that there could be diminishing 
returns when service coverage is high. This difference in the results might be 
due to the inclusion of the other six different countries; Chile, Iceland, Israel, 
Korea, Luxembourg, and Switzerland, which do not appear in Roller and 
Waverman (2001). Primarily, the penetration rates of fixed telephone in 1990 
are high in Iceland (0.51), Luxembourg (0.48), and Switzerland (0.59). The 
output contribution of fixed telephones in these countries might be lower than 
those high-income OECD countries included in Roller and Waverman’s (2001) 
study. 
 
Table 4-15: Comparison between Roller and Waverman’s (2001) study and our Study 4 on the 
relationship between telecommunication infrastructure and aggregate output 
Variables/studies Roller and Waverman (2001) Our study 
Output equation 
K 
L  
TELX 
       MED 
       HIGH 
Year 
 
Positive significant 
Positive significant 
Positive significant 
Insignificant 
Positive significant 
Negative significant 
 
Positive significant 
Positive significant 
Positive significant 
Negative significant 
Negative significant 
Positive significant 
 
We argue that the evidence of critical mass effect found by Roller and 
Waverman (2001) is not robust for high-income OECD countries. The 
hypothesis of network extenalities for fixed telephone infrastructure still needs 
further verification. The contribution of increased fixed-telepone penetration to 
aggregate output of their study is 0.05 which is much lower than our study at 
0.32. It suggests that the contribution of fixed telephone on aggregate output is 
underestimated in Roller and Waverman’s (2001) study without controlling for 
cointegrating relationships between dependent and independent variables in the 
system of equations.    
 
4.3.2.2 Mobile phones 
 
The impact of mobile phone infrastructure on aggregate output is analysed by 
using the framework proposed by Gruber and Koutroumpis (2011). The time 
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period of this study covers 1990 to 2012. We firstly separate the sample 
according to level of income. Later, the sample is classified according to the 
level of fixed telephone penetration. 
 
- The impacts of mobile telephones on aggregate output between 
1990 and 2012 separated by level of income  
 
We separate our samples into developing Sample 4 countries and high-income 
OECD Sample 4 countries to account for difference in income level. We will 
evaluate the results for developing Sample 4 countries from Table 4-16 first.   
The estimated aggregate production function shows that increases in 
capital and labour enhance aggregate output for developing Sample 4 
countries. The coefficients of telecom penetration are highly similar comparing 
the results with time trend and with time-specific fixed effects. A 1% increase in 
mobile phone penetration could generate a 0.03% to 0.04% increase in 
aggregate output. The output dividend could even be 0.008% higher comparing 
a medium penetration rate with low penetration in the equation including time 
trend (Column (2)). The critical mass effect, however, does not exist with high 
penetration in both specifications (Column (2) and (4)). The negative 
contribution of fixed telephone on aggregate output might reflect the prevalence 
of mobile phone infrastructure that was replacing the usage of fixed telephone 
as a key communication technology between 1990 and 2012 in developing 
Sample 4 countries. It is important to note that the estimated parameters for 
L(L) is much higher than the estimation without constant returns to scale 
(CRTS) restriction. The coefficients of L(L) in the equations are 0.34 to 0.47 
without restriction comparing with 1.02 to 1.07 with this CRTS restriction. 
The modification of variables in the model for mobile phone taking into 
account non-stationarity and cointegration has indicated that the variables in the 
demand and supply equations need to be transformed into first difference. 
Hence, it is not possible to directly interpret elasticities of demand and supply in 
the same way we did with the system of equations for fixed telephone. The 
telecommunication infrastructure production function is omitted from the model 
since its dependent variable, after modification, captures the same effect as 
shown in the demand equation.  
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Table 4-16: Simultaneous equations for impacts of mobile phones on aggregate output 
 from 1990-2012 for developing Sample 4 countries 
Specification/ 
Equation 
Country fixed 
with t 
Country fixed 
with t  
Two-way 
fixed 
Two-way 
fixed 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  b/se b/se b/se b/se 
          
L(GDP)         
L(K) 0.1099*** 0.1078*** 0.1015*** 0.1044*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
L(L) 1.0255*** 1.0175*** 1.0703*** 1.0643*** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
L(MOBX) 0.0327*** 0.0369*** 0.0340*** 0.0350*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
MMED*L(MOBX)   0.0083*   0.0038 
    (0.00)   (0.00) 
MHIGH*L(MOBX)   0.0172   0.0080 
    (0.01)   (0.01) 
L(TELX) -0.1680*** -0.1621*** -0.2058*** -0.2036*** 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
T 0.0092*** 0.0080***     
  (0.00) (0.00)     
ᅪ L(MOBX)         
ᅪ L(GDPC) 1.1328 1.1322 1.7110** 1.7173** 
  (0.70) (0.70) (0.77) (0.77) 
ᅪ L(MOBP) 0.0100 0.0097 0.0037 0.0038 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
ᅪ L(TELX) -0.2907 -0.2972 0.1516 0.1510 
  (0.28) (0.28) (0.30) (0.30) 
ᅪ L(URB) 8.8191* 8.8301* 7.0640 7.0345 
  (4.85) (4.85) (4.45) (4.45) 
T -0.0384*** -0.0385***     
  (0.01) (0.01)     
ᅪ L(MOBR)         
ᅪ L(GDPC) 0.7036 0.7119 1.0779 1.0972 
  (0.74) (0.74) (0.81) (0.81) 
ᅪ L(MOBP) 0.0688 0.0696 0.0669 0.0675 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
ᅪ L(URB) 4.7747 4.5226 5.7669 5.6765 
  (5.13) (5.14) (4.66) (4.66) 
T -0.0290*** -0.0290***     
  (0.01) (0.01)     
N 119 119 119 119 
 
Notes: (1), (2) Country fixed effects with time trend (3), (4) Country fixed effects and year fixed effects 
Standard errors in parentheses below parameters 
 ***, **, * Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
 
The growth rate of GDP per capita is positively related to growth rate of 
mobile phone penetration in demand equation as suggested by the results that 
include time-specific fixed effects (Column(3) and (4)). While changes in price 
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and fixed telephone penetration do not have significant effect on the rate of 
change of mobile phone penetration, an increase in the growth rate of 
urbanisation may have a positive effect on mobile phone penetration growth 
rate. An increase in urbanisation growth rate of 1% might enhance mobile 
phone pentration growth rate by 7.0% to 8.8%.  
Unlike demand equation, an increase in the growth rate of GDP per 
capita does not have a significant impact on the mobile phone services revenue 
growth rate in the supply equation. A change in price is not significantly related 
to the growth rate of mobile phone revenue earned by firms. Insiginificant 
relationship between growth rate of mobile phone revenue and urbanisation 
growth rate is also found.  
From Table 4-17 for high-income OECD Sample 4 countries, the 
aggregate production function is considered first. Aggregate output is enhanced 
by increases in capital and labour although the coefficients are somewhat 
different comparing the equations with time trend and the equations with time-
specific fixed effects. There is no evidence of mobile phone infrastructure being 
positively related to aggregate output including when considering critical mass 
effects. Instead, the increase in mobile phone penetration might slightly 
decrease aggregate output. It can be noticed that an increase in fixed telephone 
penetration still has positive impacts on aggregate output. A 1% increase in 
fixed telephone penetration could enhance aggregate output by 0.14% to 
0.16%. It may suggest that while fixed telephone remains a productive input as 
a mean of communication, an increase in mobile phone penetration in high-
income OECD Sample 4 countries does not contribute to production or 
economic activities. 
The growth rate of GDP per capita is positively related with the growth 
rate of mobile phone penetration in the demand equation only where time trend 
is included. Additionally, there is an evidence that an increase in the growth rate 
of mobile connection charge may have negative effect on the growth rate of 
mobile phone penetration. The rate of changes of fixed telephone penetration, 
and the growth rate of urbanisation are not significantly related to mobile phone 
penetration growth rate.  
While the growth rate of GDP per capita might be positively related to the 
rate of growth of mobile phone services revenue, the rate of change of mobile 
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service price and the urbanisation growth rate are all insignificantly related to 
the mobile services revenue growth rate in the supply equation. 
 
Table 4-17: Simultaneous equations for impacts of mobile phones on aggregate output 
 from 1990-2012 for high-income OECD Sample 4 countries 
Specification/ 
Equation 
Country fixed 
with t 
Country fixed 
with t 
Two-way 
fixed 
Two-way 
fixed 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  b/se b/se b/se b/se 
          
L(GDP)         
L(K) 0.2026*** 0.1964*** 0.1673*** 0.1665*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
L(L) 0.6502*** 0.6599*** 0.7307*** 0.7311*** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
L(MOBX) -0.0147*** -0.0152** -0.0366*** -0.0356*** 
  (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
MMED*L(MOBX)   0.0035   0.0013 
    (0.00)   (0.00) 
MHIGH*L(MOBX)   -0.0059   0.0017 
    (0.01)   (0.01) 
L(TELX) 0.1619*** 0.1589*** 0.1386*** 0.1381*** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
T 0.0160*** 0.0158***     
  (0.00) (0.00)     
ᅪ L(MOBX)         
ᅪ L(GDPC) 1.2521** 1.2491** 0.6608 0.6606 
  (0.51) (0.51) (0.64) (0.64) 
ᅪ L(MOBP) -0.0517* -0.0514* -0.0276 -0.0275 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
ᅪ L(TELX) 0.0882 0.0944 -0.3382 -0.3363 
  (0.31) (0.31) (0.30) (0.30) 
ᅪ L(URB) -9.6426 -9.4665 -1.9797 -1.9347 
  (7.20) (7.20) (6.23) (6.23) 
T -0.0268*** -0.0268***     
  (0.00) (0.00)     
ᅪ L(MOBR)         
ᅪ L(GDPC) 1.3511** 1.3488** 0.8462 0.8451 
  (0.55) (0.55) (0.72) (0.72) 
ᅪ L(MOBP) 0.0004 0.0007 0.0011 0.0012 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
ᅪ L(URB) -0.1851 0.0378 2.2103 2.2359 
  (7.83) (7.83) (7.40) (7.40) 
T -0.0234*** -0.0234***     
  (0.00) (0.00)     
N 216 216 216 216 
 
Notes: (1), (2) Country fixed effects with time trend (3), (4) Country fixed effects and year fixed effects 
Standard errors in parentheses below parameters 
 ***, **, * Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
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- The impacts of mobile telephones on aggregate output between 
1990 and 2012 separated by level of fixed telephone penetration 
 
We are also interested whether there is complementarity or substitutability 
between fixed telephone penetration and mobile phone penetration. If they are 
complements, an increase in mobile phone penetration would enhance 
(deteriorate) output when fixed telephone penetration is high (low). If they are 
substitutes, an increase in mobile phone penetration would enhance 
(deteriorate) output when fixed telephone penetration is low (high).  
In order to identify the relationship between fixed telephone penetration 
and mobile phone penetration according to the aforementioned aspect, the 
samples of high-income OECD Sample 4 countries and developing Sample 4 
countries are combined together. Then, they are separated evenly into two 
groups according to the level of fixed telephone penetration. The samples with 
fixed telephone penetration above 46% are classified as high fixed telephone 
penetration. Otherwise, the samples with a penetration rate below 46% are 
classified as low fixed telephone penetration.   
For low fixed telephone penetration, an increase in mobile phone 
penetration has a positive impact on GDP. A 1% increase in mobile phone 
penetration can improve aggregate output by 0.04% to 0.05%. 
For the high fixed telephone penetration, an increase in mobile phone 
penetration does not enhance GDP level. In contrast, there is some evidence of 
a deteriorating effect especially when the equations include time-specific fixed 
effects. A 1% increase in mobile phone penetration could reduce aggregate 
output by 0.04%. The evidence from our results confirms substitutability 
between fixed telephones and mobile phones in the same way as the results for 
the low fixed telephone penetration do. 
  
- Comparison with the results of Gruber an Koutroumpis (2011) 
 
Our results for annual data between 1990 and 2012 are compared with the 
period from 1990 to 2007 used by Gruber and Koutroumpis (2011) in Table 4-
18. While our study focusses on groups of developing countries and high-
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income OECD countries within Sample 4, their analysis pooled together low- 
and high-income countries. 
The coefficients on both capital and labour are positive and significant 
across all groups in the studies (Our Study 4 and Gruber and Koutrompis’s 
(2011) study). The estimated coeffficients of capital and labour for our high-
income OECD Sample 4 countries are close to their study. While their study 
indicates that an increase in mobile phone penetration is conducive to 
aggregate output, our study has found favourable output impacts only for 
developing Sample 4 countries. The output contribution from increased mobile 
phone penetration rate in our study at 0.03% to 0.04% is similar to the 
estimated from Gruber and Koutroumpis (2011) at 0.03%. However, an 
increase in mobile phone penetration rate in high-income OECD Sample 4 
countries has deteriorating effects on aggregate output. 
 
Table 4-18: Comparison between the study by Gruber and Koutroumpis (2011) and our Study 4 
on the relationship between mobile phone infrastructure and aggregate output 
Variables/studies Gruber and Koutroumpis 
(2011) 
 
Developed and 
developing countries 
Our study* 
 
 
Developing 
countries 
 
 
OECD countries 
Output equation 
K 
L 
MOBX 
      MED 
      HIGH 
TELX 
 
Positively significant 
Positively significant 
Positively significant 
Positively significant 
Positively significant 
Negatively significant 
 
Positively significant 
Positively significant 
Positively significant 
Positively significant 
Insignificant 
Negatively significant 
 
Positively significant 
Positively significant 
Negatively significant 
Insignificant 
Insignificant 
Positively significant 
 
 Note: *Our analysis includes country-specific and time-specific fixed effects in all equations.  
 
Considering critical mass effect, an increase in penetration rate when the 
level of penetration is in medium level results in increased returns in their study 
and our developing Sample 4 countries. However, the higher output dividend 
from a high penetration rate survives only in the results of Gruber and 
Koutroumpis (2011). This suggests that network externalities may exist only 
when we consider a wider set of countries.  
 While an increase in fixed telephone penetration may have negative 
effect on output in developing Sample 4 countries, the positive contribution is 
found in high-income OECD Sample 4 countries. This might reflect the 
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productive usage of this kind of communication technology in high-income 
countries. This evidence of the difference between developing and high-income 
countries is not found in the study of Gruber and Koutroumpis (2011), since 
they do not separate the samples as we did. 
 
4.4 Concluding remarks 
 
The relationship between telecommunication infrastructure and economic 
development has been assessed by using a simultaneous approach for both 
fixed telephones and mobile phones using samples from developing Sample 4 
countries and high-income OECD Sample 4 countries between 1975 and 2012. 
Our approach in this chapter has the merit of taking into account stationarity 
and cointegration among variables in each equation of the system. 
Furthermore, the restriction of constant returns to scale is also imposed to 
aggregate production function suggested by Hicks (1989). 
For fixed telephone infrastructure, output contribution of high-income 
OECD Sample 4 countries is higher than that of developing Sample 4 countries 
in the period of 1975 to 1990. The positive causal link between fixed telephones 
and aggregate output in high-income OECD Sample 4 countries is consistent 
with the findings of Roller and Waverman (2001). In our samples, we can only 
test the critical mass effect for high-income OECD Sample 4 countries. 
However, the results suggest that there could be diminishing returns when 
penetration has reached a higher level. This provides evidence against positive 
network externalities. Since the effects of critical mass do not exist in our case 
of high-income OECD Sample 4 countries, it could imply that critical mass effect 
found by Roller and Waverman (2001) is not robust. 
For mobile phones, an increase in mobile phone penetration has positive 
impacts on aggregate output in developing Sample 4 countries. There is 
evidence of increasing returns with medium mobile phone penetration. For high-
income OECD Sample 4 countries, there is weak evidence of mobile phone 
penetration being negatively related to aggregate output. This contradicts the 
findings of Gruber and Koutroumpis (2011) in which they found that the impact 
of mobile telecommunication on growth is smaller for countries with a low level 
of mobile phone penetration. Though the negative impacts are small, this 
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finding raises questions about substitutability and complementarity between 
fixed telephone and mobile phone infrastructures. 
To address aforementioned concerns, the samples are separated by 
level of fixed telephone penetration. With low fixed telephone penetration, an 
increase in mobile phone penetration has a positive impact on aggregate 
output. Nonetheless, with high fixed telephone penetration, an increase in 
mobile phone penetration may impose a deteriorating effect on aggregate 
output. It implies that fixed telephone and mobile phone infrastructures are 
subsitutes for one another. 
Even though the rise of mobile phone infrastructure has lessened the 
role of fixed telephones in enhancing economic growth, fixed telephones are still 
essential in this transition. The investment in mobile phone telecommunication 
infrastructure in developing countries is still an important driver for economic 
development since it has been used as a type of communication technology 
supporting economic activities where fixed telephone service has low coverage. 
On the contrary, high-income OECD countries would not obtain any further 
benefit from telecommunication investment unless more productive and efficient 
ways of utilising mobile telecommunication infrastructure are implemented. This 
is because fixed telephone usage is already prevalent in high-income OECD 
countries. Hence, the current usage of mobile phones in high-income OECD 
countries either replaces fixed telephone or relates to non-productive activities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
   
204 
 
Conclusion of the thesis 
 
In these studies, we focus on two different drivers of economic growth: public 
spending and telecommunication infrastructure. The analysis of the relationship 
between public expenditure and economic growth was studied in the second 
chapter, in Study 1, and in the third chapter, in Study 2 and Study 3. The 
relationship between telecommunication infrastructure and aggregate output 
was investigated in the fourth chapter, in Study 4. 
 
Results of this study 
 
We begin with the conclusion of the results from these four studies.  
 Study 1, in the second chapter, is a regression analysis of public 
expenditure and economic growth, using Bose et al.’s (2007) framework, for 
groups of countries with different income levels using Sample 1 countries. We 
also take the problem of endogeneity from taxes and investment, and the 
possible non-linear relationship between government spending and economic 
growth into account.   The results showed that gross capital formation and initial 
GDP per capita are significantly related to growth. While an increase in gross 
capital formation level has a positive effect on growth, the results also indicate 
that the higher the level of initial GDP per capita is, the lower the rate of growth 
is. This is consistent with findings of previous studies. However, without 
controlling for endogeneity, the positive growth impacts of an increase in 
investment might have been overestimated. There is evidence that 
transportation and communication spending is significantly related to economic 
growth in both developing and high-income Sample 1 countries. Other types of 
functional spending are either negatively or not significantly related to economic 
growth. Unlike the authors of earlier studies, we cannot find evidence of health 
spending and education spending being conducive to growth. The non-linear 
specifications have shown that the relationship between transportation and 
communication spending and economic growth is concave in both developing 
and high-income Sample 1 countries. Growth-enhancing effects of increased 
transportation and communication spending exist up to the level of spending of 
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8% of GDP in developing Sample 1 countries, but only up to the level of 4% of 
GDP in high-income Sample 1 countries. 
 Study 2, in the third chapter, indicates that productive expenditure might 
only be conducive to economic growth in high-income OECD Sample 2 
countries when taking government budget constraint into account. The positive 
growth effects of an increase in productive expenditure involve with financing by 
a reduction of non-productive expenditure. The results confirm Kneller et al.’s 
(1999) findings: that growth impacts of fiscal policy are dependent on the 
methods used for financing public spending. An increase in distortionary taxes 
reduces growth across groups of Sample 2 countries with different income 
levels.   
 In Study 3, when investigating the relationship between public spending 
and long-run GDP per capita level while including only the first difference of 
control variables in short-run effects, an increase in total spending financed by 
non-distortionary taxes could only enhance GDP per capita in the long run for 
high-income OECD Sample 3 countries. We have found that excise taxes 
(which, in this branch of literature, are classified as non-distortionary taxes) 
should be used for financing public expenditure in high-income OECD Sample 3 
countries. With a given level of total spending, an increase in the share of 
healthcare and general public services spending can improve long-run GDP per 
capita level in developing Sample 3 countries. In high-income OECD Sample 3 
countries, an increase in the share of education spending would have a positive 
impact on long-run GDP per capita. The estimated speed of adjustment in our 
study is extremely low, showing the persistent effect of fiscal shock in both 
developing Sample 3 countries and high-income OECD Sample 3 countries. 
 In Study 4, in the fourth chapter, we assessed the relationship between 
telecommunication infrastructure and aggregate output taking stationarity and 
cointegration tests into account. When considering fixed telephone 
infrastructure, we found that the output dividend for developing Sample 4 
countries is lower than for high-income OECD Sample 4 countries. Unlike Roller 
and Waverman (2001), we cannot find evidence of a critical mass effect in high-
income OECD Sample 4 countries. 
 Mobile phone penetration is positively related to aggregate output in 
developing Sample 4 countries. In particular, there is evidence of increasing 
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returns with medium mobile phone penetration. For high-income OECD Sample 
4 countries, there is only weak evidence of mobile phone penetration being 
negatively related to aggregate output. When there is low fixed telephone 
penetration, an increase in mobile phone penetration rate would have a positive 
effect on aggregate output. On the other hand, in the samples which have high 
fixed telephone penetration, mobile phone penetration is negatively related to 
output. This implies substitutability between mobile phone and fixed telephone 
infrastructures.    
 
Policy recommendations 
 
In terms of policy prescriptions, we consider public expenditure and 
telecommunication infrastructure together. 
 Firstly, a regression analysis of the relationship between public 
expenditure and growth has shown that investment is a key driver of growth in 
all groups of countries. Therefore, governments must create sound 
environments that support businesses’ investment decisions. 
 Secondly, transportation and communication spending is the only main 
functional spending that is significantly and positively related to growth. It is 
important that governments invest sufficiently in public transportation and 
communication infrastructure. This is particularly important for developing 
countries, as they have more room to reap the benefits than high-income 
countries.  
 Thirdly, an increase in public spending should be financed by non-
distortionary taxes, especially excise taxes. Governments should, at least, try to 
avoid raising distortionary taxes. 
 Fourthly, some types of public spending should not be curtailed relative 
to other types of spending (for example, education spending in high-income 
OECD countries and general public services and health spending in developing 
countries). Increasing the shares of these types of spending could increase the 
level of long-run GDP per capita. 
 Lastly, increase in telecommunication investment can still be a source of 
economic development in developing countries; however, it might not be 
beneficial for high-income OECD countries. Policymakers must take care to 
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select the appropriate set of actions at different stages of telecommunication 
infrastructure penetration. 
 
Limitations of the studies 
 
The four empirical studies in this thesis have, inevitably, been subject to data 
issues and econometric difficulties. Most of the data issues that arose involved 
missing values. For example, our fiscal variables data needed to be combined 
from several versions of IMF Government Finance Statistics from the UK data 
service and Gemmell et al. (2011). The method of linear interpolation was also 
carefully applied in certain cases. When an alternative source of data was not 
available, we needed to adjust the time frame of our analysis. Hence, the 
periods of studies used when considering the relationship between public 
expenditure and economic growth in the second and the third chapters are 
different due to a lack of control variables, mainly in respect of labour force 
growth in early years. 
 In addition, econometric methods cannot always provide ideal solutions. 
The results presented using the Hausman test and the adjusted R2 often rely on 
marginal differences between the best and the second-best methods. The 
results of the disaggregated analysis between public expenditure and economic 
growth for groups of countries with different income levels, however, are 
presented using the two-way fixed effects model. They are then compared with 
instrumental estimates. Moreover, since unit root tests have low statistical 
power, we might falsely reject the null hypothesis of the unit root.  
 Lastly, the analysis of the relationship between telecommunication 
infrastructure and economic growth could have reverse causality and spurious 
correlation problems. We attempted to minimise these problems by using a 
simultaneous model for telecommunication investments and economic growth, 
and by applying country fixed effects. However, misspecifications may still 
cause the system estimators to be volatile, which may affect the estimates of all 
equations. An instrumental variables estimation might provide better estimates if 
we can find appropriate instruments. While taking stationarity and cointegration 
of equations into account, we then need to omit an equation for mobile 
infrastructure production from the model for mobile phones. By doing this, the 
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interpretation of estimated parameters in the demand and supply equations 
becomes less meaningful.  
 
Further studies 
 
Lastly, we look at further extension of these studies. 
 In the second chapter, the permanent growth effects of public 
expenditure by functions were examined. Each function of public expenditure in 
Study 1 combines current and capital expenditure. When considering different 
objectives of public consumption (current expenditure) and public investment 
(capital expenditure), public expenditure should be separated into current and 
capital expenditure where data is available. Moreover, further attempts to find 
an appropriate non-linear term for public spending might improve the accuracy 
of the estimates.  
 In Study 2, in the third chapter, government budget constraint is 
considered together with the growth effects of public expenditure. Our data is 
restricted to the period from 1991 to 2012, due to unavailability of data on 
labour. Alternative measures of labour might be used to extend the dataset to 
earlier years. 
 When considering the relationship between public spending and long-run 
level of GDP per capita in Study 3, our samples are restricted to a limited 
number of developing countries. Inclusion of more developing countries may 
give a more accurate interpretation of the results for this group of countries. 
 In the fourth chapter, simultaneous equations of telecommunication 
infrastructure and aggregate output were analysed. Our Study 4 includes fixed 
telephone and mobile telephone infrastructures. Consideration of broadband 
infrastructure and the interaction between these three different types of 
telecommunications infrastructure may generate systematically different results 
from previous studies. That could improve the practicality of policy 
recommendations for current situations.  
 Where possible, developing countries might be classified into middle- 
income and low-income countries. This classification would give an additional 
set of results for groups of countries with the same level of economic 
development. Moreover, countries in certain geographical areas may have 
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substantial numbers of common characteristics. Classification of countries 
according to geographical area could also generate distinct results. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Data of public expenditure and economic growth 
 
Apart from using growth rate of per capita GDP as a dependent variable, the 
analysis of the relationship between public expenditure and economic growth 
consists of the other two main sets of independent variables which are the set 
of fiscal variables and the set of non-fiscal control variables. This section 
explains how the data is collected and combined. The discussion is on fiscal 
variables, non-fiscal control variables, missing values and group of countries in 
our study (Study 1). 
 
1.1 Fiscal variables 
 
Fiscal variables consist of three main categories which are revenue, 
expenditure by function and expenditure by economic classification according to 
the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics (GFS). In this study, data for revenue 
and expenditure by function is mainly extracted from the online database of the 
UK data service. Since there are many levels of the government; the 
consolidated central government account is chosen for this study. Recent 
development in government accounting has improved the analytical framework 
especially for the change from the GFSM 1986 to the GFSM 2001. We will 
discuss on both the change in analytical framework of GFS and the issues 
regarding the methods for combining fiscal data. It is important to note that our 
revenue data bases on GFSM 2001, whereas data for functional public 
spending bases on both GFSM 1986 and GFSM 2001. Some adjustment to 
data of public spending by function is required and will be discussed.  
 
 1.1.1 The key differences between GFSM 1986 and GFSM 2001  
 
Wickens (2002) has shown the relationship between classification system of 
GFSM 1986 and GFSM 2001 as follows.  
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 Total revenue and grants in GFSM 1986 are classified to aggregate 
revenue, except for the sales of fixed capital assets, stocks, and land and 
intangible assets in GFSM 2001. The sales of fixed capital assets, stocks, and 
land and intangible assets are classified to the net acquisition of nonfinancial 
assets (disposals/sales) in GFSM 2001. 
 The GFSM 1986 aggregate total current expenditure and capital 
transfers are classified to the GFSM 2001 aggregate expense. The remainder 
of GFSM 1986 expenditure is classified to the GFSM 2001 net acquisition of 
nonfinancial assets (acquisitions/purchases). 
 The aggregate lending minus repayments in the GFSM 1986 is classified 
to the GFSM 2001 aggregate net acquisition of financial assets. 
 The GFSM 1986 aggregate financing is separated into two components: 
the financial assets are classified to the GFSM 2001 aggregate net acquisition 
of financial assets; the liabilities are classified to the GFSM 2001 aggregate net 
incurrence of liabilities.  
  
1.1.2 Cash and accrual basis reporting 
 
Transactions of government expenditure and revenue should be reported at the 
period of time close to payment stage (GFSM 1986). In cash basis, flows are 
reported when cash is received or disbursed. On the contrary, the flows are 
recorded at the time economic value is created in accrual basis (GFSM 2001).  
Cash basis reporting should be an appropriate representative of 
governments’ activities. Available datasets are also mostly in cash basis. 
Hence, the data of fiscal variables in this study is mainly from cash basis 
reporting. If the data from accrual basis is available where cash basis is not, the 
data from accrual basis would then be used. There are two ways of combining 
these two different sets of data. First, with some overlapping years between two 
strings of data, the existing cash basis data is combined with accrual basis data 
by using the growth rate of accrual ones. If there is no overlapping data, accrual 
basis data would be added to the existing pool of data from cash basis.   
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1.1.3 Budgetary central and consolidated central government 
  
In the case of developing countries, some countries report both at the level of 
budgetary central and consolidated central government. In such a case, two 
sets of data are combined by using the growth rate from the level of budgetary 
central government. Where consolidated central government data is not 
available, budgetary central government data would be simply added into the 
set of consolidated central government data. Data from recent years is also 
alternatively reported at the level of general government. 
 
1.1.4 Classification of outlays by functions of government 
  
The main differences between GFSM 1986 and GFSM 2001 classification for 
government outlays as pointed out by Wickens (2002) are as follows. 
 Firstly, a category of expenditure which is not classified by major group in 
GFSM 1986 is classified as a part of general public services category in GFSM 
2001. We have found that public debt transactions and transfers of a general 
character between different levels of government are additionally included into 
GFSM 2001. 
 Secondly, a new category of environment protection is added to GFSM 
2001. Some parts of environmental expenditure is included under housing and 
community amenity affairs and services spending in GFSM 1986. 
 Thirdly, transportation and communication spending in GFSM 1986 
cannot be separated into transport and communication categories. 
 Fourthly, housing and community affairs spending in GFSM 2001 
excludes the subcategory of sanity affairs and services including pollution 
abatement and control from GFSM 1986. This is re-classified to environmental 
protection. 
 Lastly, the GFSM 2001 classifies outlays on research and development 
as a separate group. In most GFSM 1986 divisions, expenditures on research 
and development are not identified separately. 
 The relevant changes that need to take into account into our data 
compilation relate to transportation and communication, and general public 
services spending. We combine transportation spending and communication 
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spending together as a category of spending. For general public services, we 
exclude public debt transactions and transfers from the series of our data. 
 
1.1.5 Combining data with alternative sources for high-income 
OECD countries 
  
The data from the other sources are also combined with the data from UK data 
service to fill up missing values of high-income OECD countries. There are two 
additional sources. First, the data from Gemmell et al. (2011) consists of data 
from 17 high-income OECD countries between 1972 and 2004. In their study, 
government revenue is reported as a share of GDP while public expenditure by 
function is reported as percentage of total spending. We combine our dataset 
with this set of data by using the ratios given in order to increase the number of 
observations for analysis. Secondly, some of the data in the most recent years 
is also combined from OECD statistics. 
 
1.2 Non-fiscal control variables 
 
The set of control variables are mainly extracted from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators’ (WDI) 2015 online database. Only the data of political 
instability index comes from the Center for Systemic Peace’s Coups d'Etat 
1946-2014 data. There are two control variables (school enrolment and political 
instability index) which are calculated by the author. 
 
1.2.1 School enrolment (PST) 
 
School enrolment is calculated by using a linear combination of the gross 
school enrolment at primary (GEP), secondary (GES) and tertiary (GET) level. 
The higher weight is given to the higher education level from 1 to 3 respectively 
following the method used in Bose et al. (2007). 
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1.2.2 Political instability index (PINST) 
  
Political instability index is calculated from the average number of successful 
coups (number of successful coups d’état that occurred in the year of record) 
and assassinations of executive (Indicator of the assassination of the ruling 
executive during the year of record). These two variables appear in the data set 
of Coups d’Etat 1946-2014 from Center for Systematic Peace. The method of 
calculation is mainly based on Bose et al. (2007). 
 
1.3 Missing values 
 
Combining different sets of data across countries is subject to significant loss of 
information especially at disaggregated level. Some of the gaps between two 
years are filled by using linear trend or interpolation. This is done by careful 
consideration regarding consistency with the variables at aggregate level for 
example, total revenue, total expenditure, productive expenditure, non-
productive expenditure and other expenditure - the summation of productive 
and non-productive expenditure must not exceed total spending. 
 
1.4 Groups of countries (Study 1) 
 
The countries are separated mainly into developing countries and high-income 
countries. The developing countries are the countries with either low income or 
middle income according to the definition of the World Bank. The set of OECD 
countries is a subset of high-income countries.   
The countries with minimal availability of revenue and expenditure by 
functions data are excluded from this analysis. The selected 75 countries (37 
developing countries, 38 high-income countries, 31 high-income OECD 
countries) in Table 2-1 (as shown in Chapter 2) are used in the analysis of 
Chapter 2. These groups of countries are referred to as Sample 1. 
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Appendix 2: Growth regressions with functional spending of Sample 1 
countries (1972-2012) 
 
The growth regressions with total, and transportation and communication 
spending are presented in Chapter 2. In this section, fiscal-growth relationship 
in the endogenous growth model of developing and high-income Sample 1 
countries are presented for general public services, defence, health, education 
and social welfare spending. 
 
2.1 Developing Sample 1 countries 
 
Growth regressions with functional spending of developing Sample 1 countries 
are illustrated in Table A1 to Table A5. The relationship between general public 
services, defence and health spending and per capita GDP growth of 
developing Sample 1 countries are insignificant. The linear specification has 
shown that an increase in education and social welfare spending may produce 
growth-diminisihing effect. The non-linear specification reveals that increased 
education spending can promote growth when the level of education spending 
is below 4% of GDP. 
 
2.2 High-income Sample 1 countries 
 
The estimates of high-income Sample 1 countries from Table A6 to Table A10 
show that defence and health spending are not significantly related to economic 
growth. An increase in general public services, education and social welfare 
spending can bring about adverse impacts on growth. The non-linear 
specification has shown that the square term of education spending is positive. 
An increase in education spending can enhance growth at its high level of 
spending. This may represent the primary role of the government in certain 
countries in providing educational service, while the other countries might 
provide this service privately. 
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Table A1: Growth regressions with general public services spending of developing Sample 1 
countries (1972-2012) 
Estimation method OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Dependent variable GR GR GR GR GR GR 
Endogenous variable   tax_gdp K tax_gdp K tax_gdp K tax_gdp K tax_gdp K 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Regressor b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
            
Initial GDP per capita -7.4984*** -6.5937*** -6.2010*** -7.2529*** -7.0119*** -6.9841*** 
(1.08) (1.13) (1.26) (1.16) (1.29) (1.29) 
Initial school enrolment -0.0325 -0.0507 -0.0447 -0.0430 -0.0414 -0.0229 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Initial life expectancy -1.9193 5.8027 10.2084** 10.2834** 14.0440*** 14.1979*** 
(4.60) (4.97) (5.02) (4.99) (5.04) (5.02) 
Gross capital formation (% of GDP) 0.2250*** 0.0895** 0.0754** 0.0491 0.0424 0.0437 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Taxes (% of GDP) -0.1576*** -0.1744*** -0.1656** -0.2253*** -0.3264*** -0.2981*** 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.11) 
Political instability -3.1600 -3.2656 -3.3409* -3.2560* -3.3615* -3.3902* 
(2.00) (1.99) (1.97) (1.96) (1.94) (1.94) 
M2 (% of GDP)     -0.0500***   -0.0316** -0.0345** 
    (0.02)   (0.02) (0.02) 
Trade (% of GDP)     0.0445***   0.0434*** 0.0404*** 
    (0.01)   (0.01) (0.01) 
Budget surplus (% of GDP)       0.3277*** 0.3912*** 0.4116*** 
      (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
General public services spending  -0.1040 -0.1461* -0.1491* 0.0576 0.0658 -0.0306 
(% of GDP) 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.23) 
Other spending (% of GDP)       0.0895* 0.1424** -0.0474 
      (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
Square term of general public            0.0062 
services spending (% of GDP) 
          (0.02) 
Square term of other spending           0.0030** 
(% of GDP) 
          (0.00) 
Number of observations 877 850 841 842 833 833 
       
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses below parameters 
***, **, * Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
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Table A2: Growth regressions with defence spending of developing Sample 1 countries  
(1972-2012) 
Estimation method OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Dependent variable GR GR GR GR GR GR 
Endogenous variable tax_gdp K tax_gdp K tax_gdp K tax_gdp K tax_gdp K 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Regressor b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Initial GDP per capita -7.0299*** -6.0890*** -5.5892*** -6.6283*** -6.2525*** -5.9496*** 
(1.08) (1.14) (1.29) (1.16) (1.34) (1.33) 
Initial school enrolment -0.0187 -0.0286 -0.0272 -0.0290 -0.0278 -0.0265 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Initial life expectancy -7.1914 3.4188 8.0947 9.1693* 12.7863** 10.9804** 
(4.51) (4.95) (4.97) (5.11) (5.11) (5.21) 
Gross capital formation (% of GDP) 0.2575*** 0.0975** 0.0808** 0.0572 0.0467 0.0592 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Taxes (% of GDP) -0.1234** -0.1063 -0.0616 -0.1477* -0.2040* -0.1149 
(0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.12) (0.13) 
Political instability -2.9319 -3.1098 -3.2059* -3.0701 -3.2521* -3.1181* 
(1.92) (1.92) (1.89) (1.91) (1.89) (1.87) 
M2 (% of GDP) -0.0586*** -0.0424*** -0.0500*** 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Trade (% of GDP) 0.0498*** 0.0487*** 0.0455*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Budget surplus (% of GDP) 0.2664*** 0.2993*** 0.3040*** 
(0.06) (0.08) (0.08) 
Defence spending (% of GDP) 0.0028 0.0033 -0.0217 0.1094 0.0775 -0.2304 
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.33) 
Other spending (% of GDP) 0.0515 0.0971 -0.1407 
(0.05) (0.07) (0.07) 
Square term of defence spending  0.0224 
(% of GDP) 
(0.02) 
Square term of other spending  0.0035*** 
(% of GDP) 
(0.00) 
Number of observations 865 836 827 829 820 820 
       
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses below parameters 
***, **, * Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
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Table A3: Growth regressions with education spending of developing Sample 1 countries  
(1972-2012) 
Estimation method OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Dependent variable GR GR GR GR GR GR 
Endogenous variable   tax_gdp K tax_gdp K tax_gdp K tax_gdp K tax_gdp K 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Regressor b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
            
Initial GDP per capita -6.9974*** -6.4004*** -6.0992*** -6.9048*** -6.7969*** -6.8248*** 
(1.05) (1.10) (1.23) (1.13) (1.26) (1.24) 
Initial school enrolment 0.0237 0.0081 0.0048 -0.0021 -0.0049 -0.0121 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Initial life expectancy -8.2336* -0.3805 4.4742 5.8958 9.8582* 5.6326 
(4.47) (4.86) (4.96) (4.96) (5.06) (5.24) 
Gross capital formation 0.2620*** 0.1240*** 0.1033*** 0.0795** 0.0663* 0.0963** 
(% of GDP) 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Taxes (% of GDP) -0.0254 -0.0548 -0.0554 -0.1240 -0.2273** -0.2139** 
(0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) 
Political instability -3.2981* -3.3594* -3.4017* -3.3538* -3.4133* -3.3389* 
(1.95) (1.94) (1.93) (1.92) (1.91) (1.88) 
M2 (% of GDP)     -0.0481***   -0.0305* -0.0417*** 
    (0.02)   (0.02) (0.02) 
Trade (% of GDP)     0.0390***   0.0395*** 0.0409*** 
    (0.01)   (0.01) (0.01) 
Budget surplus (% of GDP)       0.3091*** 0.3692*** 0.4079*** 
      (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
Education spending (% of GDP) -1.0842*** -0.8455*** -0.6885*** -0.6538*** -0.4340* 0.7325* 
(0.19) (0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0.23) (0.44) 
Other spending (% of GDP)       0.0840* 0.1285** 0.0287 
      (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
Square term of education           -0.0966*** 
spending (% of GDP) 
          (0.03) 
Square term of other spending           0.0013 
(% of GDP) 
          (0.00) 
Number of observations 888 858 849 851 842 842 
       
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses below parameters 
***, **, * Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
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Table A4: Growth regressions with healthcare spending of developing Sample 1 countries  
(1972-2012) 
Estimation method OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Dependent variable GR GR GR GR GR GR 
Endogenous variable tax_gdp K tax_gdp K tax_gdp K tax_gdp K tax_gdp K 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Regressor b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Initial GDP per capita -7.6059*** -6.6595*** -6.2702*** -7.1528*** -7.0168*** -6.7076*** 
(1.08) (1.13) (1.25) (1.16) (1.27) (1.27) 
Initial school enrolment -0.0216 -0.0330 -0.0287 -0.0388 -0.0328 -0.0367 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Initial life expectancy -1.7608 4.9917 9.0692* 10.8935** 14.3095*** 14.3229*** 
(4.53) (4.94) (4.99) (4.97) (5.01) (4.97) 
Gross capital formation (% of GDP) 0.2297*** 0.0949** 0.0789** 0.0513 0.0461 0.0545 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Taxes (% of GDP) -0.1196** -0.1368** -0.1292* -0.1998** -0.2912*** -0.2856*** 
(0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) 
Political instability -3.0662 -3.1523 -3.2433* -3.1779 -3.2943* -3.1886* 
(1.99) (1.98) (1.96) (1.95) (1.93) (1.92) 
M2 (% of GDP) -0.0510*** -0.0314** -0.0335** 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Trade (% of GDP) 0.0435*** 0.0435*** 0.0370*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Budget surplus (% of GDP) 0.3276*** 0.3932*** 0.4310*** 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
Health spending (% of GDP) -0.3441 -0.2291 -0.1561 -0.0733 -0.0765 1.2339* 
(0.22) (0.23) (0.23) (0.24) (0.23) (0.72) 
Other spending (% of GDP) 0.0868* 0.1379** -0.0456 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
Square term of health spending  -0.1997* 
(% of GDP) 
(0.11) 
Square term of other spending  0.0025** 
(% of GDP) 
(0.00) 
Number of observations 883 854 845 847 838 838 
       
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses below parameters 
***, **, * Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
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Table A5: Growth regressions with social welfare spending of developing Sample 1 countries  
(1972-2012) 
Estimation method OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Dependent variable GR GR GR GR GR GR 
Endogenous variable tax_gdp K tax_gdp K tax_gdp K tax_gdp K tax_gdp K 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Regressor b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Initial GDP per capita -8.0379*** -7.0533*** -6.7972*** -7.6455*** -7.4726*** -7.3176*** 
(1.14) (1.19) (1.32) (1.22) (1.34) (1.36) 
Initial school enrolment -0.0011 -0.0165 -0.0133 -0.0263 -0.0194 -0.0129 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Initial life expectancy -1.1245 5.7779 10.0005** 11.7502** 14.8318*** 14.3363*** 
(4.56) (4.97) (5.03) (4.99) (5.05) (5.06) 
Gross capital formation (% of GDP) 0.2211*** 0.0874** 0.0724* 0.0435 0.0382 0.0349 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Taxes (% of GDP) -0.1154** -0.1332** -0.1136 -0.2028** -0.2906*** -0.2671** 
(0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) 
Political instability -3.1242 -3.1953 -3.3151* -3.2690* -3.3985* -3.4415* 
(2.01) (2.00) (1.98) (1.97) (1.95) (1.95) 
M2 (% of GDP) -0.0522*** -0.0336** -0.0357** 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Trade (% of GDP) 0.0438*** 0.0430*** 0.0403*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Budget surplus (% of GDP) 0.3365*** 0.3974*** 0.4210*** 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
Social welfare spending (% of GDP) -0.2603** -0.2338** -0.2033* -0.1189 -0.0540 -0.1444 
(0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.25) 
Other spending (% of GDP) 0.1045** 0.1507** 0.0284 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
Square term of social welfare  0.0070 
spending (% of GDP) 
(0.02) 
Square term of other spending  0.0018* 
(% of GDP) 
(0.00) 
Number of observations 865 836 827 829 820 820 
       
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses below parameters 
***, **, * Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
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Table A6: Growth regressions with general public services spending of high-income  
Sample 1 countries (1972-2012) 
Estimation method OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Dependent variable GR GR GR GR GR GR 
Endogenous variable   tax_gdp K tax_gdp K tax_gdp K tax_gdp K tax_gdp K 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Regressor b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
            
Initial GDP per capita -8.0013*** -5.9576*** -5.7212*** -5.3546*** -5.3431*** -5.2597*** 
(0.81) (0.93) (1.02) (0.97) (1.07) (1.10) 
Initial school enrolment 0.0455*** 0.0089 0.0045 0.0223 0.0120 0.0215 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Initial life expectancy 12.9498* 27.5329*** 30.2415*** 24.4433*** 26.4417*** 25.3618*** 
(7.58) (8.60) (9.16) (8.51) (9.05) (9.18) 
Gross capital formation 0.3988*** 0.0496 0.0435 0.0088 0.0200 0.0048 
(% of GDP) 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Taxes (% of GDP) -0.0664* -0.1036** -0.0715 0.0101 -0.0862 -0.1229 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) 
Political instability 2.0231 2.2330 2.6227 2.5377 3.1055 3.5557 
(2.38) (2.53) (2.57) (2.50) (2.53) (2.55) 
M2 (% of GDP)     -0.0148***   -0.0114** -0.0130*** 
    (0.00)   (0.00) (0.00) 
Trade (% of GDP)     0.0283***   0.0278*** 0.0216** 
    (0.01)   (0.01) (0.01) 
Budget surplus (% of GDP)       0.0225 0.1113 0.1327* 
      (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
General public services spending -0.1495*** -0.1350** -0.1714** -0.1791*** -0.1311* -0.1014 
(% of GDP) 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.21) 
Other spending (% of GDP)       -0.1300** -0.0457 -0.2914*** 
      (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
         Square term of general public         -0.0063 
services spending (% of GDP) 
          (0.02) 
        Square term of other spending          0.0034*** 
(% of GDP) 
          (0.00) 
Number of observations 1088 1071 896 1062 887 887 
       
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses below parameters 
***, **, * Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
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Table A7: Growth regressions with defence spending of high-income Sample 1 countries  
(1972-2012) 
Estimation method OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Dependent variable GR GR GR GR GR GR 
Endogenous variable   tax_gdp K tax_gdp K tax_gdp K tax_gdp K tax_gdp K 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Regressor b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
            
Initial GDP per capita -7.8929*** -5.7940*** -5.6477*** -5.1483*** -5.0326*** -4.8794*** 
(0.81) (0.92) (1.01) (0.93) (1.05) (1.07) 
Initial school enrolment 0.0419** 0.0024 -0.0036 0.0174 0.0058 0.0110 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Initial life expectancy 12.5183 27.6030*** 30.1135*** 25.8293*** 27.6230*** 26.0941*** 
(7.62) (8.63) (9.19) (8.49) (9.07) (9.22) 
Gross capital formation 0.3990*** 0.0506 0.0535 -0.0021 0.0111 0.0005 
(% of GDP) 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Taxes (% of GDP) -0.0899** -0.1569** -0.1344* -0.0557 -0.1438 -0.1632 
(0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) 
Political instability 1.8649 2.2449 2.6679 3.1413 3.4652 3.6832 
(2.40) (2.55) (2.59) (2.50) (2.55) (2.56) 
M2 (% of GDP)     -0.0159***   -0.0131*** -0.0136*** 
    (0.00)   (0.00) (0.00) 
Trade (% of GDP)     0.0317***   0.0226** 0.0214** 
    (0.01)   (0.01) (0.01) 
Budget surplus (% of GDP)       -0.0016 0.0909 0.1105 
      (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
Defence spending (% of GDP) -0.0606 0.0532 0.0139 0.1818* 0.1682 -0.0557 
(0.07) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.26) 
Other spending (% of GDP)       -0.1893*** -0.0994 -0.2160* 
      (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
          Square term of defence spending         0.0066 
                           (% of GDP) 
          (0.01) 
            Square term of other spending         0.0018 
(% of GDP) 
          (0.00) 
Number of observations 1091 1073 898 1064 889 889 
       
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses below parameters 
***, **, * Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
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Table A8: Growth regressions with education spending of high-income Sample 1 countries  
(1972-2012) 
Estimation method OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Dependent variable GR GR GR GR GR GR 
Endogenous variable   tax_gdp K tax_gdp K tax_gdp K tax_gdp K tax_gdp K 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Regressor b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
              
Initial GDP per capita -8.1251*** -5.7662*** -5.5448*** -5.4960*** -5.4312*** -4.6895*** 
(0.81) (0.93) (1.01) (0.93) (1.02) (1.08) 
Initial school enrolment 0.0416** 0.0084 0.0082 0.0256 0.0161 0.0199 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Initial life expectancy 15.8522** 26.4482*** 28.9747*** 22.9938*** 25.6656*** 21.7974** 
(7.60) (8.64) (9.11) (8.50) (8.97) (9.11) 
Gross capital formation 0.3997*** 0.0642 0.0699 0.0341 0.0537 0.0294 
(% of GDP) 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
Taxes (% of GDP) -0.1114*** -0.1064** -0.0846 0.0145 -0.1023 -0.1112 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.09) (0.11) (0.12) 
Political instability 1.9854 1.9950 2.5756 2.0956 2.9266 3.3740 
(2.37) (2.54) (2.57) (2.50) (2.52) (2.54) 
M2 (% of GDP)     -0.0187***   -0.0151*** -0.0147*** 
    (0.00)   (0.00) (0.00) 
Trade (% of GDP)     0.0217**   0.0224** 0.0182** 
    (0.01)   (0.01) (0.01) 
Budget surplus (% of GDP)       0.0216 0.1196* 0.1010 
      (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
Education spending (% of GDP) -0.0681 -0.2825** -0.5195*** -0.2195* -0.4056** -1.1827*** 
(0.10) (0.12) (0.16) (0.11) (0.16) (0.39) 
Other spending (% of GDP)       -0.1278** -0.0251 -0.1775** 
      (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
         Square term of education spending         0.0844** 
(% of GDP) 
          (0.04) 
            Square term of other spending         0.0017* 
(% of GDP) 
          (0.00) 
Number of observations 1094 1078 903 1069 894 894 
       
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses below parameters 
***, **, * Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
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Table A9: Growth regressions with healthcare spending of high-income Sample 1 countries  
(1972-2012) 
Estimation method OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Dependent variable GR GR GR GR GR GR 
Endogenous variable tax_gdp K tax_gdp K tax_gdp K tax_gdp K tax_gdp K 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Regressor b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Initial GDP per capita -7.5490*** -5.7314*** -5.9952*** -5.2610*** -5.6562*** -5.5071*** 
(0.79) (0.89) (1.00) (0.90) (1.02) (1.05) 
Initial school enrolment 0.0355** 0.0041 0.0049 0.0190 0.0216 0.0280 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Initial life expectancy 13.5807* 26.0767*** 29.5981*** 24.5194*** 26.7204*** 24.8865*** 
(7.43) (8.36) (9.19) (8.20) (9.04) (9.14) 
Gross capital formation  0.3938*** 0.0763* 0.0863* 0.0336 0.0503 0.0319 
(% of GDP) 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
Taxes (% of GDP) -0.0566 -0.1016** -0.0980* 0.0083 -0.0599 -0.1085 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) 
Political instability 1.9198 1.9242 2.4021 2.2133 2.7809 3.2777 
(2.33) (2.46) (2.57) (2.41) (2.52) (2.54) 
M2 (% of GDP) -0.0192*** -0.0152*** -0.0157*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Trade (% of GDP) 0.0319*** 0.0310*** 0.0271*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Budget surplus (% of GDP) 0.0617 0.1098 0.1230* 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
Health spending (% of GDP) -0.1372* -0.1043 0.1051 -0.1113 0.1586 0.3071 
(0.08) (0.09) (0.12) (0.10) (0.13) (0.26) 
Other spending (% of GDP) -0.1088** -0.0620 -0.2293*** 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
            Square term of health spending  -0.0139 
(% of GDP) 
(0.02) 
             Square term of other spending  0.0021*** 
(% of GDP) 
(0.00) 
Number of observations 1094 1077 903 1068 894 894 
       
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses below parameters 
***, **, * Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
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Table A10: Growth regressions with social welfare spending of high-income Sample 1 countries  
(1972-2012) 
Estimation method OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Dependent variable GR GR GR GR GR GR 
Endogenous variable tax_gdp K tax_gdp K tax_gdp K tax_gdp K tax_gdp K 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Regressor b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Initial GDP per capita -7.7152*** -5.4616*** -5.2695*** -5.2553*** -5.3534*** -5.3540*** 
(0.80) (0.93) (1.03) (0.94) (1.04) (1.06) 
Initial school enrolment 0.0466*** 0.0169 0.0106 0.0257 0.0130 0.0137 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Initial life expectancy 13.8981* 32.0380*** 35.1883*** 28.8162*** 32.4511*** 33.4681*** 
(7.58) (8.80) (9.37) (8.66) (9.23) (9.30) 
Gross capital formation 0.3603*** -0.0687 -0.0726 -0.0647 -0.0547 -0.0555 
(% of GDP) 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
Taxes (% of GDP) -0.0605* -0.0383 -0.0156 0.0008 -0.0960 -0.0803 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) 
Political instability 1.9776 2.3716 2.8629 2.2954 2.9887 2.8497 
(2.38) (2.58) (2.61) (2.53) (2.56) (2.57) 
M2 (% of GDP) -0.0103** -0.0091* -0.0074 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Trade (% of GDP) 0.0208** 0.0229*** 0.0251*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Budget surplus (% of GDP) 0.0249 0.1004 0.1032 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
Social welfare spending (% of GDP) -0.1954*** -0.4780*** -0.5145*** -0.4634*** -0.4313*** -0.5475*** 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.20) 
Other spending (% of GDP) -0.0608 0.0259 0.0802 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
        Square term of social welfare spending 0.0042 
(% of GDP) 
(0.01) 
            Square term of other spending -0.0008 
(% of GDP) 
(0.00) 
Number of observations 1095 1078 903 1069 894 894 
       
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses below parameters 
***, **, * Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
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Appendix 3: Choosing appropriate estimator for relationship between 
long-run GDP per capita and public spending 
 
Using the pooled mean group (PMG) estimator, the long-run coefficients are 
constrained to be equal across countries. Blackburne and Frank (2007) claim 
that pooling across different panels, yields efficient and consistent estimates 
only when the restrictions are true. However, the hypothesis of slope 
homogeneity is often empirically rejected. In this case, the pooled mean group 
estimates become inconsistent. On the contrary, the mean group (MG) 
estimates, which permits long-run heterogeneity, are still consistent. 
 For this reason, the Hausman test is implemented to test the difference 
in these models. If the null hypothesis is not rejected, the PMG estimator is 
preferred to the MG estimator. Otherwise, the assumption of long-run 
homogeneity is violated. The following tables present the results of the 
Hausman test for developing Sample 3 countries and high-income OECD 
Sample 3 countries. We focus on the regression looking at the impact of an 
increase in total spending on long-run GDP level subsidised by different implicit 
financing elements. 
 
3.1 Developing Sample 3 countries 
 
The comparison between the pooled mean group and the mean group 
estimates is possible only in the case of budget deficit financing. The result has 
shown that the null hypothesis of long-run homogeneity cannot be rejected (see 
Table A11).  
 
Table A11: The Hausman test for long-run homogeneity for developing Sample 3 
countries (Study 3) 
 Budget surplus Dist. taxes Non-dist. taxes Dist/non-dist taxes 
Chi-square 1.91 -30.13 -4.87 -4.75 
p-value 0.86 - - - 
 
Note: The null hypothesis is that PMG is preferred to MG estimates 
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3.2 High-income OECD Sample 3 countries 
 
For high-income OECD Sample 3 countries, the pooled mean group estimates 
are preferred to the mean-group estimates regardless of the selection of implicit 
financing element (see Table A12).  
 
Table A12: The Hausman test for long-run homogeneity for high-income OECD Sample 3  
countries (Study 3) 
 Budget surplus Dist. taxes Non-dist. taxes Dist/non-dist taxes 
Chi-square 6.73 3.31 6.66 3.36 
p-value 0.24 0.65 0.25 0.50 
 
Note: The null hypothesis is that PMG is preferred to MG estimates 
 
As a result, the Hausman test suggests that pooled mean group estimate 
is preferred to mean group estimate. The assumption of long-run homogeneity 
is satisfied using data from our Sample 3 countries. 
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